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Abstract
The Indian legal system has been dealing with the problem of domestic violence in
the recent years especially since the advent of the new legislation the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, which was brought into effect from the 26th of
August, 2006. The original contribution that this thesis makes to knowledge is that it
identifies a potential category of users of this law- Women in Unconventional
Relationships (WUR), and tests the support systems and the ease of access available
to this category of women within two different domestic violence frameworks in
India. This thesis locates the constructions of transgressive WUR identities in history,
society and theoretical discourse and investigates whether these constructions
adversely affect their legal subjectivity under the domestic violence law in India.
It locates WUR within the domestic violence framework in Delhi, named the Victim
Model for the purposes of this research, and within the Survivor Model in Mumbai. It
privileges the voices of ten WUR who articulate their experiences of survival,
domestic violence and the law. The research uses a combination of inter-subjective
reflexive research and a feminist analysis of the domestic violence framework. The
constructions of identities and the levels of transgression that take place and its effects
on survivor/victim legal agency are investigated. The thesis identifies the best
domestic violence framework suited for WUR which encourages their rights-bearing
capacity as full-fledged citizens of the Indian state.
INTRODUCTION
‘I had a good ghar sansaar. My husband was a good kind man and I have a
beautiful child with him. His only flaw was that he could not provide for us
financially. I left my husband for a man who is nine years younger than me.
He took me home with a promise of marriage. We lived together for six years
out of which I supported him for four. He was physically violent towards me
to the extent to rendering me completely blind in one eye and partially in the
other. He went back to his village and got married to someone else. I have had
four eye surgeries. I have given up on my Izzat and now I will fight till justice
is mine in heaven and on earth.’
Sarla, 42, WUR, Mumbai
1. International Context
Feminism has identified violence against women (VAW) as one of the major barriers
to the realisation of women’s welfare and human rights (Gordon, 1986; Schneider,
1990; Mohanty and Russo, 1991; Dutton, 2001). VAW has been globally recognised
as an issue of international and national concern. This is evident from the various
recommendations on VAW by the resolutions on violence against women of the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) (UN, 2009). In the eighth session in 1989 the CEDAW committee
recommended that states should include in their reports information on violence
against women and on the measures introduced to deal with it. In its tenth session in
1991 the committee decided to allocate part of the eleventh session to the study of
2violence against women and sexual harassment and exploitation of women. It also
decided to discuss Article 6 and related Articles of the convention dealing with VAW.
This was the topic chosen in anticipation of the 1993 world conference on Human
Rights of the general assembly by the resolution 45/155 of 18th December 1990 (U.N.,
2010). General Recommendation number 19 of the eleventh session of CEDAW held
in 1992 dealt with VAW. The committee recommended that the signatory parties
should take appropriate steps to eliminate gender-based discrimination by private and
public acts. State parties were recommended to give adequate legal protection to
ensure the welfare of women in the context of family violence and abuse. It was also
recommended that research and compilation of statistics on the extent, causes and
effects of violence and on the effectiveness of the measures taken to prevent and deal
with such violence (U.N., 2009). The resolution specifically recommended gender-
sensitisation and training of judges and legal officers dealing with cases of family
violence. Finally, the general recommendation recognised gender based violence as a
kind of discrimination that hampers women’s ability to enjoy their rights and freedom
as equal to men.
The committee concluded that some other reports of the state parties did not show the
connection between the discrimination against women, gender based violence,
fundamental freedoms and human rights violations. For its full implementation, the
convention required state parties to take positive steps to eliminate all forms of
violence against women. It was suggested to the states that they should inculcate the
comments of the committee concerning gender based violence in reviewing their laws
and policies and in their reports to the committee. The UN Commission on Human
3Rights in resolution 1994/45 adopted on 4th March 1994, decided to appoint a special
rapporteur on VAW in order to identify its causes and consequences (U.N., 2011).
This was further extended by the commission in 2003 in resolution 2003/45. It
recognised in this resolution as well, that VAW constitutes a violation of human rights
and fundamental freedoms of women and curtails the enjoyment of such freedoms and
rights (UN, 2012).
2. Indian Scenario
VAW has been dealt with differently by various countries, adhering to CEDAW
recommendations. While DV has become an international issue, the Indian women’s
movement has followed its own route to the recognition of DV. The following is an
account of how it finally arrived at a comprehensive law dealing with domestic
violence. VAW has been an axis around which women’s groups in India have
negotiated a needs-based gender equality movement in India. The first VAW
campaigns in India that focused on dowry murders and custodial rape brought both to
‘sustained public attention through a combination of strategies like media exposure,
public interest litigation, demonstrations and protests and lobbying for legal reform’
(Kannabiran and Menon, 2006:6). Dowry is the gift given by parents of a bride to the
newlyweds. Due to many cases of harassment and murders by grooms and their
families for dowry, it has been banned in India by the Anti-Dowry legislation- Dowry
Prohibition Act (Act 28 of 1961). This custom however continues unchecked in parts
of India (Menski, 1998; Palkar 2003). A lot of research in India has focused on the
4links between dowry and domestic violence (Mullender, 1996; Fernandez, 1997; Rao,
2000; Panda and Agarwal, 2005; Srinivasan, 2007, Gangoli, 2011). This thesis
focuses on the gap identified within the research, which is the links between intimate
relationships without the legitimacy of marriage and domestic violence.
Thus the landmark victories of the women’s movement include the Dowry Prohibition
(Amendment) Act 1984 and the addition of several new sections to the Indian Penal
Code, the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act. These
new sections made significant advances on earlier provisions regarding rape in these
laws, by recognising the importance of withholding the victim’s name in published
reports, redefining consent, criminalising custodial rape, recognising forced
intercourse with a separated wife as rape (Kannabiran, 2006). The most important
shifts as regards evidence have been the inversion of the ‘innocent until proven
guilty’ principle in rape trials and the new section 114 A of the Evidence Act
according to which if a woman states that she did not consent to sexual intercourse,
the court would presume this in her favour. Thus in effect, the debates on VAW in
post-colonial India have centred on the problem of dowry deaths in the ‘private’ and
state-perpetrated violence in the ‘public’ (Baxi, 2006; Jaising, 2006; Kannabiran and
Menon, 2006). Two main gaps were however identified by the Women’s Movement.
The first was the failure to incorporate marital rape into the amendments and the
second was the failure to frame a comprehensive law on domestic violence.
5Until the year 2006, there has been no mention of the phrase ‘domestic violence’ in
Indian legislation. Through a sustained campaign aimed at legislative and judicial
reform, the women’s movement in India succeeded in moving the houses of
parliament to pass a comprehensive Act dealing with domestic violence in October
2006. The first serious attempt to draft a bill on domestic violence was by an NGO
called the Lawyers Collective in 1992. After this bill was circulated amongst
women’s group, the National Commission for Women (NCW) came forth with its
own draft in 1994. By now, it was agreed that it was a gender specific harm and that
the government was reluctant to encroach the sanctity of the home and make
legislation that was potentially home-breaking. In 1999, the Lawyers Collective
drafted a new bill in accordance with the UN Framework for Model Legislation on
Domestic Violence which finally won the support of many women’s groups (Jaising,
2002). The first bill introduced by the government in the parliament was the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Bill 2001. Jaising (2002) called the
bill ‘flawed from its inception’ because of its requirement of ‘habitual assault’ by the
partner, to constitute domestic violence. This definition did not receive the support of
women’s groups.
The bill that finally became the law was the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 (DVA) with effect from the 26th of October 2006. The new
legislation meets the requirements of the CEDAW prescription regarding domestic
violence. It is a gender specific law dealing with emotional, sexual, verbal, economic
and physical violence within the four walls of a home. It has been appreciated as
6landmark legislation with several progressive features including the definition of the
aggrieved person (AP), the concept of shared household and the definition of violence
not merely restricted to the physical aspect. The central government published the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules (DVR) in 2006 in order to meet
the requirements of the DVA that demands greater governmental participation and
budgetary allocation for the implementation of the new legislation. The DVR deals
with the appointment of the authorities prescribed by the DVA, the procedural
requirements of the DVA and with the consequences of the breach of its provisions
(C.S.R., 2010).
3. Statement of Problem
It is in this crucial phase in the development of VAW law in India that the research
has been undertaken. The aim of this research is to identify and trace the use of law by
women in unconventional relationships that are or have been violent. This research
will also look at the constructions of identities of Indian womanhood by the law and
how the women in unconventional relationships (WUR) fare as users of the law, as a
result of or in spite of these constructed identities. The thesis thus critiques the DV
law in India in the context of WUR in the light of the different identities that the law
gives women and the resultant complex legal subject positioning of such women. The
thesis will rely on post-colonial feminist theories, particularly in the legal context.
The thesis will also show that there is an inherent exclusion in the word ‘domestic’ in
the Indian context. The ‘domestic’ sphere in the context of this thesis refers to a
7familial space legitimised by marriage. India being predominantly a patriarchal
society, women are protected within this sphere. The Indian society, bound by
tradition and cultural values is reluctant to accept the sexual independence of women
outside of a marriage. Sexuality outside of the domestic sphere is ‘illegitimate’ as far
as society is concerned. Thus women who are sexually active outside of this
legitimate sphere often find themselves without credibility in the eyes of the law. The
term ‘domestic’ implies a space that is often alien and unavailable to women who do
not have the legitimacy of marriage.
In the context of India, the domestic sphere is the space within which the family unit
exists and the essential precursor of such a family is a socially recognised marriage.
The importance of marriage in the Indian society is perhaps best evident from
Jaising’s (2010) reference to divorce as a ‘civil suicide’ for women. According to Puri
(1999) there is a link between the ‘Indian stereotypes of womanhood, gender and
sexuality’ and the ‘Indian cultural identity’. In social relationships there seems to be
almost a ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ and men and women are expected to live
together as ‘husband and wife in clearly defined roles’ (Puri, 1999). Ganesh (2006)
argues that ‘jori’ or the notion of a two-person identity of a married couple in India
beyond which patriarchy dictates that the woman’s identity is weaker and more
vulnerable to social disapproval. Thus women who are in unconventional
relationships are deemed to be less worthy of the law’s protection.
8The thesis adopts the concept of women in unconventional relationships (WUR).
WUR is used because there are many categories of ‘single’ women- such as
unmarried women, second and third wives, women betrayed into false marriages. It is
used to refer to all such women who are not in ‘socially sanctioned’ marriages, with
the acknowledgment that there are several different categories of such relationships.
The study is restricted to women in heterosexual relationships and this is the point of
departure of WUR from the ‘ekal nari’, used by Bachchetta in 1980 to refer to single
women in lesbian relationships in Delhi (Menon, 2007). According to Menon
‘lesbians, celibates, ascetics, unmarried and divorced women, widows’ can be
included within this term because they all have ‘disrupted patriarchal geneologies’
(2007: 15). The term WUR however is the category identified for this thesis because
it has various sub-categories of single women in relationships with married men,
married women in second relationships and other relationships that may be perceived
by the society as morally transgressive.
WUR in India are disadvantaged in many ways when compared with women who
have the legitimacy of marriage. Culturally and socially the idea of a woman
cohabiting with a man ‘taboo’ and such relationships are often not recognised by the
society and as a consequence by social institutions. The mention of intimate
relationships between unmarried people is absent in religious texts (Srivastava, 2009).
When relationships are not socially sanctioned and are considered social crimes, a
‘criminal’ could not possibly raise her voice when violence occurs in such a
relationship (Srivastava, 2009: 46).
9There are various intersecting links between class, caste, religion and violence against
WUR (Talwar-Oldenberg, 2001; Menon, 2005; Gangoli and Westmarland, 2011).
Related to the concept of shame and honour, middle class women in marriages or
virtuous/ virginal women are more likely to be believed than women who belong to
minorities or those who belong to the working class (Gangoli and Westmarland,
2011). Shame can also be experienced individually by a victim of sexual violence
(Gangoli et al, 2006). In India the concept of shame is associated with any form of
sexual activity outside of a legitimate marriage. This thesis whilst taking into
consideration the links between caste, religion class and violence against WUR
narrows its focus down to the category WUR as a group of women (far from
homogenous) have been in violent heterosexual relationships and are in one way or
the other familial or societal outcastes because of their moral choices. It also
acknowledges the existence of violence in same sex couples but finds its focus in
violent heterosexual intimate relationships.
4. Objectives and Specific Research Questions
It is in the midst of debates and controversies surrounding the new legislation on
domestic violence in India that this research has been undertaken. The thesis
investigates the support systems and legal options available to WUR that are facing
violence, within two very different domestic violence frameworks in India- set in
10
Delhi and in Mumbai. It acknowledges that similar frameworks can exist in both
Delhi and Mumbai and it other cities but the choice of the organisations gives it the
Survivor/Victim dichotomy bearing which is central to this thesis. It investigates the
various constructions of the identities of WUR and tests how these constructs affect
WUR in accessing the law. It explores how WUR emerge as a category of users of the
law in spite of the hurdles they are faced with. It is based on the presumption that
women’s sexual and transgressive identities deeply affect their subjectivity within the
law.
The specific questions that this thesis seeks to answer are to what extent are identities
constructed for WUR within the law and how do the provisions of the DVA and
related laws address the issues relating to WUR? How do these constructed identities
of WUR affect their subjectivity within the DV law in India?
Engle Merry (2003; 2006) identified two different approaches to domestic violence
framework- the legal advocacy method and the social work method. The different
ways in which international human rights ideals are translated to the local happen in
two different ways. One is the legal advocacy approach by which lawyers and legal
institutions work for and advocate the cause of victims of domestic violence. The
other is the social work approach which works on giving the victims adequate support
in order to encourage victim activism and to support their agentive rights. She
established in her research on battered women that women take on rights in different
ways when they encounter the authorities within a domestic violence framework. The
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presumption in my research is that the approach in Delhi because of its proximity to
the drafters and the legal institutions will be closer to the law as a tool method with
intermediary institutions structuring the understanding of WUR as victims. The other
approach represented by Mumbai is more likely to understand WUR as survivors. The
thesis contributes to knowledge by developing Merry’s understanding of these
approaches in the light of WUR in India.
The final question to be addressed here is to what extent do the WUR as transgressors
become victims or survivors within the law. The thesis will also show that although
WUR are not expressly excluded by the definition of victim in the new domestic
violence legislation, traditional norms and perceptions of Indian act as hindrances in
allowing women to access legal help and support within the system. The law also
seems to demand that the women can access it only by transgressing the private. After
this the law comes to the aid. Thus the law seems to be reluctant to enter the ‘sacred
space’ of the private.
It has been argued that it is within the ‘realm of sexually experiencing themselves as
sexual beings, women create a free space of their own’ and that ‘every time a woman
recognises her body as her own, she takes a step outside imprisoning ideological
boundaries that restrict her’ (Franco, Macwan and Ramnathan 2007: 161). The thesis
will extend this argument to WUR and their ability to assume legal agency on their
own behalf and for others. WUR, who have thus transgressed norms, are in an
awkward legal position. Their transgression has both negative and positive
12
ramifications. On the one hand, they have managed to break away from the rigid and
often forced identities that society and the law have constructed for them. On the
other hand, it becomes difficult for them, as transgressors of such norms to go back to
seeking law’s protection in troubled times of violence. They are often deemed as less
worthy subjects of the law and struggle more with reclaiming their legal agency.
The thesis explores this uneasy relationship between WUR and the law. Its frame
work will provide a way of thinking about WUR, intimate partner violence and the
law. In going to the law, WUR take on a new subject position, thus redefining the
norm in dominant discourses and social practices. The thesis will argue that WUR
rupture ideological strongholds when they transgress the ‘Izzat’ (honour) boundary
and access the law.
5. Methodology
The study relies on post-colonial legal feminist theories to critique the DV law in the
context of WUR. It combines different methods to situate WUR within the DV
framework. The first involves a textual analysis of the DVA and the broader VAW
laws with WUR as the subject and focal point of the enquiry. This is complemented
by a fieldwork analysis involving qualitative research methods to find the WUR
through their engagement with the law. Two sites are used to identify the institutional
differences in the relationship between law and WUR in the context of DV. The
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fieldwork was carried out in Delhi and Mumbai, both being major sites of feminist
legal activism in India (Kumar, 1989; Agnes, 1992; Sen, 2000).
It combines inter-subjective reflexive feminist research (Klien, 1983; Wolfe, 1996)
with a feminist legal analysis of the DV framework in the context of WUR. It
privileges the voices of ten WUR who tell their stories of violence and their
consequent encounter with the law. The research relies on library and archival
research. It uses the rules and commentaries and literature regarding the domestic
violence legislation. It relies on the Monitoring and Evaluation Reports published by
the Lawyers Collective. Books, journals and articles on the subject have also been
used as secondary sources. Along with this it also relies on a textual analysis of
judgments relating to DV and WUR in order to identify constructions of WUR within
precedent forming case law. The methods used include participant research with the
organisation that drafted the DVA combined with qualitative interviews with WUR
and key stakeholders, triangulated by research using secondary sources relating to the
legal framework.
6. Chapterisation
The thesis contains six chapters excluding the introduction and conclusion. Chapter
one traces the inception of WUR identities within the history of the Indian women’s
movement and the development of the law regarding VAW. It traces this alongside
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the political positioning within the national political movement. The concept of the
Hindu nation (Rashtra), the nationalist identities and the related construction of
feminine identities are explored. A history of the major incidents in the women’s
movement and the parallel constructions of feminine identities in post-colonial India
are also addressed in the context of the constructions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ identities for
women. It also argues that the awkward relationship between the police and the
women’s movement is responsible for the civil society activism in the context of
women’s rights.
In the second chapter I argue that studying the WUR in their legal encounters can help
with the exploration of their multi-layered subjectivities. The chapter also locates
WUR within the VAW and post-colonial feminist discourses by a substantive analysis
of the existing scholarships on the subject of WUR within VAW. Chapter Two also
identifies the research methodology best suited for this thesis. The use of mixed
methods triangulates findings of this thesis. The heart of the thesis is in the
incorporation of women’s experiences with violence and law in the survivors’ own
voices as a part of the feminist methodology.
Chapter three investigates the DVA in the context of the marginality (if there is) of
WUR within its structures. It also locates the constructions of WUR in the VAW
framework prior to the advent of the DVA. It then analyses the important decisions of
the higher judiciary in dealing with DV and the related laws, specifically in the
context of the constructions of WUR identities. It traces the development of judge
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made law in the context of the issues regarding maintenance and the definitions of
domestic relationships, wife and mistress in the wider legal framework of DV law.
Chapter four provides a detailed description of the field research undertaken in Delhi.
It gives the composite legislative DV framework that this study identifies as the
Victim Model based on the subject position of WUR, their limited agentive rights and
the formalism of procedure based on a strict adherence to the letter of the DVA.
Chapter five discusses the details of the fieldwork undertaken in Mumbai. Based on
the observations of the working of the DV framework in Mumbai, the study identifies
this as the Survivor Model. It discusses the DVA and the broader DV access to justice
issues in the voices of the survivors of domestic violence interviewed as a part of this
study.
Chapter six provides the detailed analysis of the field work findings in Mumbai and
Delhi and tests this in the light of the wider discussions in the thesis. It discusses the
acquisition of agentive rights within the DV framework by WUR. It also analyses the
enabling factors and the rupture points at which the WUR break the norms to access
the law in spite of the barriers they face because of societal limitations.
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the result and its wider implications; and the
possibilities for further research.
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7. Conclusion
The identification of WUR as potential and actual users of the law within the new and
protean DV framework in India contributes to knowledge by investigating the legal
agency acquired by the law’s least favoured subjects. It examines the DV law in the
light of the legal subjectivity and the agency of WUR, a category previously
unidentified and thus contributes originally to knowledge.
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Chapter One
Constructions of WUR Identities: History, VAW and
Indian Women’s Movement
1. Introduction
‘The law is never not a cultural fact’ (Sunder Rajan , 2003: xii)
The operation of the law makes sense in terms of its larger social context. Even as it
holds the possibility for the political transformation in the position of women, it is in
itself a result of the political and social historical context. The assertion of legal claims
and claims of rights has been shaped by political struggle. This is the ‘dialectic
relationship’ between rights and politics which is set within the social and political
meaning of legal claims in the feminist struggle (Schneider, 2000: 6).
The overall argument this chapter makes is that WUR are disadvantaged in law and
society because of historical constructions of various identities. This is a part of the
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different arguments developed in the various chapters in order to support the hypothesis
that when provided with an enabling feminist DV framework, WUR can break free from
the barriers that restrict their use of the DV law. Consequently they emerge as agents of
law and of their own empowerment.
For the purposes of this research the phrase ‘Indian women’s movement’ will be used to
refer to the central and progressive movement that affected a change in the condition of
women in law and society; although it is acknowledged that the phrase is far from
satisfactory to encompass the various independent movements of women that arose all
around the country to work towards a better future for Indian women. Indian feminists
are uncomfortable with the use of the phrase ‘Indian women’s movements’ (Kumar,
1999; Sen, 2000). The word Indian cannot be used to include or describe the diversity
and the differences that define women in a country that occupies almost an entire
continent. The ‘political and cultural singularity’ of the phrase ‘obscures the Movement’s
diversity, differences and conflicts’ (Sen, 2000:1). The word women also includes vast
differences in thought, culture, life style and backgrounds (Kannabiran, 1993; Sen, 2000;
Menon and Kannabiran, 2007). However without ignoring these pluralities, the generic
Indian women’s movement can be traced back to the ‘Woman Question’ and the need for
women’s emancipation as a part of the anti-colonial struggle (Sen, 1993). In the next
section, we will examine the Indian nationalist identity and the constructed feminine
identities in the anti-colonial struggle.
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In this chapter we will be introduced to the ways in which the women’s movement has
developed particularly in relation to its positioning in the national political movement.
This is divided into four phases. One of the main themes used to develop each phase is
the parallel development of the binary constructions of women as good and bad and the
consequent derivation of the prototypes of the early imaginations of WUR that find their
stock in ‘bad women’. The other theme is the movement’s focus on VAW. The third
theme in tracing the episodic history is the ‘love-hate’ relationship of the movement and
the law which has been discussed by using controversial cases. Aside of grounding the
project in its historical background one of the implications of the arguments made in this
chapter for the rest of the research is that it goes to explain the awkward relationship that
the women’s movement has had with the police. Thus the discussion of the state leads
later in Chapters Five and Six to a more specific discussion of the role of the state
enforcement agency – police. The chapter also provides the basis for understanding why
the DVA was drafted by a women’s group and the political struggles that preceded the
passing of the DV bill as law by the houses of parliament. It thus traces the active
involvement of the civil society in campaigning for VAW law.
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2. Constructions of Feminine Identities in Phase 1: the Hindu Nation,
the Nationalist Movement
This section explores the prototypes of the Indian women’s movement and the first phase
which addresses the ‘Women Question’, the first negotiation of the rights of woman in
the form of protective and punitive legislation even as the traditional ideals of Indian
womanhood continued to be the dominant construction in the society.
The precursors of the constructions of WUR identities can be traced back to the
interpretations of female sexuality in Hindu philosophy. In Hindu philosophy the
recognition of ‘the spiritual in the physical’ means that ‘the female sexuality is subsumed
to the spiritual leaving behind the physical desire and pleasure’ (Kazmi, 2010: 64).The
suffering of women in Indian tradition is ‘dangerously glorified’. This is done with the
use of mythological figures. Girls are taught to seek inspiration from submissive self-
sacrificing historical and mythological characters. They are trained when they are young
in order to prepare them for the suffering in the roles of wives and mothers. Sita, Sati and
Savithri have all been glorified as the ideal wives. Films, dance, drama and religious
rituals emphasise suffering as ‘purifying and even inevitable for women’ (Kazmi, 2010:
63).
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Prior to the year 1947 when India became a country free from British colonial rule, the
social reforms for women initiated by the new educated middle class in India were
viewed as a part of the struggle for freedom and associated with the nationalist movement
(Sen, 1993). Even so, the virtue of the woman was a decisive factor in enabling reforms.
The British government passed Acts like the Widow Remarriage Act 1856 and the
Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act 1829 as a result of these initiatives (Sharma, 1988;
Kumar, 1993). The Widow Remarriage Act was the result of a campaign by several
social reformers led by Eshwar Chandra Vidyasagar in Calcutta. During the 1850s the
Hindu educated middle class were beginning to influence the political scenario especially
in Bengal. The campaign started when Vidyasagar wrote a pamphlet in Bengali which
showed that remarriage was legitimated by the ancient Hindu text called the Shashtra.
This resulted in a discussion with the Hindu priests in Sanskrit. These discussions soon
gained negative and positive press. Subsequently the British officials advised him to
petition the governor general in 1855 requesting a law recognising widow remarriage.
In the same year a bill was introduced by J.P. Grant in the legislative council. The
arguments for the passing of the bill were that not allowing remarriage would result in the
prostitution of widows and immorality. Thus the constructions of the ‘good women’
entailed that if they were under the protection of the ‘conventional relationship’ of
marriage, they would be free from immorality. The ‘higher class’ Hindus were
disgruntled by the suggestion as it would mean a disregard of an existing Hindu custom
and about 40 petitions were submitted against this bill. The law was finally passed in
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1856. However in practice not many marriages resulted with even high caste reformers
themselves being reluctant to marry widows. It is relevant to note that the Hindu
petitioners did not mention morality in the petitions.
Sathi was the name given to the act of a woman sacrificing her life on the funeral pyre of
her husband. This custom was considered despicable as far back as 1325 when the
Mughal rulers tried to curb its extent. For any Sathi to be performed permission has to be
sought from the Sulthans. However the formalisation of the law happened only in 1829
under the governorship of Lord William Bentinck. Bentinck was inspired by the Hindu
reformist movement in his province, Bengal, called Brahmo Samaj. It was led by Raja
Ram Mohan Roy. He was also under pressure from the missionaries to encourage social
change. However Bentinck was worried about protest from Hindus and ensured that his
army would not revolt against him. The Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act 1829 was
passed amidst protest by orthodox Hindus who maintained that the commission of Sathi
was not just a sacrifice but a customary privilege for believers.
Beyond such reformative legislation by the British government the women’s movement
was beginning to take shape within the anti-colonial struggle and the ‘Women Question’,
as women’s emancipation was then referred to, was a part of the idea of nationalism and
nationhood in colonial India (Chatterjee, 1987; Chakravarthy, 1990; Sen, 2000; Forbes,
2005; Roy, 2005). There was a growing concern amongst Indian nationalist about the
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preservations of Indian culture and the need to keep it separate and distinguished from the
culture of the colonisers. They found their answer in what they believed was the nucleus
of Indian culture – spirituality. Women were identified as the ‘embodiment of
spirituality’ and as long as this status quo was preserved, the nationalists were free to
modernise (Chaterjee, 1987:249). The ‘Woman Question’ was the centre of several
debates and it has been argued that the women’s reform movements were initiated by
men in India and later taken forward by women (Mazumdar, 1999; Raman, 2005; Roy,
2005). This was the result of the revivalist movement which believed that women’s
education would help to preserve the culture through the institution of the family. They
believed that women needed to be educated to influence the men in the family there by
reintroducing Indian culture and values back into the family. Thus whilst confining
women to the private sphere by deeming them as custodians of Indian culture, the
cultural nationalists addressed the women question in public debates (Phadke, 2003).
Thus in the private the construction of women as the guardians of Indian spirituality
continued while the prostitutes and other women who were ‘immoral’ were considered
outside the purview of male protection and hence unconventional and bad.
The Indian province of Bengal has played a key role in the feminist movement in India
(Basu, 2004). The educated Bengali middle class were the initiators of the reform
movement for women. The condition of Indian women deteriorated after the Muslim
conquerors because of the disturbance within the economy and society due to foreign
invasion and the dependence of women on men increased and undesirable social customs
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were introduced to reduce the status of Indian women (Basu, 2004). However the less
than equal status of women in India can be traced back to the Vedas, the ancient Hindu
texts where it is stipulated that a woman should never be free, she must be dependent on
her father in her childhood, on her husband in youth and her son in her old age (Agnes,
2004). Despite differing opinions on the origins of the oppression, it is argued here that
Indian nationalist identity has depended on the notions of the ‘ideal nurturing woman’ to
promote cultural exclusivity resulting in stereotyping and confining women to traditional
gender roles.
Identities were constructed for ideal Indian womanhood as a means of maintaining
cultural exclusivity of the new educated middle class, from the colonising west and the
other Indian classes (Chatterjee, 1990). The emerging middle class developed the
ideologies of Hindu and Indian womanhood to distinguish and maintain their differences
and these notions were then ‘constructed and popularised through social reform and the
nationalist movement’ (Sangari and Vaid, 1990: 9). The ‘traditional’ woman was praised
for traits such as suffering, modesty, unconditional love, purity and chastity (Chatterjee,
1990; Katrak 1992). The ideal Indian Hindu feminine had to be kept separate and
protected from pollution from the west, other classes and religions (Radhakrishnan, 1992;
Rao, 1999).
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With the rising popularity of British education amongst the Indian middle class, the men
considered themselves equal to the colonisers in the public sphere. The private sphere
was a different, culturally sacred zone. Partha Chatterjee made this ‘inner outer’
argument about Indian nationalism whilst addressing why the ‘women question’ suddenly
disappeared from the social debates for a while after independence. In order to maintain
cultural superiority from the colonisers, Indians maintained that the private sphere was
totally unaffected by colonisation. Thus although in the public sphere, Indians perceived
themselves as being the same as the British, in the private realm Indians considered
themselves spiritual and ‘their’ women, the bearers of such spirituality. Hence women
had to be protected and kept ‘chaste’ (Chaterjee, 1989; Menon 2007: xxii).
Thus Chaterjee’s (1989) concepts of ghar and bahir provide an insightful way of
understanding the disappearance of the ‘woman question’ in the immediate post colonial
era. This inner outer argument defined the spheres of life as ghar and bahir. Literally
ghar means home and bahir means outside. The separation of the social sphere into home
and outside is also symbolic of the external world that stands for the domain of the
material and the home represents the true spiritual self and identity. The home is sacred
and represented by the woman. The profanity of the outside must be kept away from this
space. We thus get the identification of social roles by gender to correspond with the
separation of the social space into ghar and bahir (Chaterjee 1989: 238). Chaterjee
further argues that ‘once we match the true meaning of the home/ world dichotomy with
the identification of the social roles by gender, we get the ideological framework within
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which nationalism answered the women question’ (Chaterjee 1989: 239). Thus non-
heteronormative sexuality was criminalised and disavowed because it was seen as a threat
to the nation, the home and the family (Alexander, 1997).
Aside of the reforms within the nationalist movement, that the first precedents of the
Indian feminist movement evolved in the 1920s and 1930s (Kumar, 1989). The initial
documentation of such uprising and movement among the Indian women is mostly from
the writings, autobiographies and biographies of individual women. The reform
movements thus initiated as a part of the new middle class identity resulted in a new
division of the private and the public and a ‘redescription’ of women of different classes
(Sangari and Vaid, 1990:9). The next section will explore the conceptions about Indian
womanhood within Gandhian philosophy and its influence on the Nation.
2.1 Gandhi’s Women
‘To me the female sex is not the weaker sex; it is the nobler of the two: for it is
even today the embodiment of sacrifice, silent suffering, humility, faith and
knowledge’
M.K Gandhi (Jayavaedena et al 1986:85)
The Gandhian era witnessed a further reinforcement of cultural stereotyping of women
and the binary divisions into ‘good’ and ‘bad or deviant’ women (Mazumdar, 1992).
M.K. Gandhi, the main leader of the struggle for freedom praised traits like suffering,
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obedience and chastity in women during the anticolonial struggle (Rao, 1999). He was a
believer in the ideology which makes a distinction between ‘Rashtra’ (the Hindu nation)
and ‘Rajya’ (the state as a political tool). The Rashtra is eternal whilst the Rajya is
transitory, drawing the metaphor from the Hindu belief of the Atma (eternal soul) and the
transient body (Bacchetta, 2004: 19). Gandhi was a disciple of Rama and believed that
Rama Rajya (Rama’s State) was the ideal Rashtra (Habib, 1995). Rama the Hindu God
becomes a hero in the epic Ramayana for abandoning his wife Sita for fear that she might
have been sexually assaulted when in captivity. He does this for the sake of his subjects
whilst Sita is worshipped in India for embodying the ideals of the sacrificing, pure Hindu
woman who abandons her life in the palace for the sake of her husband’s honour
(Mazumdar, 1992). Gandhi preached that a woman’s first duty was to her husband and
chose Sita as the Gandhian ideology of the ideal Indian womanhood (Kant, 2003).
The binaries of good and bad women, of the pure and the polluted became more
prominent during the Gandhian era within the anti-colonial struggle. Gandhi took a very
firm stance against prostitutes joining the anti-colonial struggle because of issues of
chastity and immorality. He believed that such immorality would ‘pollute’ the sanctity of
the struggle for independence (Tambe, 2009). He has been held responsible for the
‘creation of a new myth of Indian womanhood’ (Kant, 2003: 65). Gandhi used the
example of Sita to preach that women ‘could find sufficient strength in their purity to
resist even the physical violence of men’ (Kant, 2003: 65). For Gandhi a woman could be
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pure and noble if she renounced sex altogether. In the nationalist movement, sexual
abstinence was linked with nobility and service.
The main influence pre independence on the women’s movement was the colonial
influence whereas, post- independence; it has been India’s experiments with democracy
(Kumar, 1989). It was post 1947 that the empowerment of women became a national
issue and an index of the development of the state (Sen, 1993). The relationship of Indian
women’s identities with the state is dichotomous. On the one hand, women are citizens,
participants in the democracy but on the other hand their lives are defined in relation to
cultural institutions and families (Rajan, 1999). In the next section, we will trace the
history of the women’s movement in post-colonial India and the continued constructions
of feminine identities.
3. Construction of Feminine identities Phase 2: Indian Women’s
Movement, Post-Colonial Period
The binaries of pure and impure can be traced back not just to the culturally exclusive
anti- colonial struggle as discussed in the previous section, but also to the partition and
the struggle for a specific Hindu identity. As the historical instances described above
have shown, national identity was always entwined with the pure Indian feminine.
Women have been represented as icons or bearers of tradition (Mani, 1987; Mankekar,
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1993: 544) The popular culture in the forms of films, television and the theatre have
reinforced such feminine identities and stereotypes (Mankekar, 1993). These notions of
ideal Indian womanhood continue to have ‘profound significance for the construction of
identity in the post- colonial context’ Mankekar (1993: 544).
After a century of colonial rule, India became an independent nation on the fifteenth of
August 1947. Following the partition of British India into India (a secular union of states,
in principle) and Pakistan (a theological state), thousands of women were abducted and
displaced by religious fundamentalist groups from both the states who believed that
controlling the bodies of the women in the ‘enemy population’ would somehow give
them power over their enemies (Roy, 2010).The Government of India passed a law called
the ‘Abducted Women Act’ and it took more than a decade before many of these women
were ‘recovered’ (Bhasin and Menon, 1993). The Hindu and Sikh women were
‘restored’ to their ‘nations and homes’ whereas the Muslim women were placed in
detention camps in India until their government ‘claimed’ them (Das, 1995; Roy, 2010).
Muslim women were perceived as ‘impure body populations’ who had no claims to
Indian citizenship and the notions of national honour were instituted through the law
(Baxi, 2009:4). Despite these dichotomies, the Constitution of India which would appear
on the pages of history within three years of Indian Independence continues to call India
a secular state.
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This Constitution, drafted in 1950 (Sripati, 1998) is the most authoritative and powerful
legal document in India (Johari, 2007). Any law that defies or undermines its Articles are
repealed or amended. In order to locate women as citizens of India and subjects of the
Constitution, it is instructive to consider draft Article 42 which was deleted without a
debate.
‘The state shall endeavour to secure that marriage shall be based only on the mutual
consent of the sexes and shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with equal
rights of husband and wife as a basis. The state shall also recognise that motherhood
has a special claim upon its care and protection’. (Shiv Rao, 2004; Kannabiran,
2007:55)
Although proposed by the drafters as a part of answering the ‘women question’ the
government did not deem it necessary or satisfactory for a constitutional debate. Such a
dismissal of a section that deals with the equality of sexes raises questions about the
actuality of the constitutional guarantee of the equality before the law. Despite the fact
that it was a draft of an equal rights Article, the special claim that motherhood had on this
State shows the patriarchal nature of the law and the paternal attitude it has for the
nurturing role of the mother. The section of the Constitution which finally gained the
approval of the government is Article 14. It states that the State shall not deny to any
person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of
India. Article 15 addresses discrimination. It states the following:
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion,
race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
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(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any
of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard
to-
(a) Access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment;
or
(b) The use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort
maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the
general public.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision
for women and children.
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from
making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes.] (The Constitution of India, 1951).
As can be seen from above, subsection 3 of Article 15 qualifies the general provisions by
accepting affirmative legislation for women and children (The Ministry of Law and
Justice, 2007). Article 13 gives the power to the State to repeal any law that is
inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights. These are the main
provisions in the Constitution of India that deal with gender equality and women’s
empowerment in the form of affirmative legislation.
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No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law according to Article 21. This Article has often been described as the
heart and soul of the Constitution. It has been interpreted very widely to encompass a
range of human rights. Article 21 has been used by many feminist groups in their legal
claims against the state and has played a critical role in the fights of women’s
organisations against VAW (Menon, 2007). It has been the focus for claims made under
public interest litigation (PIL) procedures. Article 21 and PIL will be discussed in the
later section in this chapter which analyses the development of the case law of that
period.
3.1 Continued Constructions, Women’s Empowerment 1950 to 1970s
The next phase in the growth of the Indian women’s movement and the constructions of
feminine identities was marked by three major events which lay the foundations for the
different approaches found in Delhi and Mumbai because of the different ways in which
women’s allegiances were formed. The first of these is the formal recognition given by
the government to the strongest women’s organisation. This led to the formation of the
National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW) in 1954, under the aegis of the
Communist Party of India (CPI) (Katzenstein, 1989). The key founder was Vibala
Farooqui who, along with her CPI women colleagues called a national conference to
address women’s issues. They called for equality and identified the need to ‘improve
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women’s lives and living conditions’ (Forbes, 1996: 225). This was a powerful
organisation of women as they remained allied to one amongst the most prominent
political parties in India (Subramaniam, 2006). Following suit other ‘loosely associated
organisations’ like the Progressive Organisation of Women (POW) and Stree Shakthi
Sangatana (SSS) and other Congress-supported Allegiances were formed. These
organisations had better bargaining power than organisations of women in the past due to
their political clout (Katzenstein, 1989). They were institutionalised (formally recognised
by the government), and had offices and working staff, post- independence. Parallel to
this, the National Social Welfare Board (NSWB) appointed block development officers
and health and welfare officers concerned with the welfare of women (Forbes, 1996).
For the first time, women had politically- backed power for empowerment and women
were now their own agents because of the rise of women leaders in the public sphere.
Parallel to the organisation of women’s groups, the notion of ‘personal laws’ or different
civil law for different religious groups was being codified. The effect of this on women’s
empowerment was that women belonging to different religious groups were to be treated
differently by their own personal laws. The personal laws for Hindus are contained within
separate Acts of 1955 and 1956. The uniform civil code was already being discussed by
the ruling party and the opposition in the 1950s (Everett, 1981; Parashar, 1992; Sen,
2000). Previously, first Congress government headed by Jawaharlal Nehru and his law
minister B.R Ambedkar preferred the idea of having a uniform civil code for
secularisation and democratisation of the country. But they concentrated on reforming the
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Hindu law first and suggested a Hindu Civil Code. Debates on the need for uniform civil
code have emphasised the inequality associated with personal laws in the matters of
marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance and property rights for women from different
communities (Chawan and Kidwai, 2006; Mukhopadhyay, 1994).
The second major event that marks this phase is the rise of the power of the first woman
prime minister, Indira Gandhi in 1966. The fact that Indira Gandhi was the second
woman prime minister in the world has been discussed widely (Silva, 2004). Her
appearance in the political scene marks a very tumultuous era in terms of Indian
feminisms (Sen, 1993).This period was a time of National Emergency and led to a united
uprising of the various women’s organisations in India. Indira Gandhi had been made the
head of the Indian National Congress in 1959. She was appointed by party officials who
thought she would be easy to control. She was stronger than they ever imagined and
supported the war against Pakistan for Bangladeshi independence (Forbes, 1996).
Despite the reasons for her appointment, the fact remains that she was the first woman to
have actual political power. This period marked a change in gender relations as women
were encouraged to work and the sporadic growth of women’s organisations resulted in
an increased pressure on the government for policy change regarding women’s
empowerment.
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The third major event is the publication of the report on the status of women in 1975,
following a request by the U.N for such a report from the Indian government in 1974
(Kumar, 1988). In 1975 the Committee on the Status of Women in India (CSWI)
published a document named ‘Towards equality: report of the committee on the status of
women in India’ which showed the dismal statistics regarding women’s issues post-
independence (Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, Department of Social Welfare,
1974). There was widespread consensus that the state had failed its women (Katzenstein,
1978; Ghosh, 1997). The indices of women’s status as reflected in sex ratio, life
expectancy, literacy and violence against women were dismal. The laws were
discriminatory and the representation in political bodies, paltry. With the publication of
this report, it became clear to women all over that the constitutional guarantee of equality
was not a realistic promise (Sen, 2000). The report on the status of women had in no
uncertain terms, also addressed the issue of the need for a uniform civil code. The report
led to the development of a more independent women’s movement. This is evidenced in
the 1979 publication of the first journal about women and society in New Delhi, in
English and Hindi. Saheli, a woman’s organisation was the first to address the issues of
rape and domestic violence. In this period most of the uprisings were regarding the issues
of rape and bride burning (Kumar, 1999). Women were now aware that they had agentive
responsibilities in their empowerment as they became increasingly disillusioned with the
ability of the law and the government to enable women’s empowerment.
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3.2 Mathura and the Anti-Police Sentiment
Various controversies have unified and separated the women’s movements over time.
The history of a contemporary women’s movement in India can be traced back to the
‘chaotic gender relations’ of the 1970s (Jaising, 2006). The main issues of violence
against women in the context of rape, dowry demands and matrimonial cruelty
recognised by section 498 A of the Indian Penal code as being the main concerns of this
reformist movement in that period (Jaising, 2006). The uneasy relationship that the
women’s groups have had with the police is rooted in history in the Mathura rape case
(Tukaram versus State of Maharashtra (1979) 2 SCC 143).
The facts of the case are as follows. Mathura a sixteen year old tribal girl was raped by
two policemen Ganpat and Tukaram in the compound of Desai Ganj Police station in
Chandrapur district of Maharashtra. Her relatives, who had come to register a complaint,
were waiting outside even as the act was being committed in the police station. When her
relatives and the assembled crowd threatened to burn down the police station, the two
guilty policemen reluctantly agreed to file a first information report (F.I.R.). In the court
of Sessions, the judge ruled in favour of the policemen when it came up for hearing on
the first of June 1974. On appeal the Nagpur bench of the Bombay High Court set aside
the judgment of the Sessions Court, and sentenced the accused Tukaram and Ganpat to
one and five years of rigorous imprisonment respectively. The reason given by the Court
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was that passive submission due to fear induced by serious threats could not be taken to
mean consent or willing sexual intercourse. On further appeal the Supreme Court
acquitted the accused policemen. The High Court called her a ‘shocking liar’ (Gangoly,
2007:81). The Supreme Court held that she seemed to be ‘habituated with sexual
intercourse’ and admitted medical evidence of the fact that she failed the ‘two finger test’
and that her hymen showed old ruptures (Gangoli, 1998:334; Kolsky, 2010).)
However as a result of the public outcry concerning the case, the Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1983 made a statutory provision in the face of Section.114 (A) of the
Evidence Act, which states that if the victim girl says that she did not consent to the
sexual intercourse, the Court shall presume that she did not consent.
One of the most significant impacts of this case was the general mistrust of the police by
women’s organisations. The legal enforcement agency which was entrusted with the
safety of the people had violated the code of trust by raping a girl in their custody. It was
not merely seen as a ‘one off’ incident by rogue police officers but was perceived as
being indicative of a far wider problem. Although women in India are very different in
their experiences of caste, class, religion and education their experiences of inequality,
oppression and discrimination in the public and private spheres form ‘intersecting axes’
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that bring them together. Women’s organisations have looked at individual cases of rape
as a broader issue of the increasing violence against women and have protested against
the state’s callousness in dealing with victims of rape.
The state of Emergency declared by the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975 made the
anti-rape movement effective because the middle classes who had some faith ‘in the
benevolent and progressive nature of the Indian State since 1947’ lost their trust in the
State and the ‘middle class women saw the oppressive machinery of the State in Action’
(Gangoli,1998:334).
The national campaigns by women’s organisations during this period focused on
custodial rape as well as dowry deaths, exposing injustices to the public using
demonstrations and protests, intense lobbying for changes in law and what is known in
India as public interest litigation (PIL) (Kannabiran, 2007).1 These have been used
extensively by women’s organisations in order to negotiate women’s human rights.
1 PIL is a writ petition filed in a High Court or the Supreme Court by any individual who believes that a
public wrong needs to be put right. This follows from the Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India
which
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By 1978 when a socialist feminist conference was held in Bombay it was becoming clear
that women’s organisations had begun to align themselves according to their political and
regional loyalties. Their main identification was regional - the Bombay group, the Delhi
group and so on (Kumar, 1989). The groups started sharing and learning from each other
and coming together for the achievement of common goal, one of which was the
politicisation of the private. The movement held the state and society responsible for the
atrocities and the suffering of women perpetrated within the family (Mahantha, 1998).
Even as the Courts seemed to be consistently distinguishing between ‘virtuous or good
women’ and ‘bad women’, the women’s organisations had begun to identify certain
issues of VAW that they thought needed addressing and started negotiations and public
debates on such issues (Agnes, 1992). In this process of adopting certain working
principles and causes, the organisations began to differ in their ways of organisation and
working policies. Thus the women’s movements around the country have never been
monolithic and have had various beliefs and ideologies about women’s rights. However
the differences increased greatly with the Shah Bano case and the debates about the need
for introducing a uniform civil code in the place of personal laws of minorities which will
be discussed in the next section.
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4. Phase 3 1980s Constructions of Feminine Identities
A major impetus to the women’s movement occurred with the controversy that followed
the Shah Bano case (Mohammed Ahmed Khan versus Shah Bano Begum and Others 1985
AIR 945, 1985 SCC (2) 556). As mentioned, various women’s groups became divided in
the debates about the need for a uniform civil code instead of various personal laws for
different religious communities. Liberal feminists have argued for the need for a uniform
civil code which set them against the supporters of minority rights (Mullally, 2004). The
facts of the case are as follows. A 60-year-old woman went to court asking maintenance
from her husband who had divorced her. She relied on section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure which was applicable to all women in India and was primarily to
protect from vagrancy. The court ruled in her favour. The judgment was not the first
granting a divorced Muslim woman maintenance under Section 125. A large section of
the orthodox Muslim population declared the verdict an attack on Islam. The Congress
Government, panicky in an election year, caved in under pressure of the orthodoxy. It
enacted the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The most
controversial provision of the Act was that it gave a Muslim woman the right to
maintenance for the period of iddat (about three months) after the divorce, and shifted the
onus of maintaining her to her relatives or the Wakf Board. The Act was seen as
discriminatory as it denied divorced Muslim women the right to basic maintenance which
women of other faiths had recourse to under secular law.
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The Hindu right wing party Bharatiya Janata Party saw it as `appeasement' of the
minority community and discriminatory to non-Muslim men, because they were still
bound to pay maintenance under Section 125, Cr. PC. It contains provisions which have
left it open to liberal interpretation. Flavia Agnes, a Mumbai-based lawyer, says that
liberal interpretation has not been wanting. Clause A in Section 3 (1) of the Act says that
a divorced woman shall be entitled to ‘a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to
be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband’. The injunction
that `a reasonable and fair provision is made' and `maintenance paid' leaves enough scope
for gender-sensitive judgments. This was reconfirmed by the Supreme Court in Danial
Latifi and Another versus Union of India (AIR 2001 SC 3958). The Shah Bano case
taught the country that personal laws can become political battlegrounds because
religions influence personal law. In cases that challenge personal laws, it becomes nearly
impossible to delineate the historical, personal and political elements from each other.
The Court emphasised the need for a uniform civil code envisaged by Article 44 of the
constitution in the Shah Bano Case. Although the Supreme Court Judge mentioned and
followed Sharia principles in the judgment, the emphasis on the uniform civil code raised
old fears that the code was just a tool for establishing Hindu hegemony (Upadhyay,
1992). The increasing popularity of the right wing Hindu oriented Bharatiya Janatha
Party and its support of the code cemented these fears. Many believed that the uniform
civil code would be nothing but a revised Hindu Code (Grewal, 1999).
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The personal laws versus the uniform civil code debates have been political tools of
manipulation. Women suffer humiliation, harassment and violence whilst the nation still
tries to choose between the civil and religious rights of minorities. Women’s groups have
resisted and rejected all forms of VAW. Feminists have debated on and differed in
opinion about the uniform civil code issue. While many liberal feminists support the code
as a necessary instrument to achieve equality of women’s rights, others have found a way
to bypass the issue and focus on gender justice rather than personal laws (Jaising, 1986).
The Forum against Oppression of Women (Bombay-based) has suggested gender just
legislation in areas such a marriage, inheritance, divorce and social security. The Delhi
based Working Group of Women’s Rights (supported by the Human Rights Law
Network) has proposed a new national secular civil code (Sen, 2000). Some organisations
support the idea of the civil code with an option to choose personal whenever necessary
(Ahmed, 2010).
Despite the colonial national reforms discussed in the earlier section, various practices
continue in the different parts of India. Along with dowry and rape, a battle against the
custom of bride burning has been a part of the Indian feminist agenda. Bride burning is a
practice in the northern parts of India when a woman ‘sacrifices’ her life on her
husband’s pyre. Women are forced on to the pyres and they are burned to death by their
relatives. This practice is common among the Rajputs of India. After Roop Kanwar’s sati
in 1987, there were protests among women’s organisations and academics about the
complicit nature of the society and the state in such practices (Courtright and Goswami,
43
2001).The Hindutva ideology as discussed previously, is that women are ‘pure’ and
maintain their chastity by being loyal to their husbands, even unto death. Women are seen
as representing culture and protecting their purity is a way of protecting the purity of the
culture.
4.1 Legal Reform
The nineteen eighties also witnessed a wide range of pro women legislation. According to
Agnes (1992) if the oppression of women could be reduced by the passing of laws, this
decade should be known as the golden age for Indian women with most campaigns
against VAW resulting in legislation. The women’s organisations had a dichotomous
relationship with the state and its law. On the one hand, the women’s groups depended on
the states to make laws, sponsor reports, set up commissions and involve women in the
drafting of laws. On the other, the state continued to fail women in its promises of
equality and emancipation. Another crisis, the inability to curb sex selective abortions
and female infanticides in spite of legal regulations to prevent such acts was also
becoming increasingly evident.
Meanwhile the movement won major victories in the context of legal reform. Additions
to the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Code of Criminal Procedure (CRPC) and the Indian
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Evidence Act (EA) included significant advances (Dube, 2008). The provisions now
recognised the importance of withholding the names of victims of rape in published
reports. Consent was redefined and forcible intercourse with an estranged wife was
recognised as rape (Roy, 2002). The most significant perhaps is the inversion of the
‘innocent until proven guilty’ principle in rape trials.. Soon, corroboration of such
evidence also became unnecessary (Menon, 2007). The punishment for the crime of rape
was also amended (Kumar, 2003) again. A minimum of ten years rigorous imprisonment
for rape in custody, rape by a gang and rape of pregnant women, and girls below the age
of 12 was decided on. A minimum term of 7 years was decided on, for all other cases.
‘Custody’ would include police officers, public officials, the staff of hospitals, jails,
remand homes and all government institutions for women and children. The maximum
term could extend to imprisonment for life (Menon, 2007).
The Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act of 1984 was also a major victory for the
mobilised women’s movement. However, two major gaps were recognised in the
legislation by a review held in Bombay (Agnes, 1988). One was the absence of a
comprehensive law on domestic violence and the other was the failure to include marital
rape into the amendments. The campaign against dowry started in Delhi in 1979 and for
the first time dowry suicides started being called dowry murders (Kumar, 1989).
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While the Indian Women’s Movement was making progress in the North of India, a
major case was filed by Mary Roy in Kerala, the southernmost province of India which
resulted in the reform of the law of succession. In 1986, the Supreme Court declared the
Keralean Travancore Succession Act unconstitutional in the Mary Roy Case (Mrs Mary
Roy Etc versus State of Kerala and Ors 1986 AIR 1011). It recognised the Christian
woman’s right to equal inheritance. However the equal inheritance right is limited to
intestate succession (Phillips, 2003). The debates about the gendered nature of personal
laws and its disabling effects continued during and after the Mary Roy decision. Phillips
(2003) writes that in an interview with Mary Roy, she said that the decision was a very
limited victory for women. It just means that men will be ‘wiser’ in writing wills. She
also writes that Mary Roy met with severe hostility from her community including
women. She was spoken about as ‘the crazy lady who married a Bengali Hindu (Phillips,
2003: 255).
5. Phase 4 1990s to the Present
The personal law versus the uniform civil code debate continued into the 1990s. The
legislative and political battle for the uniform civil code has resulted in women being at
the losing end of the struggle. Women find themselves let down by the civil system and
by their personal law. In SR Bommai versus. Union of India (1994 (3) SCC 1), the
Supreme Court held that religion is a matter of private faith and should not be mixed with
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secular issues. In Sarla Mudgal versus Union of India ((1995) 3 SCC 535. 13), the
Supreme Court held that a Hindu man could not convert to Islam in order to bypass the
bigamy law.
5.1 Public Interest Litigation
Surveys and studies conducted by the organisations such as the Centre for Research on
Women, national level findings by the first and second rounds of the National Family
Health Survey and by Sahayatrika, the Lesbian Collective in India revealed that VAW
was an issue in grave need of addressing by the state and the law (Sen, 2000). The
movement against VAW gained considerable momentum after the Bhanwari Devi
incident. Bhanwari Devi is a social worker in Rajasthan, an Indian province. She was in
her mid-fifties in 1992 when she was gang raped by upper caste men as a punishment for
reporting child marriages. She was a grassroots worker, a child bride herself who worked
for the organisation because she needed the money. She was ostracised by her family and
her community for failing to compromise with her rapists. Her case has resulted in
changes to anti-rape and sexual harassment laws although she still awaits justice (Sunder,
1996; Sinha, 2003).
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Taking up Bhanwari Devi’s cause as a class action, social activists filed a writ petition for
the enforcement of the fundamental rights of working women under Articles 14, 19 and
21 of the Constitution of India and to prevent the sexual harassment of women. The case
came to be known as Vishaka and others versus State of Rajasthan (AIR 1997 SC 3011).
This judgment set out a set of guidelines for dealing with sexual harassment and made
employers and institutions responsible for implementing preventive and remedial
measures (Kannabiran 2007: 45). For the first time in Indian judicial history, sexual
harassment at workplace was recognised a problem. By the court’s own admission, it was
declared that the Beijing Platform for Action and the CEDAW resolution both required
the states to ensure women’s safety in working environments (Kannabiran, 2007; Sood,
2008). In another sexual harassment in the work place case involving a complainant
referred to as Miss X , Apparel Export Promotion Council v. AK Chopra (AIR 1999 SC
625), the decision in Vishaka found new grounding when the Supreme Court found no
difference between ‘outraging the modesty of a woman’ and ‘attempting to outrage the
modesty’.
In Medha Kotwal Lele versus Union of India and Others (W.P. (Cr l) No 173-177/1999
dated 26.04.2004), the Supreme Court accepted the writ petition which requested that the
Vishaka guidelines should be implemented by the state. The petitioner was Dr. Medha
Kotwal Lele, coordinator of Aalochana, a centre for documentation and research on
women and other women’s rights groups. She documented incidents of sexual harassment
of women and the courts’s defiance of the Vishaka guidelines and one such case was that
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of a post graduate student at the University of Baroda who was allegedly sexually
harassed by her guide since 1995 (HRLN, 2007).The draft Protection of Women from
Sexual Harassment Bill 2005, amended in 2007, awaited its fate till the 6th of November
2010 when the Union Cabinet finally approved its introduction in the parliament. These
cases are examples of women’s organisations having taken up the cause of women
empowerment and effectively affecting legal change. The anti-rape campaign was the
most influential movement in affecting such change (Gangoli, 1998; Dasgupta, 2002).
In their struggle against the crime of rape, women around the country have sometimes
provided an effective alternative justice dispensing system. A prominent example is of
the Muslim women in the city of Pudhukottai, in the southern province of Tamil Nadu
(Zawahir, 2010). Feeling weighed down and short-changed by both the formal courts and
by the customary, they found their own court, a Jamaat. This Muslim women’s court
heard cases of domestic violence and harassment and provided relief to women appealing
to them. They successfully managed to subvert the dominant laws (Menon, 2007).
The decision in the Vithura case was perceived, for a while as a major victory for women
activists in Kerala (Bhatkal, 1999; Devika, 2009).This case involved the abduction and
repeated rape of a minor girl by forty two men, many of them public servants. The special
court of appeal convicted thirty six of the accused. However in a decision that caused
public outrage and had women all around Kerala protesting, the High Court reversed the
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decision and acquitted all the accused. ‘StreeVedi’ an ‘umbrella’ organisation of all the
women’s groups in Kerala have taken on the case to appeal to the Supreme Court on
behalf of the girl. Taking a stance against sexual harassment and VAW, a defence
committee was formed which would raise the finances for the case (Sreekumar, 2007).
5.2 Women’s Representation in Politics
It was now clear to the women’s movements that empowerment of women was possible
only by securing adequate representation in the public bodies. It was, for instance, only in
1993 that the National Census started counting women’s unpaid labour and work in the
informal sector. In order to counter victimisation, it was necessary to have women in
social and political power (Sen, 2000). Thus women’s empowerment requires them to act
in the field of politics (Jain, 1997). Reservation is the name given to the process of
ensuring that minorities and weaker sections of the society are given adequate
representation in the houses of the parliament. The demand for the reservation of seats in
the parliament did not arise from the women’s movements in India but it was adopted by
the women with the understanding that in order to actualise a transformative society,
power had to be redistributed in the political and state level amongst women. This was a
new shift in the women’s movement.
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In September 1996 the United Front government (UF) introduced the Constitution
(Eighty-first) Amendment Bill that reserves one third of the parliamentary seats for
women. In the previous years, most of the governments had avoided this controversial
Bill despite the fact that they promised it in their election manifestos. The bill was
referred to a joint select committee under the chairpersonship of Gita Mukherjee, a
member of the Parliament from the Communist Party of India. The resubmitted bill was
hotly debated in the House in 1997 and 1998. Since then the bill has been stalled. It
remained on the agenda in each parliamentary session; no party was willing to take on
such a controversial issue (Sen, 2000). The Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the
parliament passed it in November 2010.
5.3 The State, the Female Body and Indian Feminism
The relationship between Indian women’s identity and the Indian state’s role and
functioning has thus been constantly evolving. Citizenship has been viewed as a public
and hence men’s domain, women’s identities and lives have been subsumed or excluded.
WUR identities have been examined in relation to cultural institutions and families.
There is a gendering of citizenship and the state constructs women in a different way
from men by formulating laws and policies specific to them but also differentiates among
them women are different in law and policy according to their various religious identities
or in terms of good and bad (wives and prostitutes), normal and deviant, working and
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nonworking, child and adult. But the rights of citizenship propel women into equality
with men (Sunder Rajan, 2003).
The state has grown to be a pressing concern for Indian feminism in the recent years
following the Shah Bano issue in the 1980s which posed a choice for the women of all
communities whether to choose between a uniform civil code or to help minority
communities maintain their identity. While the state has been the main focus for
feminism in India it became a significant site of construction of gender and citizenship.
Many authors opine that it was the Shah Bano case that brought it into sharp focus as a
theoretical as well as a political issue for the Indian women’s movement. Three major
developments in the years since then, all related to policies of the state have been critical
for feminism- the new economic programme of globalisation and liberalisation, the
uniform civil code debates and the proposal for women’s reservation (Sunder Rajan,
2003).
The Indian state has failed women as is evident in the poor indices of women’s status as
reflected in sex ratios, literacy, life expectancy and violence against women.
Discriminatory laws, low representation in political bodies have meant that women have
not been treated as equal citizens by the state. The state has constitutionally guaranteed
women’s equality and has responded to pressures from outside mostly from women’s
groups, by setting aside some of its patriarchal interests. The state has sponsored reports,
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set up commissions involved women’s groups in the drafting of laws participated in
international forums and subscribed to international norms of gender equality.
In the 20 odd years between the 1980 protest by the Forum against Rape and the
demonstration by the Manipuri women in Imphal (resulting in a major feminist uprising
in the state of Manipur), women’s organisations, feminist workers and academics had to
deal with VAW spiraling out of control and they had to rethink their strategies (Menon,
2007). Various forms of violence heterosexual, homophobic, familial, caste based
violence were recognised. This wave of the movement rejected any sort of violence
against women and its rationalisation. There has also been recognition of the ‘complex
interlocking field of violence’ (Sunder Rajan, 2007).
Many organisations wanted legal reform especially regarding VAW but at the same time
they also recognised these campaigns as having a broader agenda. This was the
challenging of the inferior position of women in society and for the redefining of
women’s rights by publicising the private for legal and social recognition. The period
also saw the alliance of women’s groups with justice and human rights organisations in
the hope that such association would result in better and more legal and judicial results.
The movement has had to address a whole range of VAW issue in the years between
Mathura and the Rameeza Bi revenge rape case (Rameeza Bi was gang raped by police
men in Hyderabad in 1978) and the Maya Tyagi rape case (raped by police men in 1980).
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There was recognition of communal sexual violence, women of a lower social class were
being raped by men and there were ethnic and honour killings and their increasing reports
(Menon, 2007)
Women who had sufficient financial assets could take on court battles, but often to
invoke the law is to invoke the state (Basu, 1999). Getting the state involved in private
matters is still often unheard of in many parts of India. Furthermore the law alone cannot
affect change unless cultural practices are transformed by widespread state intervention.
Property rights are the major tools of women’s empowerment in order to challenge their
numerous oppressors including the state and the family (Basu, 1999). The state and the
law often do not speak with one voice (Sangri, 1995). The state is a protector and an
oppressor of women. Women use the state to protest against patriarchal institutions that
are actually the mainstay of state power. The female body has been an object of torture
and repression in times of ethinicised or communalised violence (Menon, 2007). The
patriarchal state supports the male ownership of women. Perhaps nowhere is it more
evident than in the Gujarat genocide of 2002. The state government actively assisted and
participated in the violence against Muslims. It refused to provide aid and rehabilitation
and it became the perpetrator of the genocide. The tolerance of sexual crimes against
women is intrinsic to the culture (Baxi, 2005). It affects all the state agencies and forms
of articulations of state power.
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The new energetic rethinking of state developed by Indian feminists rather than a
disengagement from the state would serve the purpose of gender equality (Sunder Rajan,
2003). All authors reiterate that the movement has never been monolithic. There have
been questions of rights, equality, legal justice, minority and group rights and civil
society that have been prompted by reflection on the perceived failure of the efforts of the
past two decades.
The perceptions about WUR and their transgressive sexual identities continue to this day.
Female sexuality was found highly problematic and the sexual restraint and adherence to
differentiated gender roles are both necessary for the advanced level of civilisation that
can be achieved according to patriarchal demands (Sangri and Vaid, 1989). The biggest
threat comes from women who severely challenge notions of innate female modesty and
passivity as evidenced in too much sexual desire and excessive sexual activity thereby
inverting their assigned role. Female sexual desire is perceived as particularly dangerous.
The sexually agile and promiscuous women belong to other faiths especially Islam, and
lower classes as they are barbaric, immoral and characterless and the metropolitan elite of
the upper classes who have been seduced by the west. Middle class women who have
stayed faithful to the Hindu cultural roots are praised as the Hindu pativratanari who are
the embodiment of feminine ideal and modesty and who only find happiness in being
wives and mothers. Girls are warned not to talk to strange men and not to dress
‘provocatively’. This helps in constructing a system whereby the victims are themselves
held responsible for the violence inflicted on them. The man is deemed as aggressive and
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violent and woman, submissive and docile. Thus a woman’s sexual identity is defined in
terms of men. After the rape of a sixteen year old girl by a police officer in the marine
drive of Bombay Saamna, the magazine of the former ruling party of Maharastra, Shiv
Sena (a right wing Hindu party) reported the incident in a front page article thus:
‘There seems to be a competition among youngsters to show their undergarments in the
name of ‘below waist’ fashion. It is no longer feasible for a family to roam on
Chowpatty. To see girls dangle a cigarette openly is worrisome. If a man is incited by
such clothes, who can one blame?’ (Quoted in the Indian Express 25 April 2005, Kazmi
2010:71)’
This quote shows the attitudes of the right wing Hindu political ideology in terms of
making moral judgments and the blaming the victims for the violence that they are
subjected to. WUR identities are heavily bound up to their transgressive sexualities and
the bias against them, in the society continues due to their non-adherence to the ideal
Hindu woman. It is argued that these cultural and social perceptions influence the legal
and judicial perceptions of WUR as less than ideal subjects of law, which will be
investigated in Chapter Three.
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The National Commission for Women (NCW) in its report Rape – A Legal Study based
its main argument as follows:
‘In India, in ancient times, women had enjoyed an able position in the household
and in society. As the ‘queen’ of the household, her position is envied by her
counterparts elsewhere. Unfortunately constant invasions by foreign elements
from about the eighteenth century changed the scenario to the detriment of
women’ (Kazmi 2010: 73).
Thus the RSS ideology divorces sexuality from ideal models for Hindus but does not
remove it from the discourse altogether (Bachetta, 1994). Instead it projects sexuality on
to the other. The counterpart to the chaste Hindu male is the Muslim male polygamist or
rapist and to the chaste motherly Hindu woman is the Muslim prostitute. Muslim women
are seen as merely the reproductive tools used by Muslim men to increase the Islamic
population by polygamy. The Hindu men start to promote higher birth rates as ideal for
the concept of Hindutva. Thus women whether Muslim or Hindu are both baby factories
for their cultural nations. During the Gujarat 2002 genocide, after the Babri Masjid
demolition Muslim women were raped, mutilated, murdered and unborn children were
pulled out of their wombs. These women were also made to witness the similar suffering
of men and women (Baxi, 2008)
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6. Notions of Familial Honour and Women
Two broad distinctions in the definition of the status of women can be made: status
derived from autonomy, power, and control over resources and status derived from
prestige, respect, and honour (Ahmed-Ghosh, 1995). In India, the former construct is the
privilege of a small minority of women. The latter is highly valued, as it is in the conduct,
actions, and social performance of the women that the family invests their Izzat (honour
and prestige). In a caste-ridden and closed community of extended households, the
prestige of the group and the family is considered paramount. Hence, this safeguarding of
family Izzat can be interpreted as a method of social control over women’s behaviour. A
family’s Izzat must be preserved at all costs to the extent that family interests take
precedence over individual interests (Ahmed-Ghosh, 1995). Consent to patriarchal
norms, caste, religion, and class is glorified and is reflected in the manner in which the
woman is perceived by her marital family. But Sangari (1999) warned that “careful
analytical distinctions need to be made between consent resting on material arrangements
which guarantee women rights, compensation, or protection and consent resting on forms
of coercion which push women towards normative behaviour” (373). Indeed, it is this
latter distinction that underlies the vulnerability that renders women susceptible to abuse,
servility, and voicelessness.
Izzat has been described by authors as being a male essentiality but the repositories have
always been the women in the family (Wilson, 1978; Yuwal Davis, 1992). The women’s
58
lives and actions affect it the most and yet a woman’s Izzat is not her own but belongs to
her father, her husband or is a reflection of the family in totality. Preserving a woman’s
Izzat and through it the family’s Izzat often becomes the greatest responsibility of a
woman’s guardians. Izzat is a very broad concept encompassing caste and class status,
public reputation and it covers related issues of shyness (Lihaz), shame (Sharam)
(Kandiyoti, 1991). A woman’s awareness of her own body and the Sharam related to it is
also an awareness of the social body. Sharam is a concept associated with physical
modesty and is a means of maintaining social distance from men, other caste and class. It
is also a tool for maintaining social distance between men and women, between what is
public and private and between one social group and another. Sharam and the related
Lihaz are vital to maintaining the Izzat of a woman (Thomson, 1981). In certain villages a
woman’s Izzat can be damaged even if she is seen talking to certain men. It is necessary
for the woman to not be a subject of public criticism. She may be referred to as Besharam
which means a woman without shame. This would mean that the men in the family would
lose their Izzat. Das (1976) has argued that women are the gateways to caste and family
membership. Men are not similarly placed. Hence if women are not protected the
boundaries between caste and clan start becoming blurred. The idea of Izzat is thus a
collective concept. It reaches out beyond the individual to the immediate family, the
larger extended family, the clan, the caste and the social caste. Thus Izzat is a means to
control a woman’s sexuality and any transgression by women including the wives and the
daughters of the family would be an imputation that patriarchal control has not been
exercised (Yuwal Davis, 1992:78).
59
7. Conclusion
The women’s movement’s strategic engagement with the Indian state in tackling what
might be described as the post-colonial element of the State has opened up a space for
public debates on VAW and women’ rights (Sunder Rajan, 2003).Women and civil
liberties groups have campaigned to stop excesses, to reduce state power and to increase
the space for civil society. It has repeatedly campaigned against the abuse of power by
the state officials and gender violence even when it is state generated. Yet, the other
element of the state is a product of its nationalist past, which established a
constitutionally secular state committed to equality for all its citizens and in particular for
women. This aspect of the state seems to carve out a place for women in a civil society.
This space is transient and protean and at constant risk of disintegration from threats of
religious fundamentalism and communalism. The women’s movement steers this space
despite these limitations, campaigning against state induced gender violence, and seeking
greater rights for women.
Women continue to face another constructed dichotomy between tradition and modernity.
The women’s movement, particularly through its legal and social engagement with
women’s rights, is associated with the urban middle class and is thus seen as tied to a
secular, modern, Westernised desire to create a pan-Indian identity (Asad, 2003). While
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there are diasporic sprouts of women’s groups and activism in the rural areas, the urban
elite and middle class have managed to dominate the discourse of women’s rights even as
the movement is criticised for speaking with an urban elitist bias sometimes.
This chapter had the objectives of grounding the thesis in its historical background and
drawing the history of the constructions of WUR within the nationalist and the post
colonial movement. It also had the objective of explaining the reasons for the uneasy
relationship that the women’s movement has had with the police in order to understand
the marginalisation of the police from the implementation of DVA to be investigated in
Chapters Four and Six. The final objective of this chapter was to trace the reasons for the
active involvement of the civil society in drafting the DVA.
This chapter has argued that the ways in which women’s identities have been constructed
parallel to the development of the women’s movement and its positioning in relation to
national political have influenced the constructions of WUR. It has shown how the
movement has focused on VAW even as there was a simultaneous cultural and historical
development of the binary divisions of women as good and bad. Thus the prototypes of
the early imaginations of WUR find their stock in ‘bad women’. The ‘love hate’
relationship between the movement and state has been explored. It has investigated the
origins of the awkward relationship that the women’s movement has had with the police
which will be explored in more detail in Chapters Four and Six in relation to the way in
61
which the DVA was drafted to minimise the role of the police and the gradual taking over
of the space by the civil society in the implementation of the DVA. The ghar-bahir
argument continues to the present day even as the WUR rupture the boundaries between
them as it is argued in Chapter Five. Thirdly it has provided aids for understanding why
the DVA was drafted by a women’s group and the political struggles that preceded the
passing of the Act as law by the Houses of parliament. It has traced the active
involvement of the civil society in campaigning for women’s rights and the various ways
in which the problems of VAW has been addressed in the country. It has investigated the
complex history of the battles for space and voice that the groups have had to fight
against the state for the equal treatment as citizens for its women and the positions of
WUR within these spaces. The next chapter analyses the secondary sources in the form
of existing scholarships on VAW illuminated by WUR. It also develops the research
design and explains the methodology adopted by this research.
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Chapter Two
WUR as Constructions of Post-colonial Women in India
1. Introduction
The law often works on the presumption of the ideal legal subject (Smart, 1992; Lacey,
1998; Naffine, 2003). This legal subject is rational, capable of ‘sticking to her story’ and
if the subject is gendered, she ‘fits the bill’ of certain pre-conceived constructions of
Indian womanhood. Thus when women turn to the law in times of violence, they become
legal subjects located within multiple subjectivities (Moore, 1994; Merry, 2006). The
‘post structuralist gendered subject’ takes up multiple subjectivities ‘within a range of
discourses and social practices’ and these subjectivities are held together ‘by experiences
of identity, the physical grounding of the subject in the body and the historical continuity
of the subject’ (Moore, 1994: 141). This chapter argues that a WUR approaching the law
in times of violence is breaking the historical continuity of the ideal legal subject. Her
gendered position is a complex subset of socio-cultural and legal positioning. The thesis
investigates the subject positions that WUR take up when they are faced with the DV
framework in Delhi and in Mumbai. Just as Moore’s (1994: 141) gendered subject is not
‘singular, fixed or coherent’, WUR bring a change in the historically fluid concept of the
ideal female legal subject. WUR do not have the support of family or kinships as they are
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transgressors of familial values and honour (Izzat). This will either have the positive
effect of WUR adapting to the new subject position because of the absence of familial
ties or it will negatively influence the shift in subjectivity as they feel reluctant to invoke
the law even as their families have abandoned them their new subject position in law that
of autonomous person rather than defined through the abusive relationship. In this
chapter we examine the extent to which WUR as transgressors rid themselves of the
status of victimhood through their exercise of legal agency. It explores the extent to
which this new subject position in law of WUR is that of an autonomous person rather
than defined through the violent and transgressive relationship.
This chapter argues firstly that the various constructions of post-colonial women in India
contribute to the WUR legal subjectivity. The second argument is that WUR women
manage to ‘rupture or transgress’ the heterosexual/familial matrix and their status falls
‘outside the heterosexual institutions of family and marriage’ (Menon, 2007:15). WUR
thus free up a space for themselves outside such ideological strongholds by experiences
of knowledge of themselves as being sexual beings (Franco, Macwan and Ramnathan,
2007: 161). In this way the women who are relegated to the margins of society because of
the societal preoccupation with women’s appropriate sexual conduct find themselves in
the centre of political and legal discourse by making the transition from a victim of
violence to a legal subject claiming her rights as a wronged citizen.
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This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section argues that the broader
literature on VAW contributes only marginally to an understanding of the position of
WUR. Legal feminist perspectives on the constructions of female sexual identity, the
bifurcation of social life into private and public spheres assist with an understanding of
the influence of such a transgression by WUR in terms of private sexuality and public
complaint. Developing the theme from Chapter One that Indian identity is heavily bound
up with understandings of female sexual normative transgression and with women’s
position in public sphere. It thus argues that the private transgression of WUR translates
into a public identity. The second section situates WUR within post-colonial feminist
debates while the third section argues that feminist methodology and research methods
best address the study’s research question which involves the capture of WUR identities
and legal subject positions.
2. WUR within Broader VAW Literature
In the last chapter we saw how the colonial legacy, political debates and religion
contributed to the constructions of the identities of WUR. In this chapter we focus on the
societal and cultural perceptions of sexual identities that have resulted in the
constructions of WUR identities. This section introduces the concept of the ‘sacred
space’, the division of the legal spheres of influence to private and public in the context
of VAW to understand how the law and society divided up spaces in order to ‘protect’
women and to recognise the private domain as being under a man’s personal jurisdiction
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with which the law refuses to interfere (Chakrabarty, 1993; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Gole,
2002). It demonstrates the impact of the transgression by WUR by a rupture of the
boundary that divides the private and the public by making private complaints public and
by the exit of sexuality of the WUR from the private to the public. Thus the
transformation of WUR from personal victimhood to legal agency involves a change of
space from the private to the public. The new subject position of WUR is fixed in the
public and the sanctity of the so called sacred space comes under threat. The family and
kinships remain within the private sphere and in the public sphere WUR find themselves
isolated and in a position where they are forced to take on a specific, legal subject
position as an autonomous legal subject. In their transgression of sexuality and sexual
identity they also rupture the boundary between the private and the public in order to
access the law as WUR.
2.1 The Sacred Space, Sacred Sexuality and the Three Levels of
Transgressions
The empowerment of women occurs by the transformation of power relations when
women move from being objects of subordination in relationships to becoming legal
subjects, in control of their own lives. Empowerment strategies address those power
structures that subordinate women at different societal levels – household, community,
nation – and which must be transformed so that women can take ‘full control over their
lives’ (UN/CSW 2002:50). In this sense the DV law is empowering as it entails a transit
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from the WUR being objects of violence in their homes to being subjects of the law –
citizens whom the law addresses as its subjects. Such an empowerment however pre-
requisites a certain fluidity between the private and public and a blurring of the
constructed boundary between these spheres. The three levels of transgression addressed
in this section begin to achieve this fluidity of space and object/subject.
The division of the society into the public and private spheres is inextricably linked with
the constructions of sexual identities (Kandiyoti, 1994; Kapur, 1996). The sexuality of
women is controlled by the society in one way by limiting them to the confines of the
private (Alexander, 1994; Fernandaz, 1997; Parameswaran, 2002). The two spheres are
gendered and women’s bodies are relegated to the private by regulating women’s
sexuality thus maintaining domesticity (Tamale, 2004; 2005; 2007). As far as WUR are
concerned, in their encounter with domestic violence there are three levels of
transgression that take place. Firstly the rupture of the private and public divide by their
sexuality and the transcendence of the divide by their ‘illegitimate’ sexual experience.
The second transgression of the private-public divide takes place when the WUR make
their private complaints, public. In the third instance the DV law makes the transgression.
The previously ‘sacred’ of the private is now stepped into by the law in order to aid its
new legal subjects – the victims of domestic violence and the DVA and the WUR find
themselves in the newly merged sub- space of the private-public, as a result of such
transgressions.
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Chapter one argued that the constructions of sexuality and its transgressions have divided
women as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ women depending on their adherence or non-adherence to
ideal sexual behaviour. These ‘bad’ women form the first prototypes of the WUR. By
transgressing ideal sexuality and marriage ‘good’ women also find themselves in the
undesirable category of ‘bad’ women. This chapter furthers this argument by addressing
these specific transgressions. Historically and culturally the boundaries set between the
private and public for women can be traced back to the religious books of the Hindus.
The clear demarcation of the sanctity of the private from the profanity of the public is
evidenced in the Hindu epic Ramayana. As we saw in Chapter One, Sita the female
protagonist in this epic, was idolised in the nationalist movement specifically by Gandhi
and by right wing Hindu philosophy as a role model for the ideal Indian womanhood. In a
specific and central incident, Lakshmana the main male protagonist brother, who was put
in charge of protecting Sita’s chastity, draws a line on the ground around her before he
has to leave on an urgent errand (Bhadur, 1972; Mainkar, 1997). Literally called the
Lakshman rekha or Lakshmana’s boundary, Sita is specifically instructed not to cross the
boundary. The demonisation of female sexuality begins when Sita is tricked into stepping
out of the boundary by the demon king Ravana. In the rest of the epic Sita finds herself
ostracised because she is no longer the protected private female figure. In the pretext of
protecting women from harm they are controlled by regulating their sexuality in the
private sphere. WUR break the historical continuity by tearing away from such a
confinement of ideal sexual conduct. Thus even as the control of sexuality of women by
confining them to the private is the part of a greater scheme of controlling women as the
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lesser subjects of patriarchy, WUR attain a new and distinctive subjectivity and thus add
on another layer to their subject position in the society.
Another element of the multi-layered legal subjectivity of the WUR is informed by caste
and religion. In a community oriented society such as India caste and religion also play a
definitive role in sexual control (Hale, 1989; Chakravarty, 1993; Abraham, 1999;
Mahalingam, 2007). The female sexuality is controlled, primarily through arranged
marriages, in order to maintain caste purity (Fisher and Bowman, 2003; Franco and
Macwan and Ramnathan, 2007). Caste purity and female sexual purity prevent the
breaking up of the social order of caste hierarchies and social stratification (Bailey, 1963;
Chowdry, 1997). Women’s roles as child bearers and nurturers are glorified and their
roles as sexual beings are controlled (Kielmann, 2002; Chakraborty, 2005; Franco and
Macwan, 2007). Families that reinforce a particular definition of gender relations by
conventionally allocating gender roles encourage women’s oppression. The oppression is
not inherent in the fact that women are carers but in the fact that their labour goes unpaid
and unrecognised (McIntosh and Finch, 1979; Finch, 1996). WUR often over step these
boundaries of caste and religion when making their personal choices of sexual conduct.
This forms another layer in their new subject position with the effect that they have
stepped away from the help of their community based support systems which they may
need if their intimate relationships turn violent. On the other hand, they are making a
further break in the historical continuity of the ideal legal subjectivity by the secular
choices represented by their intimate relationships.
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The protection of the female purity and its confinement within the private is fundamental
to most castes in India (Fruzeti, 1989). The symbolic tali (mangalsutra) tying ritual has
the dual functions of expressing a union between the girl and a man outside her lineage
(removing the horror of incest from her lineage) and becoming the symbolic
representation of her ‘defloration’ (Fruzetti, 1989). This is one of the main customs in a
traditional Hindu marriage. Traditionally the domestic domain is perceived as the Indian
woman’s safe haven, the home and hearth. In fact the main association of kinship and
marriage is to help keep the domestic hearth secure. In WUR often this symbolism is
missing as they are not legally married to their partners.
Discussions on VAW in India often begin with the inequalities faced by a girl child in her
family and her community (Bhattacharji, 1990; Agnihotri, 2001; Ghai, 2001; Pandey,
Sengupta, Mondal etal., 2011).VAW begins in the ‘very womb’ when foetuses are denied
the right to be born because they are ‘of the female sex’ (Dhagamwar 2005:46). Although
amniocentesis and sex selective abortions are banned in India, the falling sex ratio is
proof that the practices are still prevalent in various parts of India (Jeffery, 1984;
Mazumdar, 1994; Agnihotri, 2000; Rajan, 2003). If the girl child manages to be born,
she then becomes a victim of gender bias and is given less in terms of nutrition,
education, health care and other resources necessary for her human development
(Devasia, 1991; Chowdry, 1991; Karlekar, 1995; Premi 2001; Tripathy, 2003). As she
grows, her sexuality is entrusted to her father until she is married when her sexuality and
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chastity are given to her husband (Gupta, 1994; Schlegel, 1995; Seymour, 1999). At no
point is her sexuality hers to know or keep. It is a part of the honour of the family (Dube,
1988; Puri, 1999). Arranged marriages are also a way of continuing the control and
possession of female sexuality (Shore, 1981; Seymour, 1999; Abraham, 2001; Beckett,
2001). By way of taking control of their sexuality by choice or by chance WUR break
free of the strangle hold of familial sexual control. Their transgressive sexualities result in
two major consequences. Firstly, they have managed to change stereotypical sexual
identities. Secondly, their rejection of the constructed identities means that as a victim
and survivor of domestic violence they find themselves without familial support. Thus in
the absence of familial safety nets they are forced to act as full autonomous subjects and
agents of their own redemption.
Within the debates on VAW, violence in the private has been identified as a will rather
than a phenomenon and has been blamed on the unequal power relationship in a sexual
partnership (Kappaller, 1995; Fernandaz, 1997; Masaki, Wong., et al, 1997). The
enslavement and oppression of women begin even as sexuality defines the power
relationships within the gender roles and the masculine imaginations of the ideal loving
submissive, private woman (Alston, 1990; Orloff, 1993, 1996; Rao, 2005). There is an
ideological violence involved in the relegation of women to the private and the reluctance
of women to seek legal redressal is often attributed to women’s reluctance to disrupt this
private realm (Smart, 1989; Alston, 1990; Kappaller, 1995). By means of their
transgression WUR represent a change in the binaries of private and public in the
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imagination of a subset of private-public where sexuality is one’s own to keep, private
violence becomes public and the law can regulate the safety of its female subjects.
The third transgression is made by the DV law by intercepting the private space and the
newly imagined private-public subset. The law is often reluctant to enter what can be
called the sacred space of the home and the hearth (Poyd, 1997; Rose, 1987; Romany,
1993). In the public sphere, the law is free to negotiate rights and duties with the citizens.
In patriarchal societies however, the home is considered a man’s private sacred space, the
place where the man as the head of the household has certain rights over his family that
the law is reluctant to assume or usurp. The origin of this gendered division of the public
and private and the law’s differential influence on both can be traced back to the conflict
of interest between the family and the working environment (Elshtain, 1981; Dowd,
1989; Cornell, 1999; Burns and Shlozman, 2001). The societal division of life into the
public and private were deemed to suit the particular characteristics of men and women
and ensured the uneven distribution of power between men and women (Pateman, 1988,
1989; Wolff, 1989; Fraser, 1990; Milroy, 1994). The private and public binary division
was not limited to work, finance education and politics, and the domestic sphere but
distinguished where the law is forbidden to enter (Bridgeman, 1998). The state and the
law are the regulatory mechanisms in place in the public sphere but there is a sanctity
attached to the private sphere that cannot be violated by state regulation (Eisenstein,
1981; Donovan, 1985; Bridgeman, 1998).When the law does not regulate the private
sphere there are control mechanisms in place that leave women with less economic clout
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and bargaining power than men (Donovan, 1985; Stern, 1997). Such unequal powers and
the absence of regulatory power in the private would mean that women are vulnerable to
violence and there is a danger of the normalisation of such violence (Donovan, 1985;
Stellings, 1993; Hien, 1999; Kannabiran, 2005; Vishwanath, 2007; Roy, 2008). Feminists
have criticised the inability of the law to protect women in the private sphere and as a
result there has been a shift in what was previously considered private to the public
sphere (Donovan, 1985).
The public and private spheres of struggle are constantly being challenged and
transgressed by women who are searching for alternate forms of justice in the form of
meetings of women’s justice groups, non-formal litigation and public protest (Mohanty,
1985; John, 1998; Verma, 2004; Rajaram, 200). Even as the struggles of the WUR are
not confined to the private or situated wholly in the public, this new space is imagined in
the context of WUR and their experiences with violence and the law.
WUR are reluctant to take on rights even as it is recognised that women in violent
relationships are slow to take on rights even when the support systems are available to
them (Schechter, 1982; Schneider, 2000; Merry, 2006). Women may decide not to
continue with taking up a legal subject position in spite of initially approaching the
system for help (Merry, 2006). They are now torn between their sense of loyalty to the
kinship and their intimate relationship, and the new more autonomous self that they are
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prescribed to have by the legal system. The new subject position that they assume when
they invoke the law against their abusive partners is a difficult one because of religious
and familial values and they resist the shift in subjectivities just as they are reluctant to
encounter their new more powerful self-protected by the state (Merry, 2006). When
women in violent relationships approach the law, it is often a ‘signalling device’ to their
abusers (Farmer and Tiefenthalfer, 1996; Eshwaran and Malhotra, 2009:3). It
communicates a sense of external support to the abusers and the possibility that they may
leave if the violence continues. These arguments are captured by the process by which
WUR approach the law with the deviation that they do not feel tied down by religious
values and familial pressures as they have already transgressed such support systems.
Their abusers may feel less threatened by their public complaint as they are not bound by
marriage.
Finally the third transgression by the shifting positions of the courts and the legislative
intent to make laws to regulate violence in the private also reveals the permeation of the
boundaries of the private and public domains of law and from domestic to state local and
global terrains (Krishnadas, 2007). The spheres also become relocated when women
organising reflexive research look for new locations or ‘unique spaces (Esteva and
Prakash, 1998: 199). Women have tried to enter, exit or disrupt the existing locations in
their research especially in the field of VAW and the search for an autonomous space
may also be traced in the feminist critiques of existing VAW frameworks (Krishnadas,
2007). The binary understandings of the public and private have been subject to
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challenge because they fail to acknowledge the various possibilities that feminist activism
can take up in the various spaces that intersect when women step out of the private
(Dhanda, 2002). Thus in certain social and legal domains the lines between public and
private, state and autonomous locations were ‘blurred and transient’ (Krishnadas, 2004:
145).
3. Constructions of WUR: Post-colonial Legal Feminist Debates
In the discussions of DVA and the larger frame work of VAW, WUR can be located in
order to identify the different constructions of post-colonial women and their identities.
WUR also capture the multi-layered subjectivities of the legal subject and challenge the
essentialism in the gender relations and the rights discourse of liberalism.
3.1 WUR within the Victim Rhetoric
In domestic violence debates the subject seeking legal redressal is imagined as an ideal
female victim who has been severely wronged (Morrison and Davis, 2005). In effect the
victim subject has found favour in the VAW discourses (Krishnadas, 2006). WUR
however find themselves occupying an uneasy position in victim centered debates. Their
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moral choices seem to take away from their victimhood. Particularly in the context of
human rights and law, the victim subject is the one who seeks rights as she is the one who
has had to deal with the worst that has happened (Merry, 2003; Krishnadas, 2004). This
has enabled women all over to speak out about the abuses that have otherwise been
hidden or ignored in the human rights discourse (Kapur, 2002). Women’s conferences
like ‘Global Tribunal on Violations of Women’s Rights’ held in the UN World
Conference held in Vienna in 1993, have provided a means to give voice to the victims
in the international community. Video links were used to share horrifying and graphic
personal testimonials that had been made public and are told by the location of the victim
subject (Bunch and Reilly, 1994). These testimonials provide a concurrent location for
women from all over the world to speak about similar experiences thereby sharing legal
subjectivities. However, it still builds around a victim subject who has been subjected to
untold violence and the location was still that of a victim subject. The fear is often that
the different subjectivities and their fragmentation will deprive women of the power to
claim for rights and for a broader global recognition of claims for truth (Kapur, 2002).
WUR form a category that defies the essential notion of an ideal legal subject claiming
redressal. They have a multi-layered legal subjectivity which the law is forced to take
notice of. In this sense they defy the essentialism that sometimes plagues feminist legal
debates. This essentialism assumes that ‘women have a coherent group identity within
different cultures…prior to their entry into social relations’ (Mohanty, 1991: 7; Kapur,
2006). The articulation of the ideal victim subject is based on gender essentialism as the
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victim subject relies on a universal subject that sometimes cannot accommodate a multi-
layered subjectivity. WUR find themselves outside this ideal because of their
transgressive identities and their multi-layered subjectivities. The case against
constitutionalism and against universal norms is that they marginalise especially as
regards the impossibility of appealing to women as a category without other identities
(Menon, 2004). The feminist movement is not under the illusion that the law is a
transformative tool (Gandhi and Shah, 1998). Legal movements are more successful
when they depend on a broader strategy aimed at the achievement of public awareness
and legitimacy along with short term goals (Merry, 2006).
Opposing this pessimism is the view that law especially family law can ensure gender
justice for women in India despite problems in accessibility (Parashar, 1997). It has been
debated that focusing on how family law can help to end the oppression that the
compulsion to marry places on Indian women and by doing away with the colonial
construct of the religious nature of personal laws/the development of a uniform civil code
can enable gender justice (Parashar, 1997). Many are sceptical that it is possible or
desirable to reconceptualise marriage as a partnership within Indian family law. The
questions then are whether such secular individualistic law is suitable for a community
oriented society, whether legal reform works as a feminist strategy or whether legal
reform is the merely the part of a larger strategy for gender reform (Parashar, 2007).
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The location of feminist legal theory ‘within a dominant and phallocentric legal centralist
paradigm’ has been subject to challenge urging feminists to move out of the patriarchal,
legal framework ‘towards a feminist theory of legal pluralism’ (Manji, 1999: 435).
Drawing upon theorists of the African state, Manji observes how women changed their
relative position within state and non-state law through their physical mobility. As
women migrated from the rural areas to the township ‘women encountered state law as a
tool of social control’ which ‘necessitated the scope of state intrusion in their lives’
(1999: 444).
The logic of liberalism can be critiqued using post-colonial feminist theory which refuses
to subscribe to the notion that more rights result in more freedom and equality (Kapur,
2002). In the context of law and political activism, it can be argued that the discursive
struggle of the colonial past cannot be ignored in trying to understand the post-colonial
society (Kapur, 2002). Liberalism perpetuates the subordination of subaltern groups by
insisting on the universal notion of rights. In her analysis of the conditions of Indian
women and marginally situated sexual subalterns, Kapur (2002) also interrogates the
broader frame work of liberalism and western feminism. In the process of defining
victims of the third world, it tends to offer legal protection on essentialist presumption of
gender, culture and agency. Thus victimisation is perpetuated rather than remedied.
Sexual subaltern is used to identify the law as a sight of domination and resistance where
the dominant hegemonic culture other’s the sexual subaltern (Kapur, 2002). She argues
that the law is not just an instrument of transformation and empowerment but also a
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means of excluding others. She identifies the multi-layered post-colonial subject who
defies the dictates of liberalism. She identifies that the public private divide in India
which was partly the result of the colonial legal regime and how it informs the debates on
sexuality and the identity of the nation state.
The victimisation rhetoric can be to expose the focus of the global feminist movements
on VAW and the image of women as victims (Kapur, 2002). The problem with the focus
on the victim subject used by VAW campaigns is that it perpetuates gender cultural
essentialism. The post-colonial feminist argument is that the centre periphery cultural
model continues to stereotype essentialist notions of the victim subject (Spivak, 1990;
Mohanty, 1997). Post- colonial writers have thus challenged monolithic cateogaries of
the native victim subject as an imperialistic agenda (Said, 1978; Bhabha, 1983; 1990;
Spivak, 1990).
3.2 WUR within Third World Feminism and Activism
The dimensions of the various roles of women that revolve around the nationalist project
is also central to the ethnic project (Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989; 1993; 1997). The
idea that women are mothers of the nation informs the gender roles in a society (Yuval-
Davis and Anthias, 1989; 1993; 1997). Women are often pushed to the margins of polity
even though their central importance in the identity of the nation is constantly reaffirmed
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(Kandiyoti, 1994; 1998). As we saw in Chapter One, cultural difference and national
identity are thus maintained by the control of women and their sexuality.
The third world feminism is the response to the various problems faced by women in the
third world countries (Narayan, 2007). Although many anti feminists have tried to
denigrate feminism by branding it an unnecessary western import, feminists have tried to
address the problems that are specifically Indian. As we saw in Chapter One, feminist
groups in India have tackled dowry murder and dowry related harassment of women,
police rape of women in custody, health and reproduction; and issues on ecology and
communalism that affect women’s lives (Kumar, 2007; Bhavani, 2005). The Indian
women’s movement is not a ‘mindless mimicking’ of the western agenda but a
movement that aims to improve the lives of Indian women by addressing culturally
specific issues (Narayan, 1997: 13). Indian feminists whilst claiming solidarity with
international women’s group try to maintain a specific Indian sensitivity. In the 1970s,
the rise of liberal and radical feminism in the West meant that the focus of the
international decade of women 1975-1985 was around demands for equal opportunities in
education and employment and focus on ending violence against women. In India the
newly emerging movement based its appeal to these varied values and concepts while
examining the ways in which women in India have not benefited from international
development. Therefore the ‘Status of Women’ report commissioned by the state focused
both on liberal issues of women’s education and employment and on the radical ones on
violence (Guha et al., 1976; Gangoli, 2007:6).
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Indian feminists have often made demands to the Indian State for amendments in law and
policy based on international developments; most often the appeal is based on the Indian
State being a signatory to of international conventions. One of the ways in which women
in India legitimise their demands to legislate against specific forms of gender based
violence is by appealing to conventions such as the CEDAW and the Convention on
Combating the Crimes of trafficking in Women and Children (Gangoli, 2000). In spite of
nuances within the feminist conceptualisations of Indian society, the rhetoric of
‘westernisation’ has been used consistently as a charge to embarrass and silence feminists
(Gangoli, 2000:7). For instance feminist opposition of servile portrayals of ‘Hindu’
women as ideal wives in cinema or opposition to Sati in 1984 (Nandy, 1998) or support
for cinematic representations of lesbianism (Kapur, 2000) have all been criticised for
being influenced by western ideas. The rationale behind such critique can be seen as the
threat posed by feminists to the personal sphere of the home, manifested in feminist
critiques of ‘traditional’ sexual and personal relations based on female subordination.
The main case of legal feminism has been the gendered nature of the law and its basis on
the reasonable man (Myneni, 2002). Women are altered and othered and law fails women
as a group. Different schools of legal feminist thought have different perspectives about
how this oppression started. Liberal feminists who seek equality, equal rights and equal
legal subjectivity for women base their ideas on the fact that patriarchal myths are
projections of the male psyche (Myneni, 2002). They are also concerned with the ‘overt’
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and ‘implicit’ discrimination against women in the social order and the solution is to
‘outlaw’ such discrimination (Owens, 1997). This is evident in the scholarships on the
DVA in India.
3.3 WUR within the DVA and the VAW Scholarship
A scholarship specifically in relation to the DVA has emerged (Panda, 2005; Vyas, 2006;
Srinivasan, 2007; Babu and Kar, 3009). Whilst many authors (Revathy 2004, Acharya
2006) have hailed the legislation as a milestone in the women’s rights legislation, there
has been a hoard of controversy regarding this legislation. The history of the domestic
violence legislation can be traced back to the international scenario skimming the Vienna
Declaration, the Beijing Conference and the CEDAW (Revathy, 2004). The Indian law
relating to violence against women has been discussed as regards dowry deaths, female
infanticide and domestic violence (Revathy, 2004). WUR as a category is yet to be
identified in the literature even as many authors have discussed ‘live in partners’ and the
DVA (Basu, 2008; Sen, 2010; Rajesh, 2010; Mahajan, 2011).
Three causes for the resistance against change as regards domestic violence laws in India
are the structural patterns of society which witnesses domestic violence, shortcomings
existing in the laws and the lack of sensitisation of the members of the criminal justice
system (Acharya, 2006). In traditional societies the law is gender biased and most laws
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have their roots deeply entrenched in patriarchy and there is a ‘negation of women’s
interests’ (Acharya, 2006). As a consequence of a marriage being a norm in such
patriarchal societies, most discussions of domestic violence laws in India have focused on
marriages (Acharya, 2006).
When the effective implementation of the amendments in criminal law failed to take off,
women lost their faith in the legal system to check VAW (Agnes, 1992). It was difficult
for women to access the law and because of this the conviction rates were very low.
Courts often interpreted the laws either too narrowly or too formally (APCLC, 1991;
Elizabeth, 1999; Vindhya, 2000; Singh, 2004). Law as a discursive site is sometimes
better understood than an instrumentalist view of the law (Kapur and Cossman, 1996).
However they argue that the law as a subversive site can only be understood by studying
its struggles and limitations. It should not merely be assumed. This view of ‘law as a
subversive site’ is contested by Menon (2004) who argues that while rights are
discursively constituted in and through feminist politics, the legal discourse adjudicates
them through fixed binary categories. Menon examines arguments of women’s groups
and the judicial discourse on the rape law, abortion and reservations and finds that the
legal rights discourse reinforces the dominant understandings of sexuality, gender and
caste. She further contends that in post-colonial societies, this discourse may no longer
offer emancipatory spaces for feminist politics. Very few accounts of early women’s
groups’ use of the law in individual cases of domestic violence are available to us today
because of the lack of reports (Menon, 2008). Also, autonomous women’s groups have
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maintained a certain distance from the law in the early phase of the women’s movement
(Gandhi and Shah, 1992). Discussions on dowry death issues, has shown how natal
families press forward for their interests contrary to the interests of justice for the women
(Kishwar, 1998).
Others would argue that the law sometimes does not work as a subversive site for
feminists (Kapur and Cossman, 1996). The laws on domestic violence and rape have not
benefited the lives of women (Menon, 1995, 2004; Gangoli, 2007). Laws have instead
categorised and regulated sexual conduct and have compromise the interest of marginal
group (Menon, 2004; Gangoli, 2007). The pessimism of certain authors regarding the
legal solution to domestic violence has slightly lifted with the possibilities of alternatives
that are different from the formal structure of law (Gandhi and Shah, 1989; Agnes, 1992,
1995; Menon, 2004; Gangoly, 2007).
It may be that alternate justice systems, which have emerged in myriad areas are better
placed to help women’s fights against VAW. In cases of familial violence, early women’s
groups in Bombay have preferred the strategy of popular mobilisation to shame the
husband and the marital family, rather than taking resort to the law (Gangoli, 2007).
Vindhya (2003), drawing on her experience in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties
Committee, notes that most actions in issues of deaths of women in the family has
consisted of making the police register cases under appropriate sections. This has often
84
involved publishing educative pamphlets about the laws and amendments. Sandhya
(2000) describes her early work in the Progressive Organization of Women in Hyderabad
in similar terms. Studies of feminist activism around domestic violence in the late 1990s,
on the other hand, note that the law has come to occupy a central part of its agenda.
Women-centred experiments such as nariadalats in Gujarat have been initiated, which
seek to enable women to avail of the effects of this law, stopping abuse without actually
complaining in the police station or going to the courts. Women’s groups in other parts of
the country, including Andhra Pradesh, have sought to use such methods in tackling
domestic violence issues. Large-scale women-oriented government programmes such as
Mahila Samatha have incorporated it into their agenda in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh.
‘The pre-eminence of law in feminist activism in the 1990s can be attributed to the
growing dominance of the global discourse on human rights and development within the
entire voluntary sector:... almost all of [which] defined equality and justice in terms of a
rights discourse, that is, in terms of actions that would restore rights to those that did not
have them ... [Here] the law became central to this vision of social change, more so than
those economic and social structures of deprivation and exploitation which earlier were
central to development debates and, to an extent, action in the voluntary sector’ (Geetha,
2009: 11).
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Thus whether or not this mediation and translation succeed, such work falls outside the
framework of legal rights, into that of the political. Therefore, it needs be recognised and
theorised on its own terms. Within the everyday workings of these groups (of varied
ideological persuasions), women’s right against violence appears more as an important
political end/goal, rather than as an actual guarantee against it (Geetha, 2009: 11). Such a
position is derived from an awareness that the promise of this right stands in contrast to
the operations of the institutionalised rights regime modelled on the gendered ‘liberal
subject’ (Geetha 2009: 11). This new ‘language’ addresses the many vulnerabilities of the
woman rather than merely punishing the guilty, a characteristic of Section 498A IPC.
Yet, certain limitations remain in the tenets of criminal jurisprudence of violence. The
first is that it does not protect women from violence in relationships that are not
matrimonial in nature. The second limitation inherent in criminal laws is that it is not
aimed at providing reliefs, namely maintenance, shelter and custody aside of the limited
use of Section 125 which will be discussed in Chapter Three. Merely recognising and
providing for the offence does not ensure that women will take recourse in law, as they
do not, in most circumstances, have the support of families, friends and relatives. Third,
criminal law provisions, being state driven, have little space to gauge or reflect the
victim’s needs. A complimentary civil law in the nature of DVA hopes to address the
subjectivities of women’s suffering within the legal definition of verbal and emotional
abuse (Geetha, 2009: 11).
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Feminists in the women’s movement may ‘strategically define their relationship to
victimised women’ (Sundar Rajan, 2005:161). The means to judge the goodness of a state
of affairs in India can be in terms of the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (Rawls
1971:83). It is the deconstructive method that teaches us to reconceptualise the centre in
relation to the margin, to interrogate the positivity with reference to the differenced, and
to invoke the contingent and the singular to bring the normative to crisis: a methodology
for reflexive feminism. Above all the ambiguities within and the overlaps between
schemes for social control and social welfare that a feminist politics brought to light as
the scandal of institutional care illustrate the intimate, indeed constitutive connections
between actual violence and ostensible protection in the relationship between women and
the state. The ‘denial of individual volition is violence’, it is expressed in ‘myriad ways,
each more horrific that the other’, with states and often families as well ‘participating in
and justifying the denial of active choice in decision making’ (Kannabiran, 2005:19).
Thus in the discussion of DVA and the larger frame work of VAW, WUR can be located
in order to identify the different constructions of WUR and their identities. WUR also
capture the multi-layered subjectivities of the legal subject and challenge the essentialism
in the gender relations and the rights discourse of liberalism.
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3.4 WUR: Victim-Survivor Dichotomy and Agency
The constructions of the victim-survivor dichotomy have been studied in the light of
agency (Merry, 2006). In the context of a victim of domestic violence, it is always
possible to locate a certain degree of agency. When a woman negotiates with the man to
stop being violent, when she is contemplating, leaving him and when she asks for help
she is exercising agency (Suneetha, 2010). Institutional response must foster and
encourage such agency. Thus sometimes the only difference between a victim and
survivor is the exercise of agency.
Feminist consciousness is as much a consciousness of weakness as it is a consciousness
of strength (Carlson, 1992). This would mean that it would lead to the search for
overcoming those weaknesses in ourselves which support the system and in forms of
direct struggle against the system itself. Thus whilst trying to locate agency, it proves to
be dynamic with a constant negotiation with power relation. In the case of WUR the
question becomes that of a transcendent outside the context of her constitution.
WUR do not stand the test of ideal victim women. The resultant dichotomy is between
the attributes of innocence, dutifulness and obedience and decisional autonomy, moral
responsibility and legal subjectivity (Kapur, 2005: 98). This is problematic because even
as they are being taken as mutually exclusive, they share the ideal subject of liberal
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discourse as rights bearing. Brown (1995) defines the liberal subject as a person who is
essentially an individual operating in the public sphere through contractual relationships
and who is not weighed down by needs or familial relations. ‘[As] the attributes and
activities of citizenship and personhood within liberalism produce, require and at the
same time disavow their feminised opposites, then the liberal subject emerges as
pervasively masculinist not only in its founding exclusions and stratifications but in its
contemporary discursive life’ (Brown 1995:145). This victim women empowered women
dichotomy sometimes becomes a limitation on the ways in which women’s responses to
domestic violence can be analysed within the present domestic violence discourse, it led
to the identification and prioritatisation if formal and public institution as the legitimate
space of women’s actions. As a consequence what women do prior to, the actions
afterwards, along with and more often outside the realm of public institutions in order to
deal with the violence that they face is neglected. These actions contribute to the
complication of access to justice discourse within the broader human rights framework of
domestic violence law. Thus within this DV framework the constructions of WUR are
lost somewhere between the ideal victim subject and the liberal popular imagination of
the empowered women.
Women break their silence not just when they approach the legal institutions. Several of
them have tried going to their natal families, leaders of the community, local caste
sangam (organisation), basti level (village level) women’s groups and even local people
with influence before approaching a family counseling centre or in the case of Mumbai –
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the special cells. Several women who are not WUR go to the special cell accompanied by
a member of the natal family.
4. Methodology
The project adopts mixed methods to test the propositions made by the thesis. The field
work followed two distinct path ways in testing the proposition of the thesis regarding
WUR and their legal subjectivities in Delhi and Mumbai. This section sets out the
research design and methods used. The starting point of this feminist research is personal
experience. In Mumbai the research conducted was reflexive and feminist and included
discussion with other survivor WUR. In Delhi the field work adopted a number of
qualitative methods: semi-structured interviews, observational research and participant
observation.
4.1 Starting Point- Personal Narrative
This project began as a personal emotional journey for me. Ten years ago, a marriage was
arranged for me by my family. My husband was psychologically and emotionally abusive
resulting in my becoming acutely depressed. I had to fight my family for them to finally
allow me to divorce him. There was suppressed rage and a sense of outrage about the
90
injustice that had been done to me. Almost immediately afterwards, I started a
relationship with one of my close friends. The abuse I suffered at this man’s hands was
completely different because it was very physical and there were days I could not open
my eyes because they were swollen from the beatings. To this day, I carry around an
inhaler in my bag because I suffer from panic attacks and memory flashbacks.
After these two men I decided that I wanted to work with women who have been in
abusive relationships. In 2006, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act
was passed in India amidst much controversy. I have often wondered if I would have
taken advantage of the law if such legislation existed when I was with my partners. In
hindsight, I probably would not have. If an educated woman from a relatively privileged
background would not take advantage of the provisions and would feel tied down by the
dictates of society, how much more disabled would an economically poor, uneducated
woman feel due to the lack of exit options in similar relationships? I was able to divorce
from my husband legally but once I was a WUR, I felt like the walls had closed in on me
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like on Poe’s fictional character in the ‘Pit and the Pendulum’ 2 and I could not escape the
reality that the blade-like pendulum which was this destructive relationship would soon
kill me. I finally found the strength to leave him and life went on.
Although, I felt more trapped in the second relationship I argue that these two very
different yet equally abusive violent relationships place me in a position of privilege as
far as my research is concerned: I have been there, I have felt that way. However, my
dilemma is that whilst my personal knowledge of violent relationships works to my
advantage in so far as I have been a victim, a subject and hence have a personal
understanding of my subject, it puts me to the disadvantage of bias, of having
preconceived notions of women and their experiences in situations similar to mine.
Despite the fact that I was a victim of violence, in many ways I am aware of the potential
of ‘othering’ the women because of the fact that I am my own starting point, my body
and my mind the first references for violence and abuse at the hands of two men.
2 The pit and the pendulum is a short story written by Edgar Allan Poe published in 1842. The unnamed
narrator in the story is taken prisoner during the Spanish inquisition. No explanation is provided by the
author about why the narrator is arrested. He condemned to death and finds himself locked in a tomb. In the
middle of the tomb there is a deep pit filled with water and when he looks up he sees a giant scythe-like
pendulum moving towards him and his eventual death. He has no means of escaping and he feels fear like
no other
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Feminist dilemmas in field work are as much ‘ethical and personal as academic and
political’ (Halle 1991 quoted by Wolf 1996). Wolf (1996) argues that since feminist
dilemmas in field work revolve around power they prove to be contradictory and
confusing to the researcher may result in a major identity crisis for many such
researchers. As a researcher I was faced with the challenge of whether the research was
moved by commitments to women rather than pursuing my own carrier and personal
experience (Birch, Miller, Mauthner and Jessop, 2002). This was solved by a personal
understanding that the research would aid to fill a gap in knowledge and there by
ultimately benefit women.
The need to hear the ‘other voice’ is not the need to establish a ‘feminine essentialism or
essence’ but the need to ‘displace’ the ‘gender hierarchy in the law’ by challenging what
the law is and its inherent masculinity (Mohanty 1991: 71). According to Cornell there
should be a ‘norm of consideration’ when women seek redressal within the legal system
which is based on women’s experiences and their voices being a challenge to the notion
of what law is and what it stands for Cornell, 1989). Listening to the lives of others is a
curious kind of voyeurism. It is like living the lives of many others by proxy. Vicariously
the interviewer lives the memories told by the anecdotes. There is something very
familiar about the interview. Its purpose is to uncover the truth, reveal realities and
provide information. The ‘texture’ of women’s experiences should not, according to the
authors, be lost in statistics The nature of changing methods in feminism is more
accommodating, more generous to the needs and experiences of women thus helping
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evolve a richer picture of their lives (Maynard, 1994). Private experiences become private
knowledge (Ribbens, Jane and Edwards, 1998). In the context of India where women’s
experiences are different based on all the factors that affect their identities as members of
different classes, castes, income groups and religions, there is a need to deconstruct the
notion of this ‘norm of consideration’ as they based on the experiences of women that are
different in ‘unbridgable ways’ (Kannabiran 2007).
4.2 Feminist Reflexive Research
Reflexive feminist research can be transformative in certain ways. This method of
formulating research enables researchers working with female victims of domestic
violence to understand the experiences of such violence as they are for the women and
not as the ‘researcher’s imagination as derived from her own life’. (Wylie and Greaves,
1995; Burt and Code, 1995: 10). Sometimes analysis informed by experiences is held in
less esteem in academia (Wylie and Greaves, 1995). The problem is then about how to
locate the research within an academic community that clearly distinguishes between
experience and evidence. However stricter methods have been evolved to make it
credible (Madriz, 2003). In the 1990s, the question of methods became one of the top
issues in the feminist agenda. Working with the ‘Battered Women’s Advocacy Centre’ a
counseling Centre for battered women, Wylie and Greaves came to the conclusion that
any instrument that acts as a research method, for instance must ‘embody women’s
experiences’, must be ‘women-centric’ and ‘non-coercive’ and most of all should not
94
become a mere tool of defining the project of the researcher (Wylie& Greaves 1995:
321). The challenge for me was to get my data to speak to allow the voices of the WUR
to come through and to find the balance between academic objectivity and passion.
The methods chosen sought to capture the extent to which the DVA and more generally
the legal and institutional framework relating to VAW have constructed women as
subjects and victim/ survivors of DV. The research was specifically informed by feminist
methods which address the complex context of interviewing WUR who have experienced
DV. Semi-structured in depth interviews were conducted with the WUR survivors and
the social workers in Mumbai. Issues of confidentiality were established as a part of the
ethical aspect of the research design. Whilst designing the research framework, there was
an awareness of the possible unequal power relationships in the field. Often identified as
the most central dilemma in feminist research especially in field work is ‘power’ and the
‘unequal hierarchies or the levels of control that are often maintained, perpetrated created
and recreated during and after field research’ (Wolf 1996: 2). The power becomes evident
in three dimensions during research: power difference because of the differences in the
personalities of the researcher and the researched; the difference while ‘defining the
research relationship’; and power exerted post field, while writing up and representing
(Wolf, 1996). Post- colonial feminist scholars who work in their own countries,
according to Wolf, will at the very least ‘experience class and educational privilege’.
Many feminist researchers have ‘encouraged relationships between the researcher and the
researched as opposed to ‘positivism and objectivity’ (Wolf 1996: 4). Thus ‘potentially
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exploitative’ and hierarchical relationships’, according to Wolf, should be done away
with by ‘cultivating friendship, a sharing and closeness’ ‘that would enrich the picture of
women’s lives (Wolf, 1996:4).
4.3 Research Design Mumbai
Methods used included field notes, reflexive journal, structured and semi-structured
interview and the analysis of documents and materials. The term narrative has been used
by qualitative researchers with different meanings. Narrative inquiry refers to a subset of
qualitative research designs in which stories are used to describe human action. In the
context of narrative inquiry ‘narrative’ refers to a discourse form in which events and
happenings are configured by means of a plot (Miles, 1984; Creswell and John, 1994).
4.4 Power Dynamics in the Field
Feminist research is more likely to address women’s oppression if it respects and values
women’s experiences and their accounts of them creating a collective culture for the
respectful sharing and examination of all relevant participant experiences contributes to
women being able to identify new or better ways of understanding the situation. The
interviewing women is a contradiction in terms (Oakley, 1981). Reflecting on the power
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dimension of research and the way in which a more powerful woman who asks the
question and the less powerful women who gives the answer constitutes an uneasy
relationship (Pfeiper, 2000; Farber, 2001). In Mumbai, the dilemma of unequal power
relationships was solved in three ways. Firstly, the interviews were conducted informally
in the effective way a conversation would proceed with both the parties exchanging our
experiences with violence. Secondly, permission was asked and a third party the social
worker explained the possible ways in which their stories would be used in the project.
Finally during the writing up stage, care was taken to ensure that the women’s stories
were represented exactly as they wanted their voices to be heard.
Two broad currents of criticism and disquiet have served to dislodge modernist visions of
quality in qualitative research opening up the field to a more flexible and pragmatic
relationship between research practice and methodology. Political perspectives have
involved objections to the hidden values which modernist commitments to guiding ideals
like objectivity and rationality have involved. In the wake of this, post modernism
appears to have shaken the foundationalism on which much qualitative research has
depended. Denzing’s research practice contains elements that address both sources of
criticism (Denzin, 1991). Marxist, feminist and other perspectives from critical theory
argue that the quality of research should be judged in terms of its political effects rather
than its capacity to formulate universal laws or apparently objective truth (Acker, Barry
and Esseveld, 1996).
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Various studies on domestic violence in India and in other countries have used different
qualitative and quantitative research methods to identify various aspects of the problem
of VAW. The Women’s Studies Unit of the TATA institute of Social Sciences (TISS) in
Mumbai has pioneered research on DV in India (Mitra, 1999, 2000; Burton, 2000;
Ghosh, 2004). Mitra’s (2000) report on the study of social responses to DV against
women in the Indian states of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra used a methodology that
involved the non-random survey of institutions that worked with victims of domestic
violence. 15 different institutions were identified and surveyed. Ganesh (2006) based a
study on DV in Maharshtra by analysing the data in the records maintained by the Special
Cell.
As far as methodology is concerned the use of a highly structured intake form/ method
would run counter to the ethos of the shelter movement and other feminist support group/
agencies but also to feminist research practice. In the case of feminist agencies and
activists working to stop violence against women the articulation and legitimation of
women’s experience have been an absolutely central objective in these contexts the
rejection of the coercive objectification, of any structure-imposing methodology (either
of enquiry or intervention) has often been explicit (Greaves and Wylie, 1990; Alvesson,
2009)
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Qualitative research cuts across disciplines and subject matters. Qualitative researchers
aim to acquire an in-depth understanding of human behaviour and the reasons that govern
them. Qualitative research relies on reasons behind various aspects of behaviour. It
investigates the why and how of decision making and not just when, what and where.
Hence the need is for smaller but focused samples rather than large random samples
which qualitative research categorizes data into patterns as the primary basis for
organising and reporting results.
Feminists throughout the world have sought to develop ways of bringing the integrity of
their own and other women’s experiences directly into practical and research contexts not
necessarily treating those experiences as inviolate and sacrosanct but allowing them to
inform their thinking and acting (Helium, 2000). Feminists are aware that their
experiences and others’ rarely speak for themselves hence they require analysis and
interpretation. When the inquiry involves speaking for other people or about other
person’s experiences there is a tacit consensus amongst feminists about the responsibility
a researcher or writer has to take for the position she occupies and about her
accountability to the persons or groups about or for whom she claims to speak (Helium,
2000). Questions of authority and expertise are the issue here and the accountability is a
central feminist concern which entails a principle commitment to trying to discover how
things are with people one is studying or working with in on-going critical and self-
critical yet respectful negotiations. Accountability often manifests itself too in a readiness
to make sure that people who have participated in the research process as interviewees
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remain active participants to the extent that the researcher makes her results available and
ensures that they are accessible to them (Oakley, 1981). Ever since the 1981 publication
by Ann Oakley’s work on interviewing women many researchers have insisted that all
such processes should be interactive rather than constructed according to the old
subject/object (interviewer/interviewee) model. Amongst feminist researchers Oakley’s
work has produced a growing commitment to contesting and even rejecting the artificial
stance of the objective observer. Yet her work has also generated what Reinharz
describes as excessive demands especially in situations in which interests of the
researcher and the person being interviewed are in conflict or otherwise incongruent with
each other. While Oakley argues that interview encounters necessarily produced a
relationship between the researcher and the people she interviews some theorists have
extrapolated from this observation to conclude that researchers and the subjects must
become friends.
Social research is difficult because one has to find the right balance between the
theoretical frames and assumptions and sensitivity to the participants’ voices whilst doing
qualitative research. Women researchers who have done their research in domestic and
intimate private lives have contributed their experiences carrying out qualitative research
and expressed their shared concerns (Jackson 2002). The main concern of these
researches is the process of making ‘public’ these private and personal voices for a
professional or academic audience. Researchers have to be aware that voices of particular
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groups might be ‘drowned out’, systematically silenced or misunderstood as researchers
engage with dominant academic discourses.
One of the challenges of the research was in making public the private experience and
writing one’s own ‘hearing’ voice (Ribbens, 2002). Another obstacle was the study of
social invisible relationships in social institutions (Mathner, 2002). Song (2002) gives a
useful account of hearing competing voices and locating oneself within the research and
dealing with multiple perceptions in research and about gate keeping and overcoming the
barriers of researcher allegiance. This was useful for me to negotiate between the
institutions that acted as gate keepers and the interviewees and to strike a balance in my
relationships in the field.
4.5 Research Design Delhi
In Delhi feminist methods continued to inform the research design but in a more subtle
way than in Mumbai to fulfill the objective of understanding the constructions of WUR,
within a DV framework which is closer to the legal advocacy approach. The other
objective was to understand and investigate how WUR fare within this framework. Four
main groups were identified in order to attain these objectives. The first of these was the
Lawyer’s Collective, second, the Protection Officers, the third group the police and the
fourth group consisted of stakeholders. The police attitudes were established by
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participant observation in a police training session. Protection officer attitudes and the
complexities of the environment in which they work were established with the aid of
interviews and non-participant observation. NGO leaders were interviewed. Judges were
not interviewed because the research design already made space for the means of
establishing judicial attitudes towards the constructions of identities and WUR in the
form of a feminist analysis of the judgments made in the context of DVA and WUR
identities as ‘texts’.
The Delhi field study was based upon an internship which was undertaken with the
Lawyers collective in order to understand the legislation and the constructions of the
WUR from a centrally placed key stakeholder. The method used was participatory action
research as an intern with the drafters of the DVA (Rapoport, 1970; Reason, 1991; Zuber-
Skerritt, 1996; Whyte, 2001). Participatory action research involves problem solving and
knowledge attainment by researching within a key organisation with the aim of
understanding their strategies, practices and perceptions. It includes planning, action and
fact finding as a result of such action. The ethics of such participatory action research
should include benefit to the organisation and the researcher. Researching with the
organization raised different questions relating to ethics and power relations in the field.
The research here was more traditional in regard to interviews with protection officers
and NGO activists. Strict anonymity was adhered to when requested and there was a
constant awareness the changing power relations in the field.
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The thesis also uses secondary research methods such as reviewing of the available
reports and data. It uses a formal method of case study, in-depth interviews with stake
holders and officials under the DVA. The grounded theory approach to qualitative and
interpretive research was also used in the research undertaken with the organisation
Lawyer’s Collective (Babbie and Earl, 1989; Shields, Patricia and Tajalli, 2006).
Exploratory research methods were also used during organisational research in the
Lawyer’s Collective. Qualitative research methods involve the use of interviews,
government documents and participant observation data in order to study social and
cultural legal phenomenon. Qualitative data sources include observation, participant
observation, interviews, documents, texts and the researcher’s impression and reactions
(Myers, 2009). Kaplan and Maxwell (1994) warn that the goal of understanding a
phenomenon from the point of view of the participants and its particular social and
institutional context is largely lost when textual data are quantified. The underlying
philosophical assumption of my research is feminist, qualitative and critical.
4.6 The Ethics of Research
The research has complied with the ethical and legal requirements of the research in the
UK and India. Permissions were obtained from the gatekeepers for conducting qualitative
research. The research design methodologies and data are opened to scrutiny subject to
confidentiality of personal data. The data has not been shared with any external body and
confidentiality has been strictly adhered to in terms of data storage. The purpose,
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objectives and the means in which the data will be used was explained in detail to the
participants in the research. The decisions to grant the interviews were made by the WUR
after they had been briefed by the social workers. In the case of the unsolicited
interviews, the participants were informed in detail and their consent was obtained for the
use of their ‘voices’.
5. Conclusion
Studying women at these rupture points reveals aspects about them that might otherwise
remain hidden (Mies, 1991). WUR transgress several aspects of cultural, social, religious
and societal norms when they enter intimate relationships that do not have the legitimacy
of marriage. Once this rupture of their previously sheltered identity has taken place and
when they find themselves in situations of intimate violence, they take on a different
legal subject position as opposed to the ideal female legal subject. In the process of
becoming agents in their own empowerment, they encounter the law in a number of ways
depending on the DV framework set in place. This will be examined in Chapters Four
and Five with regard to Delhi and Mumbai respectively. The constructions of the sexual
identities of the WUR and their new legal position after the transgression from the private
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to the public have been examined. The methodological framework suited for an analysis
of their experiences with the DVA and the larger VAW framework has been established.
This chapter had for its objectives the location of WUR within the existing scholarship on
VAW and DV, and establishing the methodological framework for the research. This
chapter has argued that WUR with their trangressive identities defy the liberal
construction of the legal subject. It has argued that by transgressing the norms of family
life, the WUR have made a place for themselves as a legal subject with multiple
subjectivities. It has also argued that the existing scholarship do not account for WUR as
a category. The chapter has built on the argument made in Chapter One about the
historical constructions of WUR. In the next chapter we will locate the WUR in the legal
judgments regarding the DVA and the wider VAW framework and within the procedural
aspects of the DVA using an analysis of case law and the text of the DVA and the
position prior to the DVA.
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CHAPTER THREE
Constructions of WUR: The DVA and Case Law
‘Though it will remain a matter of never ending debate as to whether law brings
social change or social changes in society brings law (i.e. whether law "leads"
change or "follows" change), it has to be accepted that many times laws are
passed to ensure normative changes in the society. Abolition of Sati Pratha by an
appropriate enactment is a sterling example. In broad terms, "change" is of two
types: continuous or evolutionary and discontinuous or revolutionary. The most
common form of change is continuous. This day-to-day incremental change is a
subtle, but dynamic, factor in social analysis. The journey from enacting Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 to Amendment in IPC by incorporating Section 498A and
304B to the passing of DV Act is aimed at bringing desirable and much needed
social change in this particular sphere.’
Justice Sikri in Varsha Kapoor vs Uoi & Ors [WP (Crl.) No. 638 of 2010]
1. Introduction
Chapter One established the history and the evolution of the legal provisions and the land
mark cases in the wider context of the DV framework and the constructions of WUR
within this. The last chapter then placed WUR within the substantial theoretical
framework and established the methodology for this thesis. This chapter builds on these
106
arguments by achieving two prime purposes. These purposes are to describe the legal
framework for the DVA, and to analyse the construction of WUR within the legislation
and subsequent case law. The main questions that this chapter answers are as to how the
WUR are positioned within the DVA and if there is a link between their marginality to
ways in which the higher judiciary interprets the provisions. The argument that this
chapter also makes is that the construction of WUR within the legislation is marginal and
there is a link between this marginality and the ways in which the judiciary interpret the
provisions of the DVA. The worthiness of the victim subject is defined in a variety of
ways in statutes, guidance and judgments of the higher judiciary. The chapter explores
the different textual interpretations and the prerequisites that have evolved for such
protection. It identifies the constructions of WUR that have been made as a result of such
interpretations.
The fate of any legislation also depends on how the procedure is implemented and
ultimately on how the courts interpret the provisions, the procedure and the various
provisions. Sometimes legislative intent can be clouded over by the various different
interpretations made by the judiciary. Alternately, an Act can grow as a powerful law if
the interpretations by the judiciary are perceptive and progressive. The chapter argues
that the higher judiciary interprets the various elements of the DVA which particularly
contribute to the constructions of WUR. This argument will there by reinforce the overall
proposition that WUR identities are transgressive and the DVA constructs them in one
way and the courts add their interpretations. The following section begins with the
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general legal frame work available for women facing violence and narrows the scope
down to a discussion of the contents of the DVA, and subsequently the WUR within it.
2. Constructions of WUR in the VAW Framework Prior to DVA
Before the advent of the DVA, abused women had two choices: one was to file a criminal
case against the perpetrator and face the system head on in the hope of getting some
justice; the second was to file for divorce in a civil court and hope to get maintenance,
child support, and an injunction against harassment (Agnes, 1999; Kishwar, 2000). The
civil law provides that a person can file for divorce on the grounds of cruelty. Indian law
recognises the act of cruelty as a ground for divorce under the personal laws and the
Special Marriage Act. This however does not provide for immediate relief, and results in
delay and costs. This is of limited application to WUR as this civil law pre-supposes the
existence of a valid marriage.
On the criminal law front the Indian Penal Code (IPC) (Act 45 of 1860) lays down the
substantive criminal law in India (Kadrish, 1987; Skuy, 1998; Banerjee, 1990). The
procedural law that complements the IPC is contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (CrPC). There were many provisions under the criminal law for married women
although there was no mention of the phrase ‘domestic violence’ anywhere in the Indian
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legal system prior to the passing of the DVA. It was addressed as ‘physical and/or mental
cruelty’ to the wife by the husband or by his relatives as per section 498A of the IPC
(Agnes, 1993). This was recognised as a cognisable and non-bailable offence made
punishable with imprisonment up to three years. An abusive husband will usually accede
to divorce if the woman is willing to drop charges of violence against him. Also, if the
divorce is granted before the criminal hearings, charges are automatically dropped. Thus,
in many cases lawyers will advise the husband to file for divorce before the wife files a
criminal case against him so it looks like a malafide retaliation case ( Kishwar, 2000).
Unfortunately, many lawyers and the police themselves push women who are registering
a case of domestic violence to include dowry harassment to strengthen the case. This
misuse of the law has led to it being discredited, and so when genuine cases do occur,
they are not given the credibility they deserve. Section 498A deals with mental and
physical torture, while Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code deals with illegal
withholding of streedhan (women’s wealth, or dowry). WUR often do not have these
remedies available and their major recourse to justice still remains the DVA.
2.1 WUR and 498 A
Section 498A is of very limited use to WUR as it pre-supposes the existence of a valid
marriage. Thus in the first instance of the VAW framework the criminal remedy of 498A
is virtually inapplicable to WUR especially to the category of WUR who are intimate
partners living together as 498A specifically addresses cruelty in a marriage.
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The government of India addressed the issue of domestic violence in the form of dowry
harassment and dowry deaths. Section 498A was inserted in the IPC by Act 46 of 1983.
This Section is worded as follows:
498A Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty: –
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years and shall also be liable to fine.
In an explanation to this section the Act sets out the parameters of ‘cruelty’ as –
(a) Any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger of life, limb or health(whether
mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her
or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to
meet such demand.
The punishment for the offence is imprisonment for 3 years and a fine. In Shobha Rani vs
Madukar (AIR 1988 SC 121) and Prakash Kaur vs Hari jinderpal Singh (AIR 1999 Raj
46), it was reiterated that demand for dowry itself being unlawful, can amount to cruelty
as per section 498A. In Adarsh Prakash vs Saritha (AIR 1987 Bel 230) the Delhi High
Court held that demanding dowry after marriage and when the parents of the girl were
unable to meet such demands subjecting the girl to ill treatment would be an offence
within section 498A IPC.
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Up until 2005 domestic violence was synonymous with the problem of demands for
dowry in a marriage. 498A has been praised by several women’s groups in the country
for its strong deterrent value because of the immediate repercussions of criminal sanction
(Viswanathan, 2001; Mitra, 2000; Rajesh, 2010). However the implementation of 498A
has been strongly criticised by anti-feminist groups in India (Mohanti, 2001; Baxi, 2001).
These groups claim that this section is draconian and can be misused by ‘wilful and
vengeful’ women in order to harass their husbands and the relatives of their husbands
(Agnes, 1995; Kishwar, 2003). It has also been criticised by these groups as being
potentially home breaking (Lodhia, 2009). The police officials are often reluctant to file
complaints because of its perceived threat to the sanctity of the family (Chikarmane,
1999; Maukhopadhyay, 1999; Greenberg, 2002).
A seeming short coming in 498A is the practical constraints in seeking justice using
498A. Once a criminal case has been made a woman cannot go back to her matrimonial
home to gain access or to seek residence. When other options of residence and financial
support are missing women cannot take recourse to this law. The husband’s family can
easily use the option to ask to withdraw the case in return for a divorce (Chand, 2003;
Kishwar, 2003; Sen, 2010; Rege, Chatterjee, 2010). When a criminal case has been filed
a women can feel ostracised and isolated by the neighbours and relatives. Thus the
conviction rates have been very low under 498A (Vindhya, 2000; ICRW, 2001; Simister,
2008; Gangoli, 2011).
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2.2 WUR and Anti-dowry Legislation
The sections of criminal law that deal with DV in the context of dowry death are Section
302 of the IPC dealing with murder read with 304B dealing with dowry death (Mohanty,
Panigrahi and Mohanty, 2004; Gaur, 2009). This is again a dowry specific section of the
law on VAW and has limited significance to WUR. According to Agnes, the campaign
against dowry tried to ‘artificially link’ dowry which is ‘property related’ to death which
is an ‘act of violence’ (Agnes, 1991: 133). She argues that this would benefit the girl’s
father and her brother and would be of no use to her. Due to this progression of VAW
laws in relation to dowry related crimes, WUR find themselves without criminal redressal
in cases of violence against them as women.
Section 306 deals with the abetment of suicide, sections 323-328 deal with causing hurt
and sections 341 to 348 sanctions wrongful confinement and restraint (Government of
India, 1860; Mayne, 1901). These are often read with Section 304B and do not expressly
deal with domestic violence outside of section 304 B. Independently, these sections are
not gender specific and therefore do not constitute law that specially addresses domestic
violence.
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2.3 WUR and the Laws on Rape
As discussed in Chapter One, after the Mathura Rape Case, the sections of the IPC
Sections 376, 376B, 376C and 376D on rape were amended in 1983 for the first time
since 1890 (Agnes, 1990). However the amendments have been criticised for being
merely a paper tiger as in the case Premchand versus Haryana ((1989) Supp.1 SCC
(286)), the Supreme Court again relied on ‘rape myths concerning the alleged easy virtue
of a young woman’ to reduce the ten year sentence down to five years (MacKinnon,
2006: 190). In such cases, language used in the judgments contribute to the constructions
of good and bad women and therefore to the construction of WUR identities with
descriptions like chastity, servility, supreme honour, provocative attire being used
(Krishnalal versus State of Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 926, Harpal Singh & Anr. versus
Himachal Pradesh, 1981 CrLJ 1, Bijoy Kumar Mohapatra & Ors. versus State of Orissa,
1982 CrLJ 2161).
Marital rape is not recognised in India, but the 1983 amendment recognised in
Section376 sexual intercourse with a separated woman by her husband as an offence
(Malhotra, Vasulu and Dikshitulu, 1992; Murti, 2008; Mangoli, 2009). Here the
amendment made this punishable with two years than the usual minimum of five years
using the ‘logic’ that sexual intercourse may result in reconciliation (Agnes, 1990). Thus
this category of WUR finds themselves compromised by the criminal law that is based on
the illogic of forced intercourse possibly enabling reconciliation. Section 376A of the IPC
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also defines the crime of sexual intercourse without consent between a judicially
separated couple or between two married persons living separately according to some
custom. It defines sexual intercourse as rape only if one of them is divorced and not
merely judicially separated. The reluctance of the legislature to term sexual intercourse
between a separated couple as rape shows the assumed right of violation that a man has
over a woman he was once legally married to (Jaising, 2005; Mittal and Garg, 2007).
Section 354 sanctions assault with intent to outrage the modesty of a woman and section
509 of the IPC deals with words, gestures or act intended to insult the modesty of a
woman (Trivedi, 1963; Kannabiran, 1996; Baxi, 2001). Section 494 sanctions bigamy
whilst section 496 deals with fraudulent marriage ceremony, section 493 is about
deceitfully causing a person to believe that she is lawfully married and section 497
defines the crime of adultery. Offences against property are included in the criminal
breach of trust in section 406 IPC (Markey, Tripade and Mazumdar, 2009). The
significance of these sections is discussed in Chapter 5 regarding the different categories
of WUR.
On a positive note for the treatment of WUR and their protection, the courts have begun
to give a border interpretation to the word husband for the purposes of sections 498A and
304B as evident in the cases Heartwin Wessley Biju versus State (CRL.O.P.
(MD).No.9832 of 2007) and Manoj Bhimrao Wankhede versus Unknown (Criminal
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Application No. 3833/2007). The scope of the word ‘husband’ was stretched in order to
protect the WUR who did not have the benefits of a legal marriage because they had been
deceived by their husbands into false marriages. This expansion of the definition of
husband meant that some WUR were recognised as being worthy of inclusion within the
peripheries of the law’s as protection. The ratio in these decisions was that if the WUR
honestly believed that they were in legitimate marriages and the court felt that their
‘husbands’ were trying to evade responsibilities in the law, the men would be deemed to
be husbands (Heartwin Wessley Biju versus State (CRL.O.P. (MD).No.9832 of 2007) and
Manoj Bhimrao Wankhede versus Unknown (Criminal Application No. 3833/2007)).
Thus Reema Agarwal versus Anupam (AIR 2004 SC 141) defined husband to include:
Persons who contract marriages ostensibly and cohabit with women in the purported
exercise of their role and the status as ‘husband’ would come under the purview of
sections 498A and 304 B of the IPC (AIR 2004 SC 141).
Even post the advent of the DVA, this position was further reiterated by Justice Sikri in
Smt. Narinder Pal Kaur Chawla versus Shri Manjeet Singh Chawla (AIR 2008 Delhi 7).
‘We had also taken support from the provisions of Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act. In a case like this, if the interpretation we are suggesting
is not given, it would amount to giving premium to the respondent for defrauding
the appellant. Therefore, we feel that in a case like this, the appellant, at least for
claiming maintenance under Section 18 of the [DV] Act, be treated as legally
wedded wife. Even when two interpretations are possible, one which would
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advance the purpose for which the Act was enacted should be preferred than the
other, which may frustrate the purpose.’ (AIR 2008 Delhi 7)
The National Commission of Women recognised the evasion of the law by men and their
refusal to pay maintenance on the ground that there was no valid marriage. The body
recommended in 2008 that a woman in a ‘live-in’ relationship should be entitled to
maintenance if she is deserted by her partner (Vyas, 2008). The commission sought a
change in the definition of ‘‘wife’’ as described in the Section 125 of Criminal Procedure
Code (CrPC), which deals with maintenance and suggested that it should include women
involved in live-in relationship. The move aimed at harmonising other sections of the
criminal law with the DVA that treats a live-in couple’s relationship on par with a
marriage. The state of Maharashtra approved this proposal in 2008 but the central
government has not approved of this inclusion (Jaising, 2010). By this time there was a
movement amongst women’s groups to legitimise live in relationship in order to protect
WUR from violence and economic deprivation in the form of refusal to pay maintenance.
If women are excluded from the maintenance provision, they would suffer financially
despite the DVA treating them as being at par with women in ‘legitimate’ marriages.
Denying maintenance is also a form of economic abuse and there does not seem to be
intelligible differentia between wives and female live in partners especially in the light of
the DVA.
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Section 125 provides for maintenance of wife, children and parents, who cannot maintain
themselves (Engineer, 1999; Agnes, 2001). Maintenance can only be claimed by a
woman who is a wife, has either been divorced or has obtained a divorce, or is legally
separated and is not remarried. Several authors have written about the unfairness of this
provision (Pillai, 1999; Mukhopadhyay, 1999; Holden, 2004; Agnes, 2005). Jaising
(2010) states that it is essential for the Supreme Court to protect the rights of women in
such relationships until a more inclusive interpretation has been made by the legislature
about who can claim maintenance. Not doing so would result in the miscarriage of justice
in the lower courts for such women, and it would be important for the judiciary to fill in
the gaps until section 125 is reformed (Jaising, 2010).
The DVA seeks to tackle the inadequacies in the existing civil and criminal provisions. It
aims to provide a comprehensive framework for addressing issues of VAW. In order to
understand the position of WUR within the DVA and assess the extent to which it
provides access to WUR, the following section sets out the major provisions of the DVA.
3. WUR within the DVA
The DVA is a gender specific civil law designed to be accessible and friendly to female
victims of violence within the home (Jaising, 2007; Basu, 2008; UN WOMEN, 2011). It
has an innovative structure and has introduced various new institutions which aim to
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provide easier access to justice (Shenoy, Kaladharan and Sahai, 2010). The DVA takes
care of an aggrieved person’s (AP, is the term used by the DVA to address a victim of
domestic violence) need for protection, shelter and monetary relief (Lodhia, 2009;
Rajesh, 2010; Sunitha, 2010). It recognises that the immediate aim of the law should be
to provide a ‘violence free’ space for an aggrieved person in order to decide what legal
recourse to take against the abuser (Jaising, 2007; Basu, 2008).Where the criminal law
falls short and the existing civil remedies drag on for a long time in the courts, the DVA
was to recognise the responsibility of the state towards victims of domestic violence
(Jaising, 2006). The DVA expects the central and the state governments to allocate
budgetary provisions and to help with the implementation and monitoring process of the
DVA. The procedural aspects of the DVA are novel in that there is a new alliance
between the state and civil society to address the problem of domestic violence. The
responsibility of the implementation of objectives of the DVA is to be shared by the state
and the civil society. DVA is therefore no longer a private matter.
One of the main aims of the DVA is to provide a multi-agency response system offering
the necessary support to victims of domestic violence (Jaising, 2006). It requires the state
and central governments to provide the infrastructure necessary to train authorities under
the Act, provide medical facilities and other support services. It puts the onus on the state
to be responsible to victims of domestic violence. Within section 11 of the DVA the
government has the duty to take positive action to prevent violence and protect victims
from violence. This can be done by publicising the DVA through the media, by providing
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judicial services of gender sensitisation and awareness training and helping in
coordinating the departments that deal with law health and human resources (HLNR,
2008; Suneetha, 2010).
The DVA was enacted with the objective of protecting women from all forms of
domestic violence (Basu, 2008; Uma, 2010; Ghosh and Choudhury, 2011). In defining
domestic violence, the DVA went beyond mere physical forms of violence, to include
mental, sexual and economic violence (Lodhia, 2009; Rajesh, 2010; Sen, 2010; Mahajan,
2011). As mentioned to the introduction to this thesis, the definition is at par with the
internationally recognised definitions of DV set out by CEDAW (Jaising, 2007; Basu,
2008; Lodhia, 2009; Uma, 2010, Sen, 2010). It is also the only piece of legislation which
expressely includes in its scope, the protection of WUR (Rajesh, 2010; Sen, 2010; Uma,
2010).
Section 3 of the DVA defines domestic violence as
‘An act, omission or commission or any conduct of the respondent that harms,
injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well- being, whether mental or
physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes physical abuse,
sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse. If the respondent,
by such acts harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a
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view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for dowry or other property or valuable security; or threatens the
aggrieved person or any person related to her by such conduct, such acts would
constitute domestic violence. If such acts injury or causes harm, whether physical
or mental, to an aggrieved person, it would constitute domestic violence’ [The
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005, No. 43 of 2005, section
3].
The DVA is divided into five chapters, the first of which lays down the definitions. The
second chapter discusses the scope of domestic violence whilst the third chapter deals
with the duties of the authorities within the DVA. The fourth chapter discusses the nature
of remedies available and the procedures for obtaining relief. The final chapter provides
the penalties for the breach of its provisions and the statuses of the authorities in the DVA
(HRLN, 2008). The next section discusses the chief authorities and the procedure that
follows when a complaint is made under the DVA.
3.1 DVA Authorities and the Initiation of Procedure
The protection officer is an officer of the court and is often described as the most
important authority in the DVA (Hornbeck, Johnson et al; 2006; Vatuk, 2006; Mohanty,
120
2009). She works in collaboration with the courts to give access to the victims of violence
to legal aid and to remedies. She works with service providers, the medical facilities and
the police to aid the aggrieved persons. Her duties include finding a safe place for
sheltering victims, providing access to medical facilities and field visits (Mathur, 2007;
2008). It is the duty of the different state governments to appoint protection officers in
every district in each state and to notify her area of duty. One of her several duties
involve the preparation of a Domestic Incident Report upon the happening of a domestic
incidence. In Chapter Four we will expand on the importance and the duties of the
protection officer specifically with regard to WUR. As we will see later the protection
officer plays a crucial role in the complaint made by a WUR reaching the court.
The service provider can be any voluntary organisation, nongovernmental organisation or
company that has the objective of providing the rights of women through lawful means
that include legal, medical and financial aid, and has been registered with the state
government (The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005, Act 43 of
2005, section 2(r) read with section 10(1)). They have to ensure medical assistance and
the forwarding of the medical report to the nearest police station. Whenever necessary,
arrange for accommodation of the aggrieved person in a shelter home and forward a
report to the police station in order to initiate proceedings (Mathur, 2008; 2009; Mohanty,
2009; Suneetha, 2010). The service provider can also make a domestic incidence report
and forward it to the magistrate.
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The Domestic Incidence Report (DIR) is a report made on a ‘receipt of a complaint of
domestic violence from an aggrieved person and can be made by a protection officer or a
service provider (The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005, No. 43 of
2005 section 9 (1) (b) and section 10 (2) (b)). Once a DIR is filed, the Court takes over
the complaint. The DV Rules 2006 made by the central government in accordance with
section 37 of the DVA, prescribe that a DIR has to be filled in irrespective of whether a
woman wants to proceed or not, and the copies of the same shall be forwarded to the
magistrate within whose jurisdiction, the protection officer works . The reason for this
requirement is the recognition for the need for records for monitoring processes. The
service provider is the other authority empowered to make a DIR.
The procedure is thereby initiated by the filing of a domestic incidence report as specified
by form A of the Domestic Violence Rules requires the details of the complainant, details
of the respondent including the relationship with the aggrieved person. It also requires
details of the children that they have and where they are staying at the moment. The place
date and time of violence, the person responsible for the violence, the types of violence
including the details are required. A list of documents should be attached including any
medical report and list of material goods given as dowry. If the aggrieved person is
illiterate the contents of the report should be read out to her. Copies of the report should
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be given to the magistrate, to the local police the service provide and to the aggrieved
person (HLNR, 2008).
The next authority within the DVA is the magistrate. The magistrate’s duties are initiated
in three different ways. An application can be made to the judicial magistrate of the first
class by the aggrieved person by a protection officer or any other person on behalf of the
aggrieved person. The magistrate will consider the domestic incidence report prepared by
the protection officer or the service provider. An order of monetary relief can be passed
which does not affect the aggrieved person’s right to approach any other body for
compensation for injury or damages. In order to ensure speedy trial it has been prescribed
that the application has to be taken up within three days and disposed off within sixty
days. If the magistrate feels that it is required, there are provisions for counselling and
assistance by welfare experts. There is also a provision for in camera proceedings if the
magistrate feels it is required (The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act
2005, no. 43 of 2005 sections 16-20).
3.2 Remedies Available to WUR under the DVA
Several remedies are available to the aggrieved person. These are protection orders,
residence orders, and monetary relief and compensation orders. Protection orders
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according to section 18 can prevent the committing of an act of domestic violence. The
abuser can be restrained from entering a place of employment where the aggrieved
person works. A restraining order protecting a child from the abuser can prevent the
abuser from entering the school premises. The magistrate can also restrain the alienation
of assets that are owned jointly or singly including the operation of bank accounts and
banks lockers. A residence order is an order restraining the eviction or the dispossession
of the aggrieved person from the shared household as per section 19 of the DVA. An
abuser can be ordered to leave a shared household. The duties are then passed on to the
police to implement such an order and on to the protection officer to ensure the service of
notice to the respondent. The magistrate can impose an order to ensure the safety of the
aggrieved person. The abuser can be required to execute a bond for the prevention of
domestic violence. The other remedy available is a compensation order. Compensation
orders can be given for medical expenses and damages to property as per section 22
DVA. This can also be given for mental torture and emotional distress. Custodial orders
for children can also be given. Restoration of property orders can be given, and exparte
and interim orders can be given under section 23 (HLNR, 2008).
Despite the fact that the role of the police is being minimised, in practice an aggrieved
person also has the option of approaching the police for help. The police cannot refuse to
register a first information report. If the aggrieved person does not desire to initiate
criminal proceedings she can register a non-cognisable report with the police within
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section 155 of the Cr PC for future use of the aggrieved person. Once the report is filed,
the police can provide the required protection (Singh, 2009).
Although the DVA also prescribes strict penalties for the breach of protection orders
(Rajesh, 2010; Mahajan, 2011), its implementation often depends on individual judges.
Moreover, the role of the protection officer provides a primary link between the victim
and the court and is meant to embolden women to initiate legal action against the
perpetrators (Jaising, 2007; Basu, 2008). However, until September 2010 only the three
states of Andhra Pradesh, Delhi and West Bengal had full time Protection Officers
(Ghosh and Choudhuri, 2011).
4. Constructions by the Higher Judiciary
The constructions of the transgressive identities of the WUR added by the judgments of
the higher judiciary are analysed in this section. The contribution that this textual analysis
makes to my overall argument is that the constructions of WUR within the precedent
forming case law triangulates the findings in the other chapters about the historical and
social constructions of WUR identities. While undertaking the textual analysis, four
different context of cases have been identified in a search of the cases of the High Courts
and the Supreme Court of India since the inception of the DVA to the year 2011.
However prior to this period the cases which have had a direct bearing on the WUR
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constructions have also been analysed as the exclusion of these cases would mean that the
analysis would be incomplete. These four areas in which constructions of WUR have
been made within the text are the constructions prior to DVA, the DVA and ‘live in
relationships’, maintenance, and shared household and Non-Resident Indians (NRI)
within the DVA. This section has specifically selected for the feminist analysis only the
cases that have contributed to the construction of WUR identities.
Before we proceed an analysis of the case Khushboo versus Kanniammal& Another
((2010) 5 SCC 600) shows the cultural and societal perceptions on premarital sexuality.
Unconventional sexuality and the exploration and discovery of sexuality before marriage
are still frowned upon in India. Even a public comment by a famous person from a
particular community or region can offend and/ or influence the entire group of people.
There is a sense of community honour and women are often the bearers of this honour.
An act or a statement of dishonour can bring a sense of ‘shame’ upon an entire
community. Complaints were made and cases were registered against film actress
Khushboo about some comments made by her in an interview to a popular magazine. It
was alleged in the complaints that the interview had brought shame and dishonour to the
women of India, particularly of Tamil Nadu by implying that women of her stature had
engaged in premarital sex. It was also alleged that her comments had caused mental
harassment to a large section of women who were now looked at with contempt and
disrespect. The Supreme Court of India decided in favour of Khushboo and her right to
freedom of expression was upheld. However the Court said:
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‘Thus, dissemination of news and views for popular consumption is permissible
under our constitutional scheme. The different views are allowed to be expressed
by the proponents and opponents. A culture of responsible reading is to be
inculcated amongst the prudent readers. Morality and criminality are far from
being co-extensive. An expression of opinion in favour of non-dogmatic and non-
conventional morality has to be tolerated as the same cannot be a ground to
penalise the author.’ S. Khushboo versus Kanniammal& Another ((2010) 5 SCC
600).
Although the Court decided in favour of Khushboo, the wordings of the judgment
prerequisites a ‘prudent and responsible’ reader who will not stray away from the
conventional moral standards but will tolerate an unpopular view of morality. Sexual
activity outside of a marriage is acknowledged as something that someone with a sense of
responsibility will not indulge in. The social ostracism that a WUR may face can be
inferred from such popular notions of moral conduct and the possibility of one person’s
deed creating problems for an entire community. The media discussed this issue with
great rigour and the incident is illustrative of the general moral code of conduct of the
society. Women as the safe keepers of the honour of the family and the community must
abide by the moral rules of conduct that act as the adhesive that binds the community and
keeps it culturally exclusive with a distinctive caste and regional identity.
4.1 Constructions prior to DVA
A chief reason for the reluctance to acknowledge the status of WUR as being at par with
a legitimate wife is the general feeling that the rights of the ‘first’ and legitimate wife will
127
be compromised if WUR are given the same amount of protection. Prior to the existence
of the DVA, it was recognised as a legislative shortcoming. Even as some Judges
sympathised with WUR, they felt that their hands were tied as long as no legislative
action is taken for they felt that it was up to the legislature to make a law to provide for
the protection of WUR rights in order for them to enjoy the rights available to women
who are ‘conventional’ wives. Before the advent of the DVA, in the case Savitaben
Somabhat Bhatiya versus State of Gujarat and others (AIR 2005 SC 1809), the Supreme
Court held that however desirable it may be to take note of the plight of an unfortunate
woman who unwittingly enters into wedlock with a married man, there is no scope to
include a woman not lawfully married within the expression of ‘wife’. The Court held
that this inadequacy in law could be amended only by the Legislature. The facts of the
case are as follows: Savitaben was married in 1994 according to the customs of her
religion. Her husband treated her well for some time and they had a child during this
period. Later on she was subjected to mental and physical torture and was neglected as he
had another relationship. Savitaben filed a case before the magistrate for maintenance
under section 125 of the Cr.PC.
It was pleaded on behalf of the husband that Savitaben was not his legally wedded wife
and that he had been married to the other woman for 22 years and had two children with
her. In evidence he produced records proving the validity of his marriage with the other
woman. The decision of the magistrate was to grant maintenance to Savitaben and the
child. The Gujarath High Court in its appellate jurisdiction decided that as Savitaben was
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not a legally wedded wife she was not entitled to any maintenance. The submission on
behalf of Savitaben was that section 125 of the Cr.PC should be interpreted to give the
term ‘wife’ a broad interpretation as the section was intended to protect destitute women.
On behalf of the husband it was argued that there was no scope for the definition of wife
to be extended beyond its well established meaning. Finally the Supreme Court ruled that
section 125 is only meant to provide maintenance to an illegitimate child and wife and
not for a woman who is lawfully married. By way of obiter the court observed that this is
an inadequacy of the law. In this case the empathy of the Supreme Court with the WUR
was because she was duped into the marriage and the proof that customary rituals had
accompanied the ‘marriage’. Thus the woman’s ‘innocence’ about the existence of a
previous marriage was considered. The fact that the child from the union was considered
to be eligible for maintenance but the same was not applied to the WUR shows firstly the
laws reluctance equate WUR rights to the rights of legally married wives. Secondly it
shows the inadequacy in the legislature in that period to provide for destitute WUR.
However, Section 144 of the Indian Evidence Act 1857 states that there will be a
presumption of marriage in cases of continuous cohabitation where there was no evidence
of a ceremony of marriage. In Badri Prasad versus Deputy Director of Consolidation
(AIR 1978 SC 1557), the Supreme Court held that the law leans in favour of legitimacy.
The burden of proof lies on the person who seeks to challenge the legality of the union to
rebut the presumption of wedlock between two persons who have been living together as
husband and wife. In S.P.S Balasubramaniam versus V. Suruttayan ((1994) 1 SCC 460)
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the Supreme Court held that when a man and women live together for a long time, a
presumption of marriage will be raised. The principle of presumption of legitimacy of
marriage in cases of cohabitation was further reiterated by the Supreme Court in the cases
Rajagopal Pillai versus Paikkam Ammal ((2004) 3 CTC 119), Kalpana Biswas versus
Sukamal Biswas ((2004) 1 CHN 93), Madhavan Balasundaram versus Madhavan
Saeasamma (AIR 2004 Ker 79).
4.2 Constructions of WUR in Cases Relating to ‘Live in Relationships’
The definition of domestic relationship in the DVA as interpreted by the higher judiciary
seems to privilege relationships that are marriage-like. This can result in the under
protection of WUR because of the giving of benefits and protection based on how close
the relationship ‘mimics’ a real marriage. This kind of construction resembles a ‘marriage
mimicry model’ of domestic violence legislation which is an insufficient means of
discerning whether people are in real need of protection (Colker’s, 2006:1847). She
suggests using a more ‘functional approach’ to decide whom the recipients of benefit
must be (Colker, 2006:1847). The presumption of wedlock, the presumption of
legitimacy and the requirement of a relationship in the nature of marriage all require an
imitation of marriage and this would result in many WUR being left out of the preview of
the law’s functionality. The presumption is that if a relationship is ‘marriage-like’ in the
various elements that constitute it, then the law leans in favour of legitimacy. The litmus
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test is to compare the relationship with a legitimate marriage and observe if the
similarities are enough to deem a de facto marriage (Tulsa and Ors. versus Durghatiya
&amp; Ors. (2008 (4) SCC 520) and Chanmuniya versus Virendra Kumar Singh
Kushwaha (2011) 1SCC 14))
In Aruna Pramod Shah versus Union of India (Uoi) (WP.Cri. 425/2008Del), the
petitioner challenged the DVA as being ultra vires the Constitution of India for only
protecting women. It was argued that this was against Article 14 of the Constitution that
promised equality of law and equal status of the law to all Indian citizens. The Court held
that the legislation was meant to protect female victims of violence within their homes
and this would constitute an intelligible differentia that is, classification of people that
constitutes a ‘reasonable nexus’ for the objective of the legislation. The argument made
on the behalf of the man that a ring ceremony does not constitute a valid marriage and
that a ‘mistress’ would not have the same right as a wife within the DVA was buttressed
by the judgment. The higher judiciary has interpreted the definition of a victim of
violence and that of ‘wife’ in this decision. On the behalf of the man it was also argued
that the definition of domestic relationship in DVA which puts married women and
women in live in relationships on an equal footing is subject to challenge. In this case the
tensions in the constructions of WUR are evident. The court responded to the argument
that the similar status given to women in live in relationships does not take from the
status of a married woman. By way of obiter the court acknowledged the vulnerability
and the lack of bargaining powers of women in live in relationships. In this case the
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construction of WUR identity is that of a victim in need of the laws protection and their
transgressive identity is overshadowed by their helpless female victim subject identity.
4.3 Construction of WUR in Cases Relating to Maintenance
Another aspect of judicial construction of WUR is cases relating to financial support
provisions in the form of maintenance. These constructions are made in regard to whether
a WUR is entitled to maintenance and if so whether it is through an inclusion within
marriage status. Thus in this section we explore the wider legal issue of maintenance and
the constructions of WUR within it.
The first case is Narinder Pal kaur Chawla versus M S Chawla, 148 (2008), Delhi Law
Times 522 (DB). The facts of the case are as follows. Narinder was married to Chawla in
accordance with Sikh customs in 1977 in Punjab. They lived for 14 years in Delhi during
which they had two daughters. In 1991, Narinder went back to Punjab to complete her
graduate studies. When she returned in two months’ time her mother-in -law refused her
entry into the matrimonial home. She found out on her return that her husband had been
married to someone else before they were married. Her husband had deserted her and she
filed a criminal case of bigamy and also filed for maintenance under her personal law of
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her Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. She also filed for interim maintenance
during the trial. Before the high court of Delhi, it was submitted on behalf of Narinder
that they had lived together for 14 years and had shared a household and looked after
their children together. It was also submitted on her behalf that her husband had deceived
into the marriage by hiding the fact of his first marriage. On behalf of Chawla, it was
submitted that she was not entitled to maintenance as she was not legally wedded to him.
He relied on Supreme Court’s earlier judgment in Savitaben’s case discussed in section
4.1 above. This judgment is essential for establishing judicial constructions of WUR
because the court took specific use of three distinct expressions – ‘wife’, ‘Hindu wife’
and ‘concubine’. Section 18 (2) of the Hindu Maintenance and Adoption Act, 1956.
Section 18 (2) (f) entitles a Hindu wife to maintenance if the husband keeps a concubine.
The court declared that this section accords a higher status to a Hindu wife in comparison
to a concubine. The court held that women in the position of a second wife (as opposed to
a concubine) can be treated as a legally wedded wife for the purposes of maintenance.
The court based this judgment on the fact that the man had cheated the woman by
concealment of his first marriage and for this reason she can be treated as a legally
wedded ‘Hindu wife’ (Narinder Palkaur Chawla versus M S Chawla, 148 (2008), Delhi
Law Times 522 (DB) ).
In this aspect of maintenance a judgment that sparked a lot of controversy with many
women’s groups expressing outrage at the manner in which the judgment in the case was
worded was that of D.Velusamy versus D. Patchaiammal (2010 STPL (Web) 856 SC)/
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(AIR 2011 SC 479), the Court held that all live in relationships will not amount to
relationships in the nature of marriage to benefit from the DVA. Justice Katju opined
thus:
‘In our opinion not all live in relationships will amount to a relationship in the
nature of marriage to get the benefit of the Act of 2005. To get such benefit the
conditions mentioned by us above must be satisfied, and this has to be proved by
evidence. If a man has a `keep' whom he maintains financially and uses mainly
for sexual purpose and/or as a servant it would not, in our opinion, be a
relationship in the nature of marriage' (2010 STPL (Web) 856 SC)/ (AIR 2011 SC
479).
The court said that it was aware that such a view would exclude many women who had or
have a live in relationship from benefitting from the DVA. However it declared that it
could not amend or change the law as the parliament had used the expression
‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ and ‘not live in relationship’. The Supreme Court
then proceeded to list out certain specifications for a ‘live in relationship’ to constitute a
‘relationship in the nature of marriage’. It was set out that the couple should have held
themselves out to the society as having lived like spouses for a considerable amount of
time. They must be of the legal age of marriage and qualified to be married, and they
should be otherwise unmarried. They must prove that they have voluntarily cohabited
(2010 STPL (Web) 856 SC). By setting out these requisites, women’s rights activists felt
that the highest Court of the country has excluded many categories of WUR. By
specifying that the couple must be unmarried otherwise, the Court is excluding second
and third wives or single women in partnerships with married men and married women in
partnerships with single men and otherwise married couples in intimate partnerships.
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The most caustic criticism came from Indira Jaising (2010), the head of LCWRI. By
2009she became India’s sole woman additional solicitor general and attained an even
more powerful voice to speak on behalf of domestic violence victims. She criticised the
decision on several counts. She stated that the decision of the Supreme Court in this case
was made on moral grounds and as one of the chief drafters of the DVA, she said that the
definition of domestic relationship in the DVA is self-explanatory and the one used to
explain intimate relationships throughout the world (Jaising, 2010). She then proceeded
to argue that it covers by implication cohabitation and a relationship similar to marriage.
The court argued that the parties should not be otherwise married but as Jaising (2010)
argues this would mean that if a man were living with a woman who is not his wife and
they have a relationship and even children together, the ‘second’ woman would not have
rights. This is against the very spirit of the DVA. It would also mean that the DVA would
deny the protection of law to ‘such women’ in relationships in the nature of marriage. In
a country where second, third and even fourth ‘marriages’ for men are silently accepted,
such an interpretation leaves women very vulnerable. Relief to women can be denied
merely on the basis of who manages to obtain the first marriage.
One of the main concerns of the court in this decision was that the ‘first’ or the ‘real’
wife’s rights might be undermined by providing the ‘other’ woman with equal rights
under the DVA. However it ignores the fact that the man entered into a second
relationship with another woman and instead makes a moral judgment on the second
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woman. In effect, the person who suffers is the second woman while the man is without
responsibility. The distinction between the two women and their rights speaks of bias and
moral judgment (Jaising, 2010).
Aside from this, the judgment created controversy for its use of language - the use of the
‘keep’ to refer to women who do not fall within the now legitimate category of
‘relationship in the nature of marriage’. Only women can be ‘kept’ according to this
decision and is an extreme form of discrimination based on sex and marital status
(Jaising, 2010). Jaising claimed that the decision was a violation of the fundamental
rights of women and words like ‘cohabitees’ or partners should have been used instead.
The Supreme Court’s judgment on eligibility for maintenance in a broken live-in alliance
differentiates between a ‘keep’ and a free will live-in partner. Only a married man can
maintain a ‘keep’ a similar alliance in case of an unmarried, legally eligible person is a
‘live-in’ arrangement. Jaising argues that whether the relationship is for sex or for
emotional help or other reasons are issues that could be decided after weighing the
evidence brought up by the aggrieved partner, (2010).
Further, Justice Katju, included the following statement in his judgment:
‘It seems to us that in the aforesaid Act of 2005 Parliament has taken notice of a
new social phenomenon which has emerged in our country known as live-in
relationship. This new relationship is still rare in our country, and is sometimes
found in big urban cities in India, but it is very common in North America and
Europe.’ (2010 STPL (Web) 856 SC)
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He would seem to be identifying a form of cultural exclusivity in the private (as
discussed in Chapter One) and a desire to keep away from the strangleholds of western
corruptive influences. The controversial judgement was further in the news when, in a
judgment dated 16 March, 2011 reported in major Indian newspapers (Times of India;
Deccan Herald; The Tribune; 16 March 2011), the Supreme Court bench constituted by
Justice M. Katju and Justice TS Thakur quashed a petition by the women’s group Mahila
Dakshat Samiti that requested the withdrawal of the word ‘keep’ from the Velusami
judgment. The court ruled that the organisation did not have the locus standi to challenge
the decision as they were not party to the matrimonial dispute.
The frivolous nature sometimes attributed to unconventional partnerships by some
members of the higher judiciary is evidence by the wordings of this judgment of the
Supreme Court of India:
'Live-in relationship' is a walk-in and walk-out relationship. There are no strings
attached to this relationship, neither this relationship creates any legal bond
between the parties. It is a contract of living together which is renewed every day
by the parties and can be terminated by either of the parties without consent of the
other party and one party can walk out at will at any time. Those, who do not
want to enter into this kind of relationship of walk-in and walk-out, they enter into
a relationship of marriage, where the bond between the parties has legal
implications and obligations and cannot be broken by either party at will. Thus,
people who chose to have 'live-in relationship' cannot complain of infidelity or
immorality as live-in relationships are also known to have been between married
man and unmarried woman or between a married woman and an unmarried man.
– Justice Dhingra in Alok Kumar versus State &Anr. (Crl.M.C.No. 299/2009)
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This case involved a woman in an intimate partnership who was beaten and bruised by
her violent partner in an airport lounge. The man was married to another woman and was
planning to leave for London when the aggrieved person tried to intercept his travel. The
judgment of the court implied that his partner was trying to involve him in a malicious
prosecution. The court took into consideration the fact that the aggrieved person had
knowledge of the existing marriage of the respondent. The judgment also endowed fewer
rights to intimate partners as they had by their own volition entered into a ‘no strings
attached’ relationship (Crl.M.C.No. 299/2009). The danger is in turning a blind eye to
violence in the process of identifying if the woman is a worthy legal subject. The most
important issue is the fact that a woman was subject to severe violence. This seems to be
lost in the rush to establish the worthiness of the legal subject.
The ambiguity about the interpretation of the phrase ‘live in relationship’ is further
evidenced in the wording of the judgment dated 25 April 2011, of the Jharkhand High
Court in Vineetha Devi versus Unknown (Cr. Rev. No. 444 of 2007).
‘Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I find that the counsel
for the petitioner has argued consistently on the 'live-in' relationship between the
petitioner and the opposite party, though the petitioner claimed in the proceeding
for maintenance that she was legally married to the opposite party in temple after
the death of her first husband, but the same which was the issue on facts could not
be proved. No evidence could be adduced in support of valid marriage between
the parties and that the concept of 'live-in' relationship in the background of
Indian culture and society, sanction of such relationship is yet to interpret by the
Larger Bench of the Apex Court. In view of that matter, the statutory provision,
by which the "wife" has been defined in terms of Section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, cannot be liberalised.’- Justice Sinha (Cr. Rev. No. 444 of
2007)
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In the first chapter of the DVA, a ‘domestic relationship’ is defined as ‘the relationship
between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared
household when they are related by blood, consanguinity, marriage or through a
relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as
a joint family’ (The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005, No. 43 of
2005, section 2(f)). The definition makes for a clear inclusion of married women whereas
the phrase ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ has been interpreted as being a certain
qualification of ‘live in relationships’. As seen in the development of case law, the
interpretation of this phrase has been vague and unfavourable to WUR. A ‘relationship in
the nature of marriage implies an ‘imitation’ or a mimicking of the requisites of marriage.
This would include a ‘civil’ marriage of sorts, with proof that the couple have lived
together like a husband and wife, with shared property, children and the society deeming
them as though being in a marriage.
4.4 Shared Household and Non-Resident Indians (NRI) Marriages
Another element of the constructions of the WUR identity is through the interpretation of
shared household in the DVA and specifically in regard to non-resident Indian marriages.
The drafters of the law recognised that it was not merely enough to advocate criminal
sanctions for the problem of domestic violence. They realised that an enabling
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environment was necessary for an aggrieved person to assert her rights and seek legal
recourse. It is in this context that the right to reside in a shared household becomes
important. The DVA assures the aggrieved person that she would be allowed to continue
residing in a shared household even if she seeks legal action against her partner. This has
a direct bearing on the property and matrimonial rights of women which were previously
dealt with separately within the personal laws. The right to a shared household by its very
definition implies a matrimonial right. A WUR who has already ostracised her natal
family by moving in with a man would be rendered homeless as Judges have already
begun to narrow down the right to a shared household.
An issue that arises out of this right is the cases dealing with marriages of Non-Resident
Indians (NRI). The right to shared household is powerful because of the proprietary rights
that it entails. The issue of shared household in the context of NRI marriages arise when
men employed outside India get married to women who reside in India. It is customary in
India for women to live in their husband’s natal homes even in the absence of the
husband, although it is not a rule. In S.R. Batra versus Taruna Batra ((2007) (1) 4LRC
SC), the Supreme Court concluded that the right to reside in a shared household only
applies when the house belongs to the husband and does not extend to a house belonging
to the husband’s parents.
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In Varun Malik versus Payal Malik (Crl. Rev. P. No.252/2010, 253/2010 & 338/2010)
Justice Dhingra stated in his judgment the following:
‘If the domestic relationship continued and if the parties have lived together at
any point of time in a shared household, the person can be a respondent but if the
relationship does not continue and the relationship had been in the past and is not
in the present, a person cannot be made respondent on the ground of a past
relationship. Thus, the domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and
the respondent must be present and alive at the time when complaint under
Domestic Violence Act is filed and if this relationship is not alive on the date
when complaint is filed, the domestic relationship cannot be said to be there.’
Varun Malik versus Payal Mailk (Crl. Rev. P. No.252/2010, 253/2010 &
338/2010)
The court declared that the first and second respondents had not lived with the petitioner
under the same roof in India for the last seven and a half years although it was
acknowledged that she lived with the first respondent in the USA until August 2008. It
was stated in the judgment that the second respondent had no moral or legal
responsibility to the petitioner as he was not in a domestic relationship with her. The third
respondent was the first respondent’s father. Quashing her right to shared household in
her husband’s joint family house, the Judge stated:
‘The girl and the parents of the girl knew it very well that they had selected a person
for marriage with whom the girl was going to live abroad and the matrimonial home
and the shared household was going to be outside India. This act of marrying a
person settled abroad is a voluntary act of the girl. If she had not intended to enjoy
the fat salary which boys working abroad get and the material facilities available
abroad, she could have refused to marry him and settled for a boy having moderate
salary within India.’ - Justice Dhingra in Varun Malik versus Payal Malik (Crl. Rev.
P. No.252/2010, 253/2010 & 338/2010)
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The Court stated that the petitioner could not use the ‘safety of Indian culture’ to ask for
the right to a shared household in the joint family home as it was also the joint
responsibility of the petitioner’s family to house her. The court took a narrow
interpretation of the phrase ‘shared household’ and said that the domestic relationship can
said to subsist only if there has been a period of living under the same roof. It was also
stated that the definition pre supposes that the woman is living with the person who
committed violence and domestic relationship is not dead buried or severed. This does
not speak of past violence which a woman suffered before grant of divorce (Crl. Rev. P.
No.252/2010, 253/2010 & 338/2010).
The problems that this decision of the Delhi High Court has created are manifold. It
requires that the domestic relationship must exist in the present and if it is no longer
existent during the time that the complaint is made; the ‘domestic relationship’ would be
void. Secondly it narrowed the definition of shared household to that of living under the
same roof. Thirdly it is vindictive towards the petitioner in its wordings that implies that
the petitioner’s situation is a result of her own greed. WUR would struggle to prove the
existence of a domestic relationship. There are also certain categories of WUR that do not
share a household with the petitioner. Hence the very concept of the remedy of ‘shared
household’ would be a difficult one for WUR to claim.
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In the order dated 13 August 2010 in Vijay Verma versus State Nct Of Delhi &Anr.(Crl.
M.C. No.3878/2009), Justice Dhingra of the Delhi High Court used the same
interpretation of the phrase ‘shared household’ and narrowed it further to living under the
same roof for a continuous period of time. He also declared that domestic violence can
occur only when the couple reside in a shared household and emotional torture and
blackmail by messages or telephone do not constitute offences under the DVA.
‘Domestic Violence is a violence which is committed when parties are in domestic
relationship, sharing same household and sharing all the household goods with an
opportunity to commit violence.’- Justice Dhingra in Vijay Verma versus State Nct
Of Delhi &Anr.(Crl. M.C. No.3878/2009)
Thus the definition has limited and narrowed down the possibility of terming certain acts
as domestic violence and this is against the spirit of the Act which specifically intended
to leave the definition broad to ensure justice to victims of violence.
The High Court of Bombay, in the case before Smt Roshan Dalvi, of Ishpal Singh Kahai
versus Ramanjeet Kahai (Wr. P. No.576 of 2011) she declared that no proprietary rights
arise from the DVA. It is completely a protectionist legislation not an empowering one.
Although the law grants the aggrieved persons protection, it goes only as far to being a
temporary remedy and is meant to ‘hold the fort’ whilst the couple work through their
disputes and problems. Justice Dalvi, observed the following in her judgment:
‘The Act is an extension of the deeper and profounder principle of Women’s
Rights as a part of Human Rights. The matrimonial home or the shared household
of a person does not require it to be owned or co-owned by the person who has
been violated.In fact, the lesser the entitlement to property rights, the more is the
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entitlement to protection of human rights against violence. It may not be out of
place to rethink the depth of the words of none other than Mahatma Gandhi
reaching out to the most vulnerable of humankind in generic terms: I hold that the
more helpless a creature, the more entitled it is to protection by men, from the
cruelty of men.’ (Wr. P. No.576 of 2011)
Justice Dalvi thus reiterates that the DV Act does not redistribute property rights, but
introduces a new right to ‘occupy’ which finds its justification in human rights. The
judgment safely steers clear of endowing any proprietary rights which it seems to be
comfortable doing only in existing property law frameworks.
In the case of Jane Antony, Wife of Antony versus V.M.Siyath, Vellooparambil Justice
Ramachandran Nair delivering the judgment on 25 September, 2008 declared:
‘At present in our society a large number of illegal relationships prevail and the
number of illegitimate children are increasing in alarming proportions in all
communities. Several men and women live together without marrying and the
society is not attributing immorality to them.The modern enactment recognises
and justifies to the limited extent the relationship in the nature of marriage is a
cohabitation even without a lawful marriage. The only exception is prostitutes
(unchaste women) and the children born to them.. Married woman or a woman
having relationship in the nature of marriage live and share the household are
entitled to the legal protection along with others as per provisions envisaged in
the above Act’ (M.A.C.A.NO. 1324 OF 2004)
The use of phrases like ‘illegal relationship’, ‘unchaste women’, and the words
‘increasing at an alarming rate’ in the context ‘illegitimate’ children illustrates the
judiciary’s discomfort with unconventional morality. The judgment continued to declare
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that ‘Pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant.’- the father is whom the marriage points out.
This confirms the legality of marriage and the legal status of the people confined within
it. It others WUR and their children by defining a sphere of legality marked by the
institution of marriage and ruling out everything outside this sphere as illegal and
illegitimate. However in the case of Mrs. Savita Bhanot versus Lt. Col. V.D.Bhanot
decided on 22 March 2010 (Crl.M.C. No.3959/2009 & Crl.M.A.13476/2009) it was
decided that the DVA can be applied retrospectively for acts of violence that were done
before the Act became the law. It was also declared in the judgment by Justice Jain that
women did not have to be living with the abuser in order to file a complaint using the
DVA as the Court failed to see the intelligible differentia between women living with the
abuser at the time of complaint and women living separately.
5. Conclusion
This chapter had the objective of locating WUR within the procedural and substantive
aspects of the DVA. The other objective was to locate the inclusion and exclusion of
WUR within the case law. This chapter has argued that the marginally placed WUR are
disadvantaged in so far as they are compared to women in legitimate marriages. The two
specific ways in which they are able to find a favourable position within the judgments
are when the relationship ‘mimics’ a marriage and when their helpless victimhood
overshadows their trangressive WUR identities. The findings of this chapter thus build on
the arguments in Chapters One and Two. In the next two chapters we will investigate the
field work findings in the two different DV framework in Delhi and Mumbai.
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CHAPTER Four
Accessing the DVA: WUR in Delhi
1. Introduction
In order to explore the way in which WUR are constructed as transgressors and to
consider the extent to which differing institutional approaches to tackling VAW are in
operation in India, field work was undertaken in two locations – Delhi and Mumbai.
Delhi was chosen for considering the implications for WUR because of the central role
played by the NGO, Lawyers Collective Women’s Right Initiative (LCWRI) in the
development and the implementation of the DVA and the prominent role played by
women’s legal activism in this DV framework. The other reason is that Delhi being the
centre of legal establishment in India, the likelihood that an advocacy approach to VAW
may be dominant. Mumbai was chosen because of the importance of the Tata Institute of
Social Science’s collaborative approach with the local police commission and because of
the distance from the capital leading to the likelihood of a social work approach to VAW
in order to test its implications for WUR. This chapter considers the first framework
called the Victim Model. As Chapter Two established a feminist approach to research, in
the context of Delhi Victim Model, it took the form of participatory research coupled
with qualitative interviews. This chapter begins with placing the research within the
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wider social and political context of Delhi before moving on to describe the positioning
of LCWRI within the overall institutional context. My location within the organisation is
then described before turning to a more detail description of the field work taken under
their auspices. There after the chapter moves on to describe research undertaken with
other institutional stakeholders. The main questions that this chapter seeks to answer are:
What are the identities constructed for WUR within the Victim Model and what are the
implications for the WUR accessing the DVA with such constructed identities in the
Victim Model.
1.1 A Note of Caution
The two models- Survivor and Victim- are derived from the particular way of
functioning of the selected organisations. This is not a comparative thesis and it does not
exclude the possibility of other frameworks existing within both these cities. The two
organisations have been chosen on the premise that due to the various characteristics and
the geographical location of the two organisations, the Survivor Model (represented by
the Special Cells for Women and Children, Mumbai would follow the social work
approach and the Victim Model (represented by the Lawyers Collective, New Delhi)
would follow the legal advocacy approach. The other reason for the justification for the
choice of these two representative organisations being the need to understand the DV law
as a WUR survivor (in the Special Cell) and as a lawyer and a researcher (in the Lawyers
Collective).
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2. New Delhi: City Profile
New Delhi is the capital city of India and is the seat of the central government of India as
well as the government for the National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCT). It is also the
location of the President’s residence, the Parliament of India and the Supreme Court of
India. It has a total area of 42.7 kilometers. In the sixty ninth amendment of the
Constitution of India, 1991 the Union Territory of Delhi came to be known as the
National Capital Territory of Delhi. The main languages spoken are Hindi which is also
the national language, Punjabi, Urdu and English (Delhi Government 2005). Other
linguistic groups include Bihari, Bengali, Sindhi, Tamil, Telgu, Garhwali, Kannada,
Malayalam, Marati, Oddiya and Gujarathi (Indian Government 2006). New Delhi is also
one of the nine districts of Delhi. Geographically New Delhi is a landlocked city with the
exception of the river Yamuna. In the census of 2001New Delhi had a population of
179112 with 86.8% of this population being of the Hindu religion (India Government
2010). The other major religious communities are Muslims – 6.3%, Sikhs – 2.4%, Jains –
1.1%, and Christians – 0.9%. The literacy rate is 81.67% and the female to male ratio is
925 women to 1000 men (U.N 2006).
Although New Delhi is the political and legal capital of India, it is also the least safe city
for women in India (U.N 2010). Despite this, New Delhi is the feminist hub of India, and
the domestic violence legislation is the result of almost a decade of consistent work by
the women’s rights movement.
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3. Institutional Context: LCWRI
The law is sometimes perceived as a tool or an instrument that can bring about social
change (Murphy, 1992; Stoodard, 1997; Vago & Nelsen, 2000). Particularly in relation to
human rights work, social transformation is often one of the long term goals of NGO
(Rao, 1997). As we saw in the introduction to this thesis, the Lawyers Collective (LC)
was the main drafter of the DV bill and is still working in tandem with the government
and other women’s groups to monitor and evaluate the working of the DVA throughout
the country. In order to locate WUR in the access of the DVA and within the dominant
discourses amongst the legislative authorities and the other main stakeholders, the
research was designed to test the proposition by undertaking field work related to LC and
its duties in relation to the DVA.
The Lawyers Collective Women’s Right Initiative (LCWRI) in its manifesto declares its
main objective as the empowerment of women through law (Jaising, 2006; Basu, 2008).
This NGO acts on the premise that law is a tool that can bring about social change and
consequently extol the constitutional and human rights of women. Since its inception in
1998 the LCWRI have worked in collation with the government in relation to women’s
rights issue in the law. This initiative is a part of Lawyers Collective which is an NGO
that consist of a small group of lawyers lead by Indira Jaising. The NGO works broadly
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on issues related to human rights but focuses on the use of law for the empowerment of
marginalised groups. This is done by extensive human rights advocacy, legal training and
litigation. Jaising is often celebrated as the chief drafter of the DVA. The LCWRI was
largely responsible for the enactment of the DVA as they worked on the drafting of the
bill and lobbied for the passing of the bill by the government.
The LCWRI receives its main funding from the UN trust fund VAW for the purposes of
the implementation of the DVA. This funding is largely used for the training and
sensitisation of the authorities, the preparation of training and bench manuals for the
judges (LCWRI, 2010). The main aim of this project funded by the UN is to make the
DV framework a victim friendly one so that the aggrieved persons can expect easy
procedure to access protection from domestic violence. The LCWRI have also joined
hands with the Ministry for the Welfare of Women and Children, the Tata Institute of
Social Sciences and the National commission for Women.
Thus as the seat of the legal initiative which resulted in the implementation of the DVA,
New Delhi was chosen as one of the two fields of this research. It is mainly in Delhi that
the Lawyers Collective conducts police training sections, workshops for Protection
Officers and social workers in order to ensure that the procedural framework of the DVA
is slowly perfected by the identification of the best practices and the elimination of the
worst ones (LCWRI, 2009; 2010; 2011). Through training and sensitisation programmes
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the Lawyers Collective seems to be opening up a civil societal space as a safety net for
the users of the DVA. This will be discussed in a later section in this chapter and further
analysed as a field work finding in Chapter Six.
The preliminary research was done in the New Delhi office of the LC in the form of a
internship in the month of September in the year 2007. This period is a crucial time in the
implementation of the Act as the first year all India conference of the monitoring and
evaluation of the DVA was in October and the officers were busy compiling the first year
monitory and evaluation report. The next stage of field work in Delhi was undertaken in
August 2008. The research design aimed to examine the legislation from the point of
view of the main authorities towards WUR. It was deemed that as a researcher and a
lawyer working with the drafters of the DVA I would be able to decipher the working of
the authorities in the centre of the DV legal framework and their outlook towards WUR.
As mentioned in chapter two the Delhi mode of working of the DV law is termed the
victim model following the presumption that since the implementation is closely related
to LC and the law as a tool method, this design is the virtual opposite of the Mumbai
model where as a participant observer and a survivor of violence, I was able to access the
point of view of the WUR towards the centre. Thus the research was designed to get a
bifocal view of the experience of the DVA as a survivor and a researcher.
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3.1 The LC: Shaping Debates, Constructions of Victims of DV and WUR
The LCWRI supported by UNIFEM has systematically monitored and evaluated the
implementation of the DVA in various parts of the country. Every year as a part of the
monitoring process the LC publish a report after collating data from different states in
order to identify the best practices adopted and to address the problems regarding its
implementation. The first such report presented in the first conference was called
‘Staying Alive: An Assessment of the Functioning of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act’ (Basu, 2005). During the editorial work and from the various
interviews conducted with the drafters it came to light that the legislation and the reports
had to be cautiously drafted in order to avoid political controversy and maneuver around
the anti-feminist sentiments of the people in power. So when I suggested that ‘Women’s
Rights are Human Rights’ could be the title of the press report of the impeding
conference, newspaper review about one of the drafters replied:
‘You cannot imagine the controversy this would court. We had enough trouble
getting this Act passed.’
The drafters had to negotiate and drive a hard bargain with the government to persuade
them to accept a draft of the bill that later became the DVA. Any mention of the human
rights of women according to the drafter would topple the fine balance that they had
achieved in appeasing those in political power and negotiating the rights of the victims of
DV.
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Six interviews were conducted within the LCWRI with officers who held different
positions, in order to establish constructions of WUR within this leading civil society
institution. This was done to test the extent to which the LCWRI with the legal focus at
the heart of the process, take the legal advocacy approach, construct WUR as victims and
adopt a feminist inclusive approach.
In her interview Asmita Basu said that the language of the DVA which specifically
includes ‘live in relationships’ was a major victory for the women’s movement (Basu, 17.
October 2007). However she expressed her doubts about the judicial interpretation of the
definition and speculated that the legislation might be running ahead of its time as far as
such relationships are concerned. In the context of WUR and monitory compensation,
Basu was of the opinion that it was unlikely that the Courts would interpret live in
relationships liberally as most judges were reluctant to give same remedies to legally
married women and WUR. In term of remedies that the DVA provided, Basu opined that
the most important remedy that women need is monetary compensation as the importance
of money to affect changes in a victim’s life cannot be underestimated (Basu, 17 October
2007). Thus in the specific remedial context of monetary compensation WUR are greatly
disadvantaged in comparison to their legally married counterparts. These finding have
been triangulated by the subsequent judgments discussed in the previous chapter.
153
Tensing Cheosang the chief research officer for the LCWRI (Cheosang, 18 October
2007), said that one of the main factors that set the DVA apart from previous attempts to
deal with DV is the inclusion of the phrase ‘live in relationship’ within the definition of
domestic relationship in the DVA. Despite this inclusive definition the chances of WUR
accessing this law are limited according to Cheosang. The reasons she gave for this were
the societal and traditional limitations placed on WUR. Mehak Sethi the chief advocacy
officer of the LCWRI (Sethi, 1 November 2007), seemed to be more optimistic,
believing that as the DV law grows, it would be effective in aiding WUR as much as
other women. He emphasized the possible role of the media in spreading awareness about
the problem of DV and the remedies available in the form of the DVA. Research and
advocacy officer Brototi Dutta (Dutta, 1 November 2007) shared this view and said that
media campaigns and legal awareness camps would have a positive influence on the
ability of WUR to access the law. Senior advocacy officer Afreen Sidiqui (Sidiqui, 22
October 2007) stated in her interview that the impetus for WUR in accessing the DVA
has to come from external sources. Elaborating on this statement she said that the law has
been laid down. However the access to justice is an issue that is often outside the control
of the law. It is in this sense that the legal recognition of a category outside of married
women does not go far in the case of WUR and their access to justice.
The interviews with Basu, Cheosang and Dutta, established that they emphasised that the
DVA was a ‘satellite’ legislation around which all the other legal methods of accessing
justice for victims of domestic violence still remained in place. One of the main aims of
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the legislation was to provide a violence free space and time for victims to decide on
what course to proceed on. For WUR, such choices of legal remedies are often limited as
we saw in Chapter Three how the DVA is the only law that expressly recognises women
who are not married but are in violent intimate relationships.
The interviews with Dutta, Cheosang, Basu and Sethi revealed that only the DVA
expressly includes within its definition of domestic violence victim, women in ‘live in’
relationships facing violence. The opinion on whether WUR would access the legislation
was divided, with the drafters saying that it would take time but, once the DV Act
becomes better known to the public, the marital status of victim would be irrelevant. The
other opinion was that unless the judiciary and the police were sensitised, certain
categories of WUR would be excluded due to prejudices against ‘illegitimate’
relationships. According to Basu, the mechanism provided for in the law is slowly taking
shape. Courts have been granting reliefs to women facing violence at home. There are,
however, wide regional variations in the manner of implementation and interpretation of
the law. However the drafters agreed that whilst collecting empirical data for the two
annual reports, throughout the country, the largest percentage (more than ninety five) of
users of the DV Act were married women. All of them agreed that gender inequality has
a direct bearing on the incidence of domestic violence specifically among WUR because
of the added societal prejudices.
155
3.2 WUR- The Conference, the Reports
In this section, we move on from the data from the qualitative interviews in the LCWRI
to the data collected by being a participant observer of the DVA review conference and
the secondary analysis of the reports of the three subsequent conferences. The
preparatory work and the report writing were completed and on the 27th and 28th of
October 2007 the first year review conference of the DVA was conducted at the Indian
Habitat Centre in New Delhi. The conference brought together representatives of state
agencies from around the country. This included Protection Officers, police,
representatives from government department, legal services authorities and civil society
activist working on woman’s rights issues.
The conference provided a forum for those who have involved in the implementation of
the DVA to share their experiences and to acknowledge the best practices that had been
adopted. Thereafter the state agencies – the judiciary, the central government, the police
and the legal service authorities responded to the problems raised and provided
suggestions for the effective implementation of the law. The national report ‘Staying
Alive: First Monitoring and Evaluation Report; 2007 on the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005’ was presented at the conference. There have been
conferences adopting a similar format accompanied by an annual report ever since. This
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process is unique in the legislative implementation processes and has shaped the debates
regarding DV and WUR. No other piece of legislation in India has been thus supported in
its implementation.
Jaising in her foreword to the fourth report calls the breakdown of marriage and its
attendant discrimination a ‘civil death’ for a woman. This shows what a marriage means
to a woman’s status in society. In this context, WUR are perceived as a category that is
discriminated against. Without a legal marriage, the discrimination in society is rampant
(Rasthogi & Therly, 2006). In Maharashtra, in fact, women have also moved against the
members of their natal family. In two states, mothers have also filed cases against their
sons.
This research undertaken for the purposes of the report brought to light that the primary
users of the DVA are married women. A trend confirmed by each monitoring report in
the following three years (LCWRI, 2008; 2009; 2010). WUR thus do not use the DVA as
much as married women according to the data compiled by the LC.
In terms of remedies for the victims, the most common relief asked for and given was
maintenance (LCWRI, 2007). This triangulates the data from the interview with Basu
about the importance of providing monetary relief to victims. The second most
commonly granted relief were residence orders and protection orders. As per the data
collected from the reports and at the conference, mostly married women and not WUR
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have been making use of such remedies under the DVA. An urgent need was recognised
for adequate budgetary allocations at the central and state levels in order to provide for
the remedies and the facilities in the implementation of the DVA (LCWRI, 2007).
The LCWRI supplement their legal advocacy strategy by being mindful of wider feminist
approach involving survivors is evident from the existence of the ‘Survivors Groups’ that
consisted of women who had been in violent relationships and who had successfully
managed to escape and rebuild their lives. The Lawyers Collective has initiated the
formation of these ‘Survivors Group’ in Bombay and Delhi in order for victims of
domestic violence to have a forum for sharing their experiences and to support each
other. It was one of the members of this group in Delhi, who designed the beautiful front
cover of the first report. The members of these groups met to help and listen to each other
and also to provide feedback about the needs of the law and how it can be improved.
Such local support networks were not exclusive to married women and such social
groups could constitute nonjudgmental forums for WUR to form supportive friendships.
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3.3 The DVA: The Government and Civil Society
Monitoring the functioning of the law was perceived by the drafters as an integral part of
ensuring implementation, specifically monitoring in conjunction with the government.
The reports, by collating the data from all these states and by evolving a useful set of
indicators and identifying best practices, have significantly shaped the debates. LCWRI
therefore undertook to collect data in collaboration with the Ministry of Women and
Child Development, the National Commission for Women, Solutions Exchange
Programme of the UNDP, lawyers and women’s rights groups in the states. The Office of
the Chief Justice of India facilitated data collection on cases filed and proceedings
adopted under this law from all High Courts. The methods involved circulating
questionnaires, interviews and consultations with state functionaries, collection of orders
and judgments from different courts and functioning authorities and field visits to 10
states by members of the LCWRI (Jaising, 2006).
At the start of the Lawyers Collective campaign, it was decided that the law should be
primarily civil in nature, with important crossover elements of criminal law. However,
the foundation of this effort was the recognition of the agency of the woman (LCWRI,
2010). The Lawyers Collective website notes that the first copy of the report was given to
the Speaker of the parliament to indicate government endorsement and to show the
credibility of the efforts. Over the four years, the monitoring and evaluation efforts by the
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Lawyers Collective have been very fruitful and best practices have been identified for
improving the implementation of the DV law and the data has been useful for the
formulation of the DVR which is released and published by the government. This kind of
joint endeavor between the civil society and the government strengthens the DV
framework because of the financial aid that the government can provide in conjuncture
with the civil societal activism.
From filling of Domestic Incident Reports (DIRs) to assisting in the enforcement of court
orders, POs have been performing various functions. Under the DVA, the DIR containing
the formal complaint can be recorded with the PO (Protection Officer), the Service
Provider (SP), and the head of the Medical Facility (MF). In the first year, based on the
ways in which the Aggrieved Person (AP) was approaching the courts, three models were
identified by the LCWRI, namely, the Public, Private and Mixed which have been
discussed in Chapter Three (LC, 2007).
The new ‘civil space’ that the DVA seems to be carving out is ideal for the sensitive
nature of the complaints of DV. It forms a safety net, so to speak, to protect victims from
the perpetrators of abuse and to prevent harsh and challenging means of accessing DV
law. The net has been meticulously woven by the drafters and the carefully designed
system of constant monitoring and identifying the best means has reinforced the safety
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net. Advocates, drafters, NGO activists, and the designated authorities within the DVA
seem to be assuming agency on the behalf of the victims.
4. WUR through the Eyes of the Police
In the second phase of my research, still adopting the participatory research method, I
attended and observed a police training session in the month of August 2008. By this
second phase of the field work in Delhi, my research revealed a major difference in
attitudes towards the institutional role of the police because it was now an activist aim to
marginalise the police from the working of the DVA and to minimise their role in
dealing with DV complaints. Various reasons have been given by various stakeholders as
to why police involvement seems to have been checked by the drafters and reviewers of
the DVA. In the view of the research officer of the LCWRI Tensing Cheosang this is a
result of the failure of section 498 A:
‘The police are often the first port of call for a victim of violence. The debacle of
section 498A was considered whilst the Bill was drafted.’ (Cheosang, 18 October
2007)
Elaborating on this, Tensing Cheosang explained that the bad press that 498A that turned
family members into ‘criminals’ made the think-tanks at the LCWRI decide that the need
of the hour is a civil law that would provide such a ‘violence-free space’ (Cheosang,
2007). The sense of excitement was evident in the interviews with the members of
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LCWRI was this gradual movement of the law on DV from the control of state
authorities towards a more woman-centered and victim friendly civil society. Similar
sentiments were expressed by a Protection Officer who wished to remain anonymous:
‘The police are insensitive to the needs of a domestic violence victim. They often
make rude sexist comments and sexual innuendos especially if a young unmarried
woman is involved and goes unaccompanied to the police station’
Thus the role of the police office is limited to that part of the DVA contained in section
31 of the DVA when the civil law becomes a criminal one.
The drafters of the DVA conduct police training sessions in Delhi to educate and sensitise
the police about the DV Act and to help them understand their role in facilitating justice
in cases of domestic violence. Permission was obtained to observe a police training
session in Delhi. The observation sought to establish police attitudes to WUR within this
wider institutional context. The ‘question answer session’ during the session was
particularly useful to establish how the police perceived different categories of women
under the DVA.
Forty four officers of various ranks attended, including five police women. The session
was led by Tensing Cheosang, Chief Research Officer, LCWRI. Two of the other
speakers were Supreme Court advocates and the fourth speaker was a member of the
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Human Rights Association in Delhi. The role of the police was explained by Tensing
Cheosang to the police at the training session:
‘The role of the police officer starts only after section 31 is evoked. Thus section
31 is the turning point of the Act from civil to criminal sanction.’ She also read
out the relevant section and elaborated its function to the police officers.
Section 31 ‘Penalty for breach of protection order by respondent –
(1) A breach of protection order, or of an interim protection order, by the respondent
shall be an offence under this Act and shall be punishable with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which
may extend to twenty thousand rupees or with both.
(2) The offence under sub-section 1 shall as far as practicable be tried by the
magistrate who had passed the order, the breach of which has been alleged to
have been caused by the accused.
(3) While framing charges under sub-section 1 the magistrate may also frame charges
under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other provision
of that Code or the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 (28 of 1961), as the case may
be, if the facts disclose the commission of an offence under those provisions.
Several questions were raised by the police officer about the functioning of the DVA.
One of them explained that there were no Protection Officers in the vicinity of his police
station. The answer to this was that this was because the DVA was still a fairly new piece
of legislation. The police officer was directed to send the aggrieved person to the nearest
possible Protection Officer. Upon asked whether this would result in the miscarriage of
justice if the aggrieved person was in urgent need of protection, the speaker replied:
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‘The Act is suffering from teething problems. But this is a natural consequence of
a new and radical legislation.’
However she went on to explain that the immediate aim of the legislation and
consequently, all the designated authorities under the DVA, is the immediate end to the
violence. The legislation has been designed as a ‘stop gap arrangement’ to give the
woman some time to decide the best path in the law for her. The police officers were
informed that it was their legal responsibility to inform women of the procedures and of
the existence of such an Act. According to Cheosang, up to ninety five percent of the
women who approached the police because of violence did not know about the new
legislation.
During the question and answer session, a police officer enquired:
Jo aurath shaadi shuda nahi hai, jab hamare paas aathe hain, to hame kya karna hai?
‘When women who are not married approach us what should be do?’
The advocates replied that the DVA is applicable to all victims of domestic violence
irrespective of their marital status and proceeded to explain the definition of domestic
violence. Several objections were raised by the police officers about the misuse of 498A
and the unfairness of giving the same rights to wives and ‘other women’. The police
officers protested vehemently and declared that they were tired of the ‘false’ cases of
498A which they were forced to register by victims’ families against men and their
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mothers. They opined that this results in unnecessary harassment for men and they feared
that DVA would add to this ‘suffering’. They also seemed to think that if the WUR had
made their moral choices, they should be prepared to face the consequences for it.
Objections were also raised because the police officers found it problematic to treat wives
and ‘other’ women in the same way. There were also concerns about the potential home-
breaking nature of the legislation. An officer described how the temperament and the
education of the woman might result in her ‘talking back’ at her husband and in such
cases husbands might be justified in disciplining their wives. The speakers clarified that
the character or temperament of the woman was not their concern, neither was the
preservation of the family unit. The legislation had for its main aim the protection of a
woman complaining of the domestic violence. The woman’s word was final as far as the
existence of violence in her life is concerned.
The training session also revealed that the right to residence is a very important right. The
Batra judgment ensures that women can access and live in the ‘shared household’ even
after a complaint has been filed (2006 (13) SCALE 652). When this was being discussed,
a police officer asked the speaker about a second or third wife’s right to shared residence.
The speaker explained that the marital status of the woman was not a decisive factor
within the Act. If the woman happened to have ‘lived in’ with the respondent at any
stage, she is entitled to continue living in the house. The decision in Batra was further
reiterated in Shalu Bansal versus Nitin Bansal (CC 1250/1 (Delhi, Unreported Judgment
January 3, 2007).
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During the police training session, she referred to Indira Jaising’s opening address at the
First year review conference in which she said:
‘Our main aim was to create a violence free space for a victim of violence to decide
what action should be taken against the abusive partner.’ (Jaising, 27 October 2007)
There are no shelter homes in Delhi but the drafting lawyers felt that this was a teething
problem. The duty of the police officer, in the case of a woman seeking shelter from an
abusive partner was to make sure that she is taken to the nearest ‘safe place’ that the
woman knows about. This should ideally be a friend’s or a relative’s house. If a woman
fears that she might be subject to violence at this shelter, the police officer’s duty was to
pacify her and assign a police woman to protect her and send her to the nearest safe place
that the officer can think of.
There is a sense of ‘displacement’ when one thinks of the women. It is left to the
discretion of the police officer to ‘place’ her in ‘safe hands’. There seems to be a sense of
alienation when the women are considered. The law was tailor made to fit in with the
needs of domestic violence victims. And yet, despite its victim-centeredness, it does not
look victim friendly.
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The new DV legislation, according to a speaker was confusing even for lawyers.
However one of the specific intents of the Act was to minimise the role of the police in
the handling of domestic violence complaints. However some women continue to
approach the police officer and this still remains the first port of call for some victims of
violence, in spite of the restrictions on the powers of the police by the DVA. It was the
duty of the police officer to direct them to the nearest Protection Officer. The police were
specifically instructed that the right authority to handle a case of domestic violence is the
Protection Officer.
During the recess, a conversation with one police officer revealed that he thought that the
family is more worthy of protection that the women as Indian women were socially and
culturally trained to ‘adjust’ (Officer x, 23 August 2008). The views expressed by the
police officers are supported by other researchers who report a widespread opinion
amongst the police officers that domestic violence is a matter of the family and must be
dealt with privately; hence they are unwilling to interfere (Pardee, 1996; Hornbeck,
Johnson, LaGrotta, Sellman, 2005). The failure by police officers to properly report and
investigate domestic violence and dowry-related deaths has been widely reported (Spatz,
1991; Greenberg, 2003; Kaushik, 2003; Hornbeck, Johnson, LaGrotta, Sellman, 2005).
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4.1 The Deputy Commissioner of Police
‘No unmarried girl has approached me under the Act.’ (Virk, 28 August 2008)
In addition to the police training session, I also observed a session with the Deputy
Commissioner of police, HPS Virk in his office and interviewed him after the session. I
had been informed by Tensing Cheosang that DCP Virk was very interested and
concerned about protecting women and women’s rights. During the observation of a
session with the DCP taking a complaint from a victim of domestic violence, he consoled
her thus:
‘Beta, aurat ko sab sehna padtha hai. Jab wo kuch kahe, aap bas chup baitiye.
Use zyada ghussa math dilana’
‘Child, women have to bear everything. When he talks, you should keep quiet. Do
not provoke him more when he is angry’
Whilst he heard the complaints, I felt that he was concerned but uncomfortable that the
woman was crying. He consoled her by saying that they should ‘accept fate’ and try not
to be too defiant with her husband. He said ‘answering back’ was a main cause of the
aggravation of the situation in cases of domestic violence. DCP Virk explained to me that
there were no appointed Protection Officers in Nanakpura and hence, his officers dealt
with cases relating to domestic violence. He talked about the need for Protection Officers
in the premises. He tries to direct women to the Protection Officers in the nearby districts,
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but he admits that it is probably a tiring and expensive process for the victims to have to
go through.
5. Protection Officers and Related Authorities (Services Providers and
District Welfare Officer)
The main aims for this aspect of the research were to understand if the marital status of
the victim made a difference to the Protection Officers, to understand how much agency
these ‘middle women’ had in regard to WUR and DV and to understand any possible
short-comings and set backs of this institutional aspect of the Victim Model
5.1 Protection Officers
Seventeen Protection Officers were assigned for the whole of Delhi of whom only eight
were working. When they were contacted, four of them agreed to give me interviews. Out
of the remaining four, three calls went unanswered and in the fourth call, one person
informed that the Protection Officer had retired due to violence against her whilst on field
duty. When the unanswered calls were followed up on, it came to light that two of the
Protection Officers never actually held office and the third was on pregnancy leave.
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Four Protection Officers were interviewed in Delhi- P (27 years old, Masters in
Sociology), B (34, Masters in Sociology), K (26, Masters in Sociology) S (26, Masters in
Social Work). Complaints being received from victims of violence at the Protection
Officers’ workplaces were observed. The officers warned in advance that they did not
receive professional training to deal with victims in distress. They admitted that the only
respite was the occasional training workshop conducted by the LCWRI.
All the Protection Officers were very strict about conforming to the procedural aspects of
the DVA. They specifically advised the women to proceed under the DVA. There was
evidence of the ‘classical notion of DV victim’ present in their discourse. There was a
general good faith that if the DVA is implemented and the institutions are firmly and
efficiently in place the victims would be helped and violence against women could be
curbed. The most common means by which the victims reached the Protection Officers
were by the police officers redirecting them towards the Protection Officers.
When the victims approach the Protection Officers, the procedure is set in motion as the
Protection Officers guide the victims through a domestic violence questionnaire. This
questionnaire has descriptions of various kinds of anticipated violence, the time of
violence, the place, provisions for medical evidence and asks for specific details of the
domestic event. This is standard procedure after which the officer prepares a domestic
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incidence report for the court’s perusal. During this process the Protection Officer as the
‘middle women’ decides on which cases actually make it to the court based on personal
discretion.
5.2 Marital status of Victims
‘A married woman would have the support of her family to take action against
violence. But an unmarried woman would not have this support.’ (B, 27 August 2008)
All the four Protection Officers agreed that women who were in violent marriages came
to their offices accompanied by members of her natal family whereas the very few WUR
who actually came to the offices, came alone. A victim of violence often returns to her
natal family and related support systems like relatives, trusted friends of the family and
neighbours. When such support systems and safety nets are no longer available because
of a woman’s decision to be in an unconventional relationship, it then becomes difficult
for her to reclaim her rights under the law.
‘In a hundred cases I have seen may be one person admits to a violent live in
relationship. And this person is usually from a very reputed family.’ (S, 3
September 2008)
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‘Personally, I would not show any bias towards women who are not married but
are in violent relationships but such cases are so rare in our country, I have hardly
had to deal with such cases’ (K, 2 September 2008)
This may be also because such women belong often to the ‘elite classes’ and they may
opt to directly hire a lawyer to fight their case. When asked if it would make any
difference if the victim is married or unmarried, all the Protection Officers said that they
would not be affected by the marital status of the victim. Their priority was to keep the
women safe. The extent of violence was the main parameter to decide on the urgency of
the case. The other parameters were the availability of medical records, presence of
children in the relationship and the absence of a place.
A different category of WUR that approached the Protection Officers consists of women
who had no proof to show for their marriage. Others were abandoned by the husbands. A
Protection Officer said that it was ‘heart-breaking’ when women from ‘good families’
were abandoned by men and/ or were subjected to physical and emotional abuse due to
no fault of theirs. She said that these women had genuinely believed that they were
legally married and were not ‘promiscuous’ or ‘immoral’ women. This does show that
the Protection Officer had a perception of WUR possibly being ‘immoral’ or
‘promiscuous’.
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The other categories of WUR include divorcees and second and third wives who
complain of harassment by partners and previous partners. A reason that the Protection
Officer S gave for live in partners not approaching her was that the victims who are living
in were unaware of their entitlement under the DVA and if they were aware of the rights,
they were reluctant to take them on due to fear of societal embarrassment. At the same
time all the officers concurred that the Magistrates should be sensitised to the needs of
unmarried women. They said that the judiciary was prejudiced and biased against women
who were unmarried who they perceived as ‘home wreckers’ and women of ‘loose’
character.
5.3 Protection officers and DVA
‘The Act is very powerful but the police and the NGO sometimes wash their
hands of the cases and I feel stressed and over worked, my colleague resigned
because she was beaten up during a field visit.’ (B, 29 August 2008)
The Protection Officers felt that the work load was too much to take on. They felt that
they got little or no help from the NGO Service Providers and the police. They felt that
the Office of the Protection Officer held too much responsibility. One of the Protection
Officers said that she had hand written about 390 complaints in a few weeks and still
there were several hundreds of files gathering dust in the offices.
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Protection Officer K opined that it was preferable for the post of Protection Officer to be
taken up by a woman as the women from the villages were not comfortable talking about
their domestic events with male officers, specifically if the events were of a sexual
nature. However they were of the opinion that male peons should be continuously present
in the offices and especially on their field trips to ensure their safety.
‘Out of a hundred cases received 25% are genuine and 75% are false. I find that a
lot of ladies misuse the legislation.’ (B, 29 August 2008)
The Protection Officers felt that several women bring false complains against their
husbands to ‘trouble’ the husband’s natal family. They said that they had to use discretion
to understand if the complaints were genuine or fake. They said that this was often tough
and one of the reasons why they sometimes insisted on medical records was to ensure
that the complaints were not malicious or fake.
5.4 WUR and Reconciliation of the Family
‘We have to do reconciliatory and counselling duties. Although this is not
prescribed as a part of my job description in the end the Protection Officer decides
which of the cases should make it to the court.’ (S, 3 September 2008)
‘Some people asked for counselling. We give them a list of counsellors. Most of
us are not trained to be professional counsellors. My first question to a victim is
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about her back ground. Then I ask her what burden she faced. Finally I ask her
about what remedy she expects.’ (K, 2 September 2008)
Although the DV Act is a legislation that has for its aim the protection of female victims
of domestic violence, three of the Protection Officers felt that they had reconciliatory and
counselling roles to play in order to avoid breaking up families. All the women they
encountered were seriously disturbed mentally and emotionally because of the violence.
The officers had not been given any special training for counselling. Hence they were
uneasy fulfilling the role of a Counsellor, but did it nevertheless. Although the primary
objective of the DVA was the welfare of the victims, the Protection Officers sometimes
felt obliged to preserve the family unit. For instances when in doubt, P consults the
District Welfare Officer regarding such matters because they have their offices in the
same building.
5.5 General Findings from PO Interviews
All four Protection Officers were unanimous in their opinion that the DV Act is very
powerful piece of legislation and if implemented in its true spirit, it would make great
inroads into the attainment of gender justice. However the police and the NGOs have
started washing their hands off domestic violence cases, which means that Protection
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Officers are overworked and burdened with the management of the hundreds of cases that
come their way. The police consider themselves no longer responsible for domestic
violence cases and as a result the Protection Officers have too much work to do. They
were hired on a contractual basis and were given a consolidated salary till January 2009.
They believed that since the legislation was needs and emergency based, the practical
rules need to be worked out for its effective implementation.
Most cases do not make it to court and the officers opined that although a great deal of
responsibility was given to them by the new legislation, very little power was bestowed
upon them. One of the officers told me that since she took charge a year and a half ago,
almost three hundred complaints had been filed with her and only about a quarter of them
had made it to court.
The Protection Officers were assigned to work in pairs but all the four officers that I
talked to informed me that their co-officers had resigned due to various reasons. One of
the main observations was that the officers should have their offices in the police stations
or at least close to a police station, as the police were still the first port of call for
domestic violence victims. The Protection Officers should be at a place where there is
easy access to contact the NGOs and the police. Instead the DV Act requires the NGOs
and the police to introduce the concept of the agency of the Protection Officer to the
victim.
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All the officers concurred that the job was a very demanding and tough one. They were in
urgent need of clerical help. They also wanted the government to ensure their safety in
the field.
Women who came to them were between the ages of late twenties to early forties. The
middle economic classes were conspicuous by their absence as the complainants tended
to be from either very low or very high economic strata of the society. One of the main
reliefs asked for by the women was economic support. Thus maintenance seems to be the
most sought after remedy prescribed by the DV Act.
Most women were aware of the law although section 498 A of the IPC which prohibits
harassment for dowry was their preferred option. At that stage into the research, there
was one designated shelter home based in Nizammudin for the whole of Delhi as opposed
to when the research was in its initial stages when there were none. The Protection
Officers said that many of the victims were reluctant to make use of this remedy as they
did not want to leave their households for various reasons like children, financial
complications and fear of alienation by their relatives. The Officers seem to think that the
‘shared household remedy’ is the most promising and effective remedy prescribed by the
Act for victims of domestic violence.
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Many women were reluctant to talk about the sexual violence that they faced and for this
reason the Protection Officers were of the opinion that the DV Act was right in preferring
women in the post of protection officers. Many of them go to the National Commission.
Many cases are directed to the officers from the Commission. The cases were also
brought to the Protection Officers by non-governmental organizations, lawyers, the police
Action India. The people who directly approach the Protection Officer are about 10
percentage of the total victims seeking justice. These people are aware of the existence of
the new legislation.
A personal experience of violence cannot be reduced to fit the confines of little boxes in
the violence questionnaire. During one of sessions of observations in the Protection
Officer’s work place, the complainant was a bit unsure about answering the officer’s
questions and fumbled a little. The Officer lost her patience with the complainant and
told her off for being unsure about what she was reporting. The woman was obviously
nervous and in awe of the articulate Protection Officer and was struggling to get the facts
right.
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6. Stakeholders and WUR
In order to establish attitudes of the key institutional stakeholders toward WUR and the
DVA framework, qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with two service
provider representatives and with the District Social Welfare Officers.
Joe Athally
According to Joe Athally of Amnesty International:
‘I have dealt with individual cases of violence brought by women who were
suffering from repeated physical violence and the subsequent denial of share in
the property. Many times the women reported the cases to the police and received
no help. Such women were educated, fluent in English and belonged to the
nouveau socio economic class.’ (Athally, 26 August 2008)
Joe Athally has been working with Amnesty for three years and has worked on gender
and youth as a category. He has worked on the Stop Violence Against Women campaign,
presently working on ‘Make Schools Safe for Girls’ an internationally recognised
campaign. Domestic violence per se has been a concern. According to him, the DVA is a
very progressive piece of legislation but he wanted to ‘wait and watch’ regarding its
proper implementation. When asked about the marital status of women and the
unconventionality of intimate relationships making a difference to the course of justice,
he replied:
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‘Although legally speaking the marital status of a victim of violence is irrelevant,
you can imagine the questions and comments that they will be subjected to
especially in police stations.’ (Athally, 26 August, 2008)
‘It is not socially acceptable for women to be in such relationships. So anyone to
complain about violence must muster up a tremendous amount of courage.’
(Athally, 26 August, 2008)
‘Women are made to feel bad about their sexual choices and practically speaking
it is a challenge for the judiciary to accept such relationships.’ (Athally, 26
August, 2008)
‘I do not know about the instrumentalities of the Act but in order to make it victim
friendly I think police and magistrates should be avoided by women. There is a
need for some procedure where she does not have to go and be subjected to more
humiliation. Instead they should take cognizance of what she says. She should not
feel humiliated for her courage.’ (Athally, 26 August, 2008)
A woman approaching the law to complain against her legitimate husband takes a great
social risk. This is evidenced by the bad press and criticism that section 498A got. It is
understood that a woman’s role in her new family is to be submissive and accept that
suffering in silence is an ideal trait for a ‘good’ Indian woman.
The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women provides a definition of
violence against women has a detailed view of violence, encompassing any act of gender
based violence which results in or is likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological
harm or suffering by women, including threats or such acts of coercion or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life (Brautigham, 2002: 13).
The reason for such a broad definition is to allow the international community,
governments at the national level and women’s groups an effective tool in addressing
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violence against women with regard to both its causes and consequences. Athally said he
was pleased that the DVA was in keeping with the international agreements and he said
that this was the first time that India had stayed so ‘faithful’ to the prescribed
international standards.
Shabnam Hashmi
Shabnam Hashmi is the director of the NGO Anhad, human rights NGO based in Jammu
and Kashmir, with an office in Delhi. In her telephonic interview she blamed the unequal
gender relationships in India for the problem of domestic violence. Although she has
aided individual complainants of domestic violence by providing legal assistance and
advice and by responding to letters written to her by women in distress, her NGO at that
period in time had not formally worked as a Service Provider. She said that it would take
a while for people to get familiarised with the DVA and after the initial problems, as with
any new law, people would find the different means of accessing the DVA in the Victim
Model very useful and choice-endowing.
Talking in the context of WUR, she said that there were several second and third wives
and divorcees who were coming forward with reports of domestic events and violence.
As far as women in live in relationships were concerned, she opined thus:
181
‘Living in is a city phenomenon. The societal and moral values within the close-
knit communities of the Indian villages will not allow such relationships.’
(Hashmi, 4 September 2008)
In terms of the DVA, she was of the opinion that one of the major short coming was the
lack of awareness amongst the people. Her NGO does a lot of service in the villages and
she was sure that not many people would know even of its existence. She said wide
spread public awareness campaigns using the media and by conducting awareness camps
in the villages would greatly aid towards the control of domestic violence. Another
method suggested by her was to introduce the problem in the high school curriculum so
that the awareness would exist from a young age about the problem of domestic violence
and the need for curbing it.
District Social Welfare Officer
Pushpa Pathak, the District Social Welfare Officer for New Delhi, finds herself handling
cases of domestic violence after the advent of the DVA. This happened over and above
the duties she has as a Welfare officer. The reason is that the Protection Officer P has her
office in the same premises as her. As a woman of more experience she often takes on
some of the duties especially those regarding counselling, at the request of P. Primarily
she aims for the welfare of the woman in this aspect, but as a Welfare Officer she finds
that she has to think about reconciliation of the family. She talks about the possibility of
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working towards a violence free marriage by using the means of conciliation and
counselling. She was of the opinion that the ‘new women’ were less patient in their
marriages whereas the women in her generation were more tolerant of their husbands and
family. She felt that it was a matter of ‘adjusting’ to the new home and the new family
and with patience, problems could be solved. However when extreme cases of violence
are brought to her, she would never encourage the woman to continue with the family.
She opined that the misuse of the criminal laws regarding domestic violence makes her
wary of cases of domestic violence brought under the DVA.
Regarding WUR, she was of the opinion that women who are cheated into false
marriages were worthy of protection as they had the genuine belief that they were legally
married. Regarding divorcees and their rights, she was of the opinion that those cases
were best handled by the family courts and under personal laws. She said that ‘live in
relationships’ existed in New Delhi, especially amongst the immigrant (from other states
in India) student populations. She said that so far, she had not dealt with women in live in
relationships and were facing violence.
7. Conclusion
The field research was undertaken in Delhi to establish how WUR are understood within
a particular DV framework. The structures, procedures and the working of the DVA
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within the Victim Model were investigated in the light of WUR. Participant research with
the drafters allowed an understanding of the politics that are involved in drafting a new
and radical legislation. The drafters had to manoeuvre around political sensitivities and
societal traditional strongholds. The drafters, as evident from the interviews, intended for
the DVA to be useful for and used by WUR in the definition of domestic relationship
they have had to eke out a fine balance between allowing inclusiveness and not offending
detractors of the DVA.
Police attitudes have been established by the training session observation and the
protection officers and related authorities interviews have aided to understand the
institutional attitudes towards the WUR regarding the DVA. We have seen the different
recourses that the WUR have in the law in the Victim Model of the DV framework. We
have seen how they are perceived and their identities are constructed in the discourses
and how much agency they take on as far as the DVA is concerned.
The Victim Model of the DV framework set in place in Delhi is formal and less agency
endowing for the victims. The treatment of the victim is not as an equal subject of the
law. In the zest for implementing the provisions of the DVA in its strictest sense, the
agency of the victim to acquire rights in the law is compromised. WUR seem to fare less
favourably in this structure. From the various interviews and the participant observation
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explained in this chapter, we have three major findings that will be explored and further
analysed in Chapter Six.
The first of these is the connection between formality of procedure and the treatment of
legal agency. The second finding is the alienation of police from the various stages of the
implementation of the DVA and the creation of the so called civil society safety space.
The third finding is the connection between WUR and the ideal legal female subject.
Before an extensive analysis of these three key findings set within the wider discussions
in this thesis, the following chapter will give an account of the field work in Mumbai.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Surviving DV: WUR in Mumbai
1. Introduction
‘Feminist theory - of all kinds - is to be based on, or anyway touch base
with, the variety of real life stories women provide about themselves’
(Lugones and Spelman, 1990:21)
We saw in the previous chapter how a Victim Model of the DV framework works, and
how the authorities perceive and thus construct WUR within one institutional context.
This chapter understands the law from the point of view of the WUR who have managed
to access the remedies available to them through an alternative institutional context.
Chapter Two established that a feminist perspective which recognises the importance of
survivors’ narratives offers the most appropriate framework through which to understand
the DV law from their perspective. This chapter consists of the voices of WUR who are
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or have been victims of violence. These stories documenting women’s experiences with
the DV law form the heart of this thesis. These survivor narratives also reveal the extent
of women’s agency. Such research finds its precedents since the 1970s in regard to
domestic violence, as understandings of men’s violence towards women have been
‘derived directly from women’s actual experiences and have informed the development
of feminist theory and practice’ (Scheter, 1982; Kelly, 1988; Dobash and Dobash, 1992;
Hague and Mullender, 1998; Hague and Mullender, 2005:149). It would aid current
policy and women’s empowerment in India to ‘take on the perspectives of abused women
about domestic violence’ as has been done in the U.K (Hague and Mullender, 2005: 147).
Research on violence against women ‘began with talking to women about their
experiences’ (Griffiths and Hanmer, 2005:23). The research undertaken here reveals a
model of DV law framework which is called the Survivor Model. This chapter seeks to
answer the question- how do WUR fare in a survivor model of the DV framework?
All the women who participated in this research project had survived after having
transgressed certain societal norms and had broken away from emotional barriers. These
women had reached the law after having survived serious personal battles. In their
survival, they had acquired legal agency on their own behalf and on the behalf of other
women. Advertently or inadvertently they had passed this agency on to other women who
were or are in similar need.
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There were different categories identified within WUR in Bombay. Women who were
deceived by their partners under the false pretext of marriage form one category. Another
category consists of women who were promised marriage by their partners only to later
face the consequences of the breach of their trust and broken relationships. Second and
third wives sometimes even fourth form another category. Women in ‘live in’
relationships form another category. This includes women in relationships with men who
are otherwise married, married women in relationships outside of marriage and women in
unmarried intimate relationships. There are thus shades of grey that constitute the
category WUR, women whose relationships are unconventional in one way or the other.
2. Mumbai – The City Profile
Mumbai has a population of 20.4 million and is the largest city in India. This city
sometimes described as the commercial capital of India generates 6.16% of the total
GDP. It has the reputation for being the safest city in India for women. It is also the
richest city in India (Government of India, 2008). It is the seat of the Bombay High
Court, the jurisdiction of which extends to the states of Maharashtra and Goa and the
Union Territories of the Daman and Due and Dadra and Nagar Haweli. With the
population density of 20,482 persons per square kilometre and a sex ratio of 848 females
per thousand males, Bombay has a large immigrant population that come into the city
from other parts of India to work (World Gazetteer, 2008). Amongst the 16 major
languages, the main languages spoken are Hindi, English, Marathi and Gujarathi. The
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religious groups include Hindus – 67.39%, Muslims – 18.56%, Buddhist – 5.22%, Jains –
3.99%, Christians – 4.2% and the rest of the population consisting of Sikhs, Parsis and
Jews (Government of India, 2008). It is also the city where the Special cells for Women
and Children which has a system of taking justice, quite literally, to the backyards of
survivors of violence because of the collaboration with the Tata Institute of Social
Sciences (TISS) and the Maharashtra Police.
3. Institutional Context: Special Cells for Women and Children
In contrast to LCWRI and its focus on legal advocacy and the construction of a Victim
Model, Mumbai is associated with an alternative nationally recognised VAW model
which will be called Survivor Model for the purpose of this research. This involves the
special cells for women and children and is related to academic social work rather than
social activist location. While Delhi activists designed the DVA to minimise the role of
the police here we will see that Mumbai activists prior to the advent of the DVA designed
interventions in association with the police. The two prominent protagonists Indira
Jaising, the lawyer in Delhi, and Anjali Dave, a social worker and academic in Mumbai,
are both feminists and have been actively involved in evolving the two DV models. The
influences of these two leaders can be observed in the different approaches to dealing
with DV in Delhi and Mumbai which will be further discussed in Chapter Six.
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Feminist legal theory reaches beyond a conception of law as a system of norms or rules-
statutes, constitutions and cases- and beyond standard legal officials such as judges to
encompass other practices which are legally relevant or quasi legal. The power and social
meaning of law are determined not only at its legislative, doctrinal and judicial levels but
also by non-legal or partially legal decisions about its interpretation and enforcement
(Lacey 1998:9). The TATA Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) is one such organisation
that acts as a resource and a guiding agency for the Special Cells. Mutual cooperation
and planned collaboration between legal enforcement agencies and NGOS result in an
effective means to facilitate legal access and enforcement agencies that are more attuned
to the needs of women. The Special Cells provide various services to women and their
families such as emotional and mental support, counselling services and crisis
intervention. In the process of working with the police, prior to the advent of the DVA
enabled the influencing of the interpretation of the available legal provisions to include
domestic violence (Dave and Solanki, 2000). The Special Cells by being attached to the
police stations in Mumbai are accessible to all the people that the Mumbai Police
Commission caters to (TISS, 1999). Founded in 1936 to meet the pressing need for
scientific training in social work, TISS trains professionals in social work, social services,
administration, and allied professional fields. TISS also conducts social research that can
contribute to the formulation of social policies, produces publications, and undertakes
innovative action projects in social work, development, and welfare. The Special Cells
for Women and Children were revamped in 1984 as collaboration between the
Department for Women and Child Development, the Maharashtra State police and TISS.
However the project was so successful that the Maharashtra police took over the project.
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The Special Cell is situated behind the police station and opens out into a neighbouring
courtyard surrounded by tall buildings which served as living quarters to many families.
Divya Taneja, one of the two social workers at the cell, in her interview, (Taneja, 18.
September. 2008) was of the opinion that this was an advantageous location as news
about the Special Cell and its services spread by word of mouth. According to Taneja,
most of her clients were from the lowest economic strata of the society. A vast majority
of them worked as domestic help in this neighbourhood and once they received the help,
other women in the neighbouring slums came to the Special Cell. Since film is a very
strong medium in India, some famous film stars had helped by advertising anti-domestic
violence videos and anti-violence help lines. In the year 2008, two years after the
inception of the Act, none of the interviewed women knew about the existence of the new
domestic violence legislation. However, they were definitive users of the law in terms of
accessing justice in the best possible way known to them. Many cases were filed within
section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and 405 breach of trust with regards promise of
marriage. Divya Taneja had filed cases for some of the victims according to the DV Act.
The women often approached the Special Cell as though they would approach a police
station, that is, to file a criminal complaint.
Anjali Dave is an associate professor in the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) and
in affiliation with the Centre for Women’s Studies, Children and Families in TISS. She
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has been actively involved in the working of the Special Cells for Women and Children.
In her interview identified WUR as various categories of ‘single’ women with her
comment, ‘there are singles and singles and singles’ (Dave, 15. September. 2008).
While doing participatory research it came to light that many cases that were filed in the
Special Cell were regarding breach of trust, that is there was a promise of marriage and a
breach of the woman’s trust and resulting economic abuse. The most spectacular thing
about the women’s cell was the fact that women define ‘violence’. Unlike Delhi, the
Bombay model seems more victim- friendly. However the difference is that the Special
Cell is not specifically designed to deal with cases of domestic violence, they just happen
to get these cases as well along with others.
The police although are most often the first port of call, they are rarely trained to give that
specialised kind of support that women need. The Special Cells try to ameliorate this by
appointing specialised social workers. At present there are seventeen branches attached to
police stations in Maharashtra. Each Cell has two qualified social workers, working full
time, housed in the police station. The primary goal of the Cell is immediate crisis
intervention and its pre-litigation role is pivotal, it helps the women survivors to decide
what remedies they would like to pursue in the law. TISS supports the Action project. It
concentrates on women centred social work. The attitude of the organisation towards
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WUR is evidenced in the following interview excerpts with the social worker Divya
Taneja.
3.1 Voice of the Social Worker
‘We are a feminist organisation and our priority is our women. It is easy to say that
the family should stay together but why should it be at the cost of the women’s
happiness. We offer counseling services but we will not encourage women to suffer in
silence’ (Taneja, 18. September. 2008)
Divya Taneja lived quite far from the Cell and had to get two buses to get there. She
explained to me that the work was strenuous and often emotionally draining but
extremely rewarding. She helped the women who approached her because it was her
life’s goal and she did not treat her duties merely as a part of her job.
‘We get approached by women in very different relationships. Whether a woman is
married or in an adulterous relationship is not for me to judge. My duty is to counsel,
listen and help them choose the way in which they want to proceed legally’ (Taneja, 18.
September. 2008)
Unlike other agencies of the government, she said they did not see why the family should
be protected at the expense of women and their wellbeing. She also made several field
visits in the course of the week in order to help her clients. She often went to the
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survivors’ homes which according to her was a way of ensuring that the violence was
under control. It was also a way of signalling to the abuser that the survivor was not
without support. Taneja empathised with WUR because she felt that they were the most
disadvantaged as they did not have familial support most of the time and often came
alone to the Special Cell. She lauded the bravery of the survivors who have had to suffer
a great deal of violence and had managed to come seeking help and justice despite all
odds being against their favour.
4. Survivors- The Interview Context
The threat of the single woman arises sharply in the context that she has possibilities of
independence and upsets the traditions by asserting the rights over her own body and
sometimes even asserting the right to own property. In the context of the Shah Bano right
to maintenance case, many authors have written that the ‘destitute’ woman ‘widow,
divorcee or abandoned wife is envisaged as a potential threat to public peace (Pathak and
Rajam, 1989; Qadeer, 1988; Chachchi, 2005).
The interviews were conducted in the Special Cells for Women and Children attached to
the Dadar police station in Mumbai for a week starting on 15 September 2008. One
interview was conducted, unsolicited outside the Assistant Commissioner’s office in
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Nanakpura, Delhi. Permission was granted by TISS and the Special Cell to allow
interviews with five women in intimate relationships that were violent, and a mother and
a sister of one woman who had been murdered by her partner and his family. Two
women gave unsolicited interviews as I was waiting for the social worker outside the
Special Cell.
All the survivors and the family of the victim interviewed knew that they had been
wrongly treated. They approached the Special Cell to obtain legal recourse to justice.
Their stories and their views on what happened to them and how the law has helped and
should help them have been recorded with minimal inputs from me. I refer to the
respondents as survivors because they had survived to tell their stories and to affect and
influence others’ lives with their strength and courage. The woman who lost her live was
represented by her family who are survivors on her behalf, seeking justice for her and
ensuring that other women do not meet with her fate.
The interviews took place in the one room that is allocated to the Special Cell. One of the
two social workers who were based there, Rahul was away on a training workshop
conducted by the Lawyers Collective. I was allocated the use of Rahul’s desk for the
interviews. The social worker Divya Taneja, explained to the women the purpose of my
visit and requested them to take part if they are interested. Seven women volunteered.
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Names have been changed to protect confidentiality and where ever requested, some
quotes have been used without names due to requests for anonymity.
In the first instance it was planned that semi structured interviews would be conducted
and permission was obtained to use a tape recorder. When the first interview with Sarla
started, we realised that conversing with each other without the help of external aids
helped the narrative to flow better. Minimum amount of prodding was required as a
strong voice described the suffering of a WUR, as a survivor of DV and Sarla spoke out
against the cruelty she had been subjected to.
There was a constant awareness of the possibility of re-victimisation. Hague and
Mullender (2005: 156) warn the researcher about the effects of poverty, social class, and
the impact of abuse on self-esteem, stigma; and the silencing effects of DV and the harms
of revisiting painful memories. The survivors were informed that they did not have to talk
about anything that they were uncomfortable discussing and that I was mostly interested
in what they thought the law should do for them. The interviews were interactive, I
shared my experiences with the other survivors and they shared their experiences with
me. Sharing of personal and social experiences of both the respondent and the interviewer
can be rewarding (Ellis, Kiesinger and Tillmann-Healy 1997: 121).
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‘Giving voice’ to what I heard in the field and transcribing it into my own work was one
the main challenges I faced doing this research. I had to justify the use of the voices, the
pain that I felt in them, and the tears that I saw. For a while, I distanced myself from my
work, almost paralysed by my inability to proceed. Working with the ‘Battered Women’s
Advocacy Centre’ a counselling Centre for battered women, Wylie and Greaves came to
the conclusion ‘that any instrument that acts as a research method, for instance must
embody women’s experiences, must be women-centric and non-coercive and most of all
should not become a mere tool of defining the project of the researcher’ (Wylie&
Greaves, 1995: 321). When I discussed my fears with the social worker Smt. Divya
Taneja in the Centre for Women and Children where the interviews were done, she
informed me that some of the women had gone back to her and told her that they were
happy that somebody wanted to listen to them and write about their situation. This was
my most rewarding moment in the field.
The interviews with the women were done in Hindi and some dialects were a bit difficult
to understand. There was very little that was formal about the setting except that Smt
Taneja explained my cause in advance to them. One lady, Tanuja (name has been
changed) spoke only Marathi (the vernacular language). Speaking with her proved a little
more difficult as I can understand but not speak Marathi and she can understand but not
speak Hindi. So she spoke in Marathi and I responded in Hindi.
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5. Voices of Survivors
Sarla3
Emotions are always present in personal interactions in ethnographic work. Here
the feminist perspective is useful in reminding us that emotion can form an
important basis for understanding and analysis (Ellis 1991: Klienman and Copp
1993: Naples 1997: 88)
Sarla was the first WUR who volunteered to give me an interview. She was emotional
during the interview and she seemed to be constantly struggling with the guilt of being a
WUR at the same time she was very aware of the injustices that had been done to her.
She was determined about wanting legal redressal and she wanted her former partner to
pay for the cruelty he had subjected her to.
In India, living with a man who is not one’s husband is a transgression, a break from the
norm. It is in many ways, a break from many ties, and a final goodbye in the sense of the
security that a family seemingly provides. In this there is a discursive violence, a denial
because of the break in trust. This was very evident in Sarla’s story.
3 Names have been changed as requested.
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Sarla is 42 years old and a survivor of intimate partner violence. She filed an application
under the DV Act and her application was quashed by the Magistrate. She had been
unaware of the existence of the legislation until the social worker informed her about it.
She addressed me as ‘beta’ which translates from Hindi as child and I addressed her as
‘didi’ meaning ‘older sister’. She told me that she was glad to know from Divya-ji (‘ji’ is
often suffixed to names in Northern India as a sign of respect whilst addressing someone
older or someone who deserved respect in some way) that I was studying about women in
distress. She shared her story with me. We were both emotional during the interview, I
could relate to her and I felt that she was relating to me. At the end of the hour that I
spent with her she gave me the phone number of a shop next to her house and told me to
look for her when I had finished my research. There was an acknowledgement that as
WUR we understood each other’s plight.
‘Beta mera bahut acha ghar sansaar tha. Maine sab kuch bigad diya’
‘Child, I had a very good family world. I spoilt everything’
Sarla blamed herself constantly for getting involved with her partner. She referred to her
former home as ‘ghar-sansar’. Ghar translates as the familial home and sansaar translates
as world. In this phrase is perhaps evidence of the notion of the home being a woman’s
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world. On hindsight, she regretted being a WUR and felt that she was being punished for
her sins. At the same time she felt that since she did not have any more ‘Izzat’ (honour)
to lose, she should fight for justice. As a WUR, Sarla felt that she had a lesser moral
foothold in society and therefore before the law.
Sarla was married to a man and had a child from him. According to her, her husband was
kind and ‘only’ subjected her to economic abuse. She fell in love with a friend of the
family, a man considerably younger than her. They started an intimate relationship and
within a few months, he invited her to live with him in his house. He promised her
marriage. They lived together for six years. For four of these years, she supported him
economically. The relationship was violent and his beatings left her completely blind in
one eye and her other eye had a blurred vision. Her partner returned to his village and
got married to a young girl that his parents approved of. She tried to call him, but he
ignored her calls and abused and denied their relationship when he did finally answer her
call.
As advised by the social worker, she had asked for compensation in the DV petition as
she had had to have four eye surgeries to try and correct her vision. The Magistrate
interpreted the provisions of the DV Act in such a way that she was asked to file an
application against her husband. She did not know very specifically about the provisions
of the DV Act, but she knew that her petition was quashed by the Magistrate. She was
200
talking to the social worker on how to proceed during that period. She asked me why if a
woman complains about the slightest harassment on the streets by a stranger, the law and
the police instantly come to her aid but a woman who has been suffering for six years has
her needs and safety ignored by the law. She constantly feels helpless, depressed and
suicidal and takes out her anger on her daughter. She also fears for her daughter’s life as
the people in the life call her names and are dangerous and judgmental about her
‘adulterous’ relationship
Sarla said that she does not trust the law. She says that she went to the law with no
thought of her Izzat (honour). She asked me how many women in her place would fight
for justice. I said I would probably not have the courage to do so. At this point I told her
that I had been in a similar situation in my life and never mustered the courage to take
such a step. She said that she constantly fights with God because she feels disheartened
by the injustice. She believes that God is a man. Had he been a woman, he would not
have let her suffer like this. Feeling disillusioned with everything, she tried to kill herself
several times.
Sarla discovered the law because she washes dishes in the houses in the neighbourhood
where the Special Cell is situated. She approached the Special Cell for advice and help.
She said that the social worker was helpful and kind and had become a friend. She told
me that she was informed by the social worker in the Special Cell for Women and
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Children that she could file a petition for breach of trust. This is often used by women in
India for the non-fulfilment of a promise of marriage.
After hearing about Sarla’s story and her experience at the Special Cell, her friend in the
slum approached the Special Cell with a complaint against her abusive husband. Sarla felt
that if she gets insaaf (justice) it would be not just for herself, but for many other women
in similar situations of abuse. Even as she cries, she tells me that she will fight for justice
and that she knows that it will be hers in heaven and on earth. Sarla had thus become an
agent in her survival. She had also passed on the agency to her friend who then found the
courage to approach the law. As a WUR survivor, Sarla had set the law in motion not
merely for herself but for other women who had and will encounter in the future. And
yet, Sarla constanty struggled with moral guilt and justification:
‘Main koi buri aurat nahi hun.Meri shaadi bhagwan ke samne hua hain’
‘I am not a bad woman. I was married in front of God’
She told me that she was wrecked with guilt by the way people in her neighbourhood
treat her and often felt like a ‘buri’ (bad) woman. She is a Hindu and they exchanged
garlands in a temple. This is a Hindu marital ceremony ritual. She says that they are
married in the eyes of God. She told me that this thought is the only one that gives her a
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good night’s sleep sometimes. She said that the fact that she does not have a legal
marriage made her vulnerable in society and the law. She felt that the law is partial to
men and to people with money. She said that had she had the necessary finances, she
would not be abused in such ways.
Upon being asked about what the law could do for her, she said that she had become
fatalistic about the law and about God in general. She appears to associate legal justice
with God’s justice in many ways. She intermitted between telling me about her faith in
the law and in God and about her arguments with God and her disillusionment with the
law that promises great justice.
She told me that she was lucky that she had chanced upon the Special Cell. She felt that
very few women knew about the existence of laws to protect them especially when they
did not have legitimate marriages. She felt that if women were educated and the
government did something to protect poor women from violence, it can be stopped. She
firmly believed now that any man who raises his hand to a woman should be punished by
the law. She said that sometimes she feels fed up of being a woman. To be a woman in
this world means suffering. We were both emotional and I felt connected to her. I could
see how we had both survived violence but how she had managed all by herself and how
her survival was much bolder than mine. The social worker told me about the
insensitivity of the judiciary in expecting her to ask for compensation for the eye
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surgeries from her husband solely because in the eyes of the law, she remains married to
him and is therefore responsible for her.
‘Only when there is a rupture in the ‘normal’ life of a woman, ie, a crisis such as a
divorce or the end of a relationship, is there a chance for her to be aware of her
true condition’ (Mies 1983: 125).
In Sarla’s case as with the others, this rupture, transgression was the disregard for Izzat. It
was this point that the private became the public. Can suffering puncture the otherwise
unsurpassable boundary between the private and the public? And can this then result in
the victim being her own agent in accessing and using the law? This is further evident in
Sandra’s case
Sandra
The day I first saw Sandra (the only woman who wanted me to use her real name in my
work) she was an emotional wreck. She was crying and verbally abusing a very tall man
in Marati. Divya Taneja told me that I could talk to her outside whilst she counselled this
man about the situation. The man was accompanied by a very fashionably dressed young
lady and three children. I was to learn the story soon from Sandra.
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Sandra is a 33 year old Christian woman of Goan origin. She had been living with a
partner for the last ten years. He is a criminal and a thug and has several cases filed
against him. He pursued her relentlessly till she agreed to have a relationship with him.
They have three children from the relationship. Soon afterwards, the man told her that he
had fallen in love with another woman and asked her permission to take another ‘wife’.
Sandra told me that she loved him deeply and was afraid of losing him, so she consented
to the second relationship. Her partner started a relationship with the other woman and
together they threw her out on the streets.
Sandra was emotionally very disturbed and repeatedly told me that she does not want to
harm her ‘husband’ in any way. She just wanted to be able to see her children. She told
me that she had agreed to her husband’s second ‘marriage’. She said that she loved him
so much that she was willing to give him anything he wanted. She did not anticipate that
she would have to stop living in their house and that she would be denied access to her
children. He constantly threatened her with violence if she did not keep away from his
‘family’.
The social worker Divya Taneja had sent a notice to her partner to come to the Special
Cell with the children so that Sandra could see the children. The man arrived with his
new partner and Sandra’s children. Sandra was continuously crying and was in a very
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depressed state especially because the children refused to talk to her. Sandra and the man
started shouting at each other. The social worker told them to calm down. The man called
Sandra insane and told the social worker that she was a bad influence on the children and
that was why he did not want her to be around the children. Later Divya Taneja told me
that she informed the man that Sandra was entitled to see her children whenever she
wanted according to the law. She said that if they did not settle the matter and arrange for
visitation rights, Sandra would be forced to move the court. The man stormed out of the
room at several points of the discussion.
Sandra told me that their nine month old baby does not recognise her anymore and this
makes her very sad. She told me that the older children had been told malicious things
about their mother and had taken to ignoring her and being rude to her. Violence as she
defined it was the denial of the right to see and spend time with her children. Sandra told
me that she has great faith in the law. She came to the Special Cell on a regular basis. She
said she did not care about her safety or her health anymore. She wanted to be with her
children. She was aware of her legal entitlement as the mother to her children. However
she told me that not a single person in the world supported her in her struggle. She came
to the Special Cell after having heard about it from a friend. She was glad that she had
approached the authorities. She told me she was without any fear of consequences as she
is prepared to fight for her rights as a mother.
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Considering her emotional state, I did not want to ask her much. So I sat beside her and
listened to everything she had to say. When I went back to where I was staying, I wrote in
my field diary that hers was the most powerful voice I had heard so far. Here was a
woman who refused to be a victim and who was prepared to fight for her rights even
when she knew that she was unsupported and deserted by friends and family.
‘Mujhe unse koi shikayath nahi, par mujhe job hi ho, bachon ko dekhna hai’
‘I have no complaints against him, but I have to see my kids no matter what happens’
The rupture point for Sandra for approaching the law was the need to see her children.
She felt entitled as a mother to the rights of visitation and of spending time with her
children. She acquired the agentive rights for herself when she felt this sense of
entitlement. She also acquired the agency from the friend who had benefited legally from
the Cell before her. Thus there is evidence her of the legal agency being passed on from
WUR to WUR even as the sense of entitlement to legal redressal is passed on. As long as
Sandra could have access to her children, nothing else was of importance to her. The
greatest violence in her life as she defined it was the denial of the enjoyment of spending
time with her children.
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Tanuja
For Tanuja, amongst all the violence and the injustice that her partner had subjected her
to, the most hurtful was the deception. The fact that she had lost her ‘Izzat’ due to no fault
of hers was painful and hard to get over. I addressed her as ‘didi’ and she spoke to me
without addressing me. I introduced myself and told her that I study women in violent
relationship because I was a survivor myself. She nodded and answered that she would
share her experiences with me. This is her story:
She is a Hindu woman who runs a ‘daba’ (a small road-side canteen for late night truck
drivers and other travellers). She got married to a man who had promised her marriage.
After the wedding, she discovered that the man was married to another woman and that
her marriage is not ‘legitimate’. She lived like a domestic help in his house and was
subjected to a lot of physical and mental violence. She had a daughter from this
relationship. Unable to bear the violence any longer, she asked if she could take up
separate residence. Her partner agreed with the condition that she would pay him a huge
sum of money.
She moved out with her asthmatic daughter and started earning a living by running the
daba. Her ex-partner does not provide for their child who needs constant medical care.
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He also continued to be violent towards her by constantly intimidating her with threats of
violence and severely attacking her with a belt in her new place of residence. She went to
the police but found that they were sarcastic and unhelpful. She encountered a social
worker who visited her slum and directed her to the Special Cell. She told me that she
was very grateful to this person and believed that it was a divine intervention. She said
that she has hope in God and hope in justice now.
At the Special Cell, she was advised to get a divorce. Instead she said that she only
wanted to make sure that he would not harass her again and that her daughter would have
legitimate rights. She fears for her daughter’s future as her health has been severely
weakened by her asthma attacks. She showed me her wrists on which she wore green
glass bangles. It is a custom amongst Marati (Maharashtrian) women to wear green
bangles because the belief was that this would ensure that their husbands had long lives
and prosperity. She told me that she wished him no harm. She had approached the law
most importantly for the sake of her sick daughter.
She told me that the law should punish such a severe breach of trust. In spite of the four
years that they have been living apart, she suffered severe physical and mental violence at
the hands of her ex-partner. She felt that the best thing about the social workers at the
Special Cell was that they were considerate and had a genuine interest in her life and that
she could drop in at the Special Cell without an appointment even if she was in just
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desperate need to talk to someone. She told me that she was more comfortable talking to
Divyaji than Rahul-ji because she felt that Divya could relate more to her and empathise
with her for the fact that they were both women.
She felt entitled to justice because she had been led to believe that she had a valid
marriage. She did not feel guilty about anything except for her daughter’s suffering. She
believes that her daughter is asthmatic because she witnessed the beatings and the torture
that her mother was subjected to by her father. She feels that fate had been very unfair to
her daughter who was innocent and undeserving of any of this. She wanted the law to
protect her daughter. She was worried about the hostility that her neighbours showed
towards them. She said they often verbally abused her and accused her of prostitution
because she lived alone with her daughter and did not have a man in the house.
Tanuja was caught in a continuum of violence despite having left her partner. The
violence was not just by the partner but by the neighbours who judged her and subjected
her to ridicule and humiliation. Her rupture points for ‘going public’ with her complaint
were the fear and concern for her daughter and the breach of trust by her partner. This
breach was violence as she saw it. She was a survivor WUR who had acquired agentive
rights on her on behalf and for the sake of her daughter despite the barriers imposed on
her by her community and neighbourhood.
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Preetha
Preetha is a confident young woman. She was 28 years of age at the time of the
interview. She came to the Special Cell accompanied by her natal family and her
daughter. When I introduced myself, she said that she would like to talk to me outside the
Special Cell whilst her parents talked to Divya. I complemented her about her blouse and
told me that she liked sewing and often sewed for her neighbours for small amounts of
money. She had a marriage that was arranged for her by her family. She was a graduate
and liked to take tuitions for students in her neighbourhood. She was saving up in order
to secure a good future for her daughter. She has a small son too but was more anxious
for her daughter because she knew how the world treated women. She felt that her
daughter had to be educated and had to have a profession so that she can always stand on
her own two feet. She has great aspirations for her daughter whom she says has a keen
interest in studies especially in science.
After a few weeks of her marriage she discovered that her partner was married to her only
in name and had been married to other women before and had sexual relations with
several other women. She was subjected to physical and mental violence. If and when she
complained, the violence became unbearable. He was also a very jealous man and a main
bone of contention between them was her giving private tuitions. He was also jealous of
her qualification after having falsely representing to have a degree prior to the marriage.
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The recurring theme in this interview was her concerns and aspirations for her daughter.
She told me that she wanted her daughter to be strong, educated and independent. She
told me that her parents support and are proud of the fact that she stood up against the
violence. Initially they were reluctant to take legal recourse but Preetha convinced them
about it. She had read about the Special Cell in a local paper. She feels lucky to have a
supportive family and feels that they have stood by her in her time of great need.
She said that the law should be punitive and should punish any man who is abusive of a
woman. She wishes for a system in which men would be afraid to ever raise his hand to a
woman. She told me that her education gave her the necessary confidence to approach the
Special Cell. She told me that all women need to be educated and confident in order to
live independently without depending on men. She told me that the man who had taken
her Izzat could not look after her. She said that if he could not provide for her and for
their children, she had to ensure that they were provided for. She came to the Special Cell
in order to get her dowry back from her partner and to ensure that the violence will stop.
When I asked her about the new DV Act, she said that she did not know about it. When I
explained some of the provisions of the new law, she was very pleased. She was
surprised that the law protected women in such situations of violence. However she told
me that most women would consider their ‘Izzat’ before approaching the authorities.
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When I asked her if she would have come to seek help from the law if she had been
‘living in’ with a person, she was quiet for a bit. Then she said that if she had her children
to think about, she would certainly come to the law because their welfare was her only
priority. She was doubtful about her parents supporting her in that situation.
She said that once she had stopped all her ties with her ‘husband’, she would like to do
something to help women in similar situations. She felt that women need to feel
encouraged to complain about ‘anyaay’ (injustice) and that in this day and age, women
should not be silent sufferers. Of everything she said, the following sentence made me
realise the extent to which women are enabling their own empowerment just by the mere
realisation and acknowledgement of their own worth.
‘Hum log kam karthe hain, bache palthe hain. Hum sab kuch kar sakthe hain jo
admi log karthe hain. Fir pyar main hum ethane dabaye huye aur majboor kyon
rahte hai?’
‘We are earning members of the society, we look after our families, and we can do
everything that men can do. So why do we have to feel trapped and helpless when we
love?’
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Preetha was different from the other WUR because she was more educated and had the
support of her natal family. The support was most likely because she was an ‘innocent’
WUR who had been ‘tricked’ into a marriage. But the difference in the survivor WUR
who came to the Cell supported by family and education is remarkable. She was more
confident and less fatalistic; she had a sense of entitlement to justice which was almost
inherent. She had the awareness that her situation should not be allowed to repeat as far
as her daughter is concerned. Her agency is thus being carried forward to her daughter
and so is her entitlement of being a worthy legal subject. She was displaying aspirations
of social activism to help other women similarly placed. This bolder attitude to the
acquisition of agency and worthiness before the law makes the legal system ‘wake up’
and take notice of its otherwise ‘less’ worthy recipients of its protection.
Veena
Veena is a 47 year old Hindu woman. Her partner is a plumber and they have four adult
kids. He has never provided for her. He started a relationship with another woman. They
live in a single room in the slums and she has to share the room with her ex- partner and
his present partner. She felt humiliated and was subjected to severe mental and emotional
abuse. She heard of the woman’s cell when she came to the police station where the cell
was situated. She told me that the social worker had told her that she had the right to
proceed in the law against her partner.
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She wished for the violence to stop and get her house back. She feels entitled to the house
because she took care of her children and provided for them. She approached the police
after a particularly violent attack. When she spoke to the social worker, she felt at peace.
For the first time, she felt that someone was interested in her well- being and concerned
for her safety. When she spoke to the social worker, she was informed about all the
remedies available to her and was told that she could choose what she wanted to do. The
social worker told her that they were there to help her. She also promised a field visit to
ensure her safety.
Veena told me that she felt that the law would come to her aid. She already felt good for
having met the social worker. She felt that it was destiny that had come to her aid. Veena
was informed of the DV Act when she visited the Special Cell. The police had directed
her to the Special Cell. She told me that the law should protect women regardless of how
good or how bad she is perceived as by her relatives and neighbours. She told me that in
the slum where they reside, many men and women live as couples even if they are not
married. She felt that when the violence is so bad and when a woman starts fearing for
her own life, nothing else should have to be considered. Veena’s point of accessing the
law was thus life threatening violence.
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Prateeksha and Manya
I met Prateeksha and Manya when I was with Divya Taneja at the Special Cell. They
were visiting the cell for the first time. I was allowed to stay and observe while they
shared their story. Prateeksha is a 70 year old woman from a very poor economic
background. She had two daughters Manya and Mitra. Manya is 22 years old and Mitra
had just turned 18 when a man from a wealthy family fell in love with her and asked for
her hand in marriage. Mitra was a very beautiful girl. Prateeksha told us that at first they
were very hesitant as there was a considerable difference in their economic backgrounds.
But the man insisted that he could not possibly like another woman and did not want any
dowry from the family.
Prateeksha gave her daughter an amount as dowry. After the marriage things changed as
the man harassed her daughter and wanted to get her to leave him. One day, shortly after
the wedding, Prateeksha was informed that her daughter had hanged herself. When they
dressed Mitra’s body for the funeral, they found signs of abuse including cigarette burns
on her neck and face. They were afraid to file a complaint against the man as he was from
a powerful family.
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Prateeksha was constantly crying whilst Manya narrated the story. Divya Taneja was
trying to pacify them but was moved and upset by the mother’s tears. Prateeksha had
been told about why I was there. She told me that I should write about the problems
women face and study them. Women everywhere were suffering at the hands of men, she
told me that those who could make a difference should do so however and whenever
possible. She told me that she wanted to make sure that no other girl would meet with the
fate of her daughter. She was talking in Marati (the local language) but her daughter
Manya translated it to Hindi for me. Manya was angry about the injustice. She told us
that there is never any justice for poor people and that the rich always seem to be fine.
Manya was very angry at the situation. She told me that they had travelled a very long
distance to get to the Special Cell. They had travelled all the way from the outskirts of
Bombay. She said that she had convinced her mother to fight for justice for her sister. She
told me that they could barely afford a change of clothing but they had to ensure that the
criminals who murdered their Mitra should not go unpunished. Prateeksha and Manya
worked as labourers, often carrying heavy loads of cement and bricks at construction
sites.
It was an emotional moment when they showed me pictures of Mitra as a happy bride
standing alongside her husband. Prateeksha told me that she had had serious doubts about
getting Mitra married to such a rich man and now she felt that she had sold her daughter
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to death. At this point, she broke down and sobbed and Divya Taneja got her to drink
some water to calm her down. She told them that this was a case for the police. Whilst we
waited, she went in through the adjoining door to the police station and spoke to
someone. After this, Manya went in to file an FIR (First Information Report, filed by the
police upon receipt of a criminal complaint). One of the main observations I made during
this session was how the Special Cell had eased away the discomfort of approaching the
police station directly. A patient and understanding hearing was given before the
remedies available to them were discussed. There were no confining timelines for the
complainants. They were with the social worker all afternoon and this was real evidence
of an enabling, feminist way of rendering legal aid.
Bharati and Reema
Parts of the interview may echo our own thought or own lives but in writing, rarely does
the author let the audience know that her life may parallel the respondents’ lives. The
placement of the author’s voice may validate the respondent’s experience (Rubin 1996,
Hertz 1997: xii). Knowledge produced in an interview does not emanate from a single
person but is shaped out of the interaction between two communicating people (McKenna
et al 1993 Mykhalovsky 1997:245)
218
Tuesdays were appointed field work days for the social workers in the Special Cell. I was
waiting outside with two women who were talking to each other in Marati. They seemed
to be old friends, and were laughing about various things. At one point, one of them
asked me in Hindi, the following:
‘Kya hua hai aapko? Madam ko dekhni hain?’
‘What has happened to you? Have you come to see Madam?’
For a moment I was taken aback as I did not understand what she was referring to. Then I
realised that they assumed that I was there to complain about violence. The concern for
another woman, a gentle curiosity was evidenced in this question. It was this interaction
amongst the survivors in the Special Cell which was possibly responsible for this spirit of
community among the survivor WUR. I explained why I was there but I also told them
about my experiences with violence. I asked them if they would be willing to talk to me
as it would greatly help my research. Bharati told me that she was a frequent visitor at the
Special Cell. She told me that her husband was an alcoholic and came home every night
to subject her to violence. She told me that she had made friends at the Special Cell
including Reem and Divyaji and came often to talk and discuss as she felt that she was
with people who she could relate to and they could share their problems. She had not
asked for any legal action to be taken against her husband. I sensed an easy friendship
between the two women.
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Reem is a Hijaben (a covered Muslim woman). She is over 65 years of age (she told me
she was not quite sure how old she exactly was. She comes from a family of ten children
and jokingly told me that her parents could not remember the exact date and year). She
told me that she had a violent husband and she had not come for a while to the Special
Cell because of Ramadan (The Muslim period of fasting leading to Eid). Her husband
had two other wives and she told me that she was his first wife. She believed that she had
special rights because she was the first wife. She told me that her husband did not provide
for her economically and she was not allowed to go out to work. Like Bharati, she came
to the Special Cell looking for someone who would listen to her and give her some
advice. She told me that the Special Cell was a place of hope for women like her.
At this point, Bharati asked me if I wanted some special tea from the chai-wala (the man
who made tea on the corner of the street). We got the tea and I asked them about the law
and what they thought about the protection. They said that only the rich can afford the
protection of the law and advocates. I asked them about the Special Cell. Bharati told me
that the Special Cell did not feel like a formal place of law. She said that it was more a
place of ‘samuhik-seva’ (social work). I realised that Bharati and Reem had accessed the
law through the Special Cell almost without realising that they were accessing it. They
had brought their complaints and their problems in their private lives out in the public.
Soon Divyaji came back and asked them with a smile,
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‘Reseacher bahut saare savaal puch rahi haikya?’
‘Researcher asking too many questions?’
After a couple of appointments with clients who wanted a private meeting, I went in and
explained to DivyaTaneja that I had told the two women about my work and they had
been happy to converse with me. I asked her if I could use the conversations and she told
me that if I had consent from my respondents, she was okay with it.
Bindiya
I met Bindiya when I was waiting to see Assistant Commissioner Virk in Delhi,
Nanakpura, for an interview. She was waiting to see him too. In India, when an
important person gives a scheduled time for an interview, the interviewer might end up
waiting for a long time to be seen. I asked Bindiya if she waiting to see Virk too. She told
me that the officer was a distant relative and she had come to file a complaint against her
husband. She asked me why I was there. I told her about my work and about my
appointment with the officer. She asked me why I was studying about domestic violence.
I told her that it was because of some violence in my past. She told me that at one point in
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her life she had felt like she was the only sufferer but she had recently met many women
who had faced violence. The reason why Bindiya’s interview has been included in this
chapter and not in the previous chapter is because she is a survivor WUR. She had a
voice that wanted to be heard and a story that she wanted to share with whoever was
willing to listen.
I asked her if it was okay to speak about the work while we waited. I told her that I may
write about her. She told me that I could as long as I did not disclose her real name. She
was 25 years old and had been married to a man for two years. She had a baby with him
but realised that he had another wife. She said that she was not a fool and would not stay
any longer with him. When she tried to leave him, he was severely physically violent
towards her and even threatened to harm their child. She was a graduate and she told me
that she could find a job and look after her child. She told me that she did not want the
indignity of living with such a man.
I asked her about the law. She said that the reason why she had felt that she could come
to the law was because she knew the Commissioner. She felt that he could help her in her
struggle to get a divorce. She told me that she did not have her ‘Izzat’ anymore and felt
that she had nothing to lose. I asked her at what point she decided to seek ‘outside’ help.
She told me that for her, violence was the fact that she was required to stay as a ‘wife’
when he already had another woman. She said that as a young, educated woman she did
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not feel like she had to stay in such a violent marriage. I asked her if she thinks she might
have come to the law if she did not know anyone in power. She told me, she was not sure.
She told me that the fact that she knew someone gave her the necessary confidence to
access the law. I asked her if she would have done the same if she had been in a
relationship with the man but was not actually married to him. She told me that she came
from an Izzedar (honourable) family and she would never live in with a man outside of a
marriage. I asked her if she thinks the law should act differently with such women, she
told me that any woman who was being abused had a right to get protection. Soon, we
were called into the office at the same time and we had to finish the conversation.
6. Conclusion
A study of the TISS reports and observational field work revealed that there are the
specific ways that law is being built up in this small legal community. There is a culture
of giving back to the legal system as survivors whose experiences help in understanding
domestic violence and improving the laws that protect against it. Merely by accessing
the law, women have played a part in the progress and development of the law. The
process of defining violence is a major contribution. Another welcome change brought
by survivor activism is that by defending what is due to them in terms of legal rights,
they have forced the system to perceive them differently, to see the suffering without
judgment and social ostracism. They appropriate the public space that was previously
unavailable to them. To the women who approach the organisation, violence can vary
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in nature, definition and intensity. Their experiences and encounters with violence have
helped in refining and contributing to DV law. From the interview with Anjali Dave
(Dave. 15. September. 2008) it was established that the drafters of the DV law took into
consideration the reports of these experiences in the TISS archives. The survivor model
of DV framework was agency- endowing, WUR friendly and empowering as observed
in the field.
The voices in this Chapter belong to eleven women, including me.
‘It is in the realm of sexuality of experiencing themselves as sexual beings, that
the women create, we believe a free space of their own... We are aware that the
whole issue is problematic, as far as possible the authors try to let the women’s
voices speak for themselves... Every time a woman recognises her body to be her
own, she takes a step outside imprisoning ideological boundaries that restrict her’
(Franco, Macwan and Ramnathan 2007 :161).
The moment a woman decides to step outside or transgress the borders of honour set out
for her by her community and the society, she seems to find the strength to be her own
agent/saviour when faced with persistent violence from or because of the person she did
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this for. This seems to be even more evident when women have children to look after.
When women came to the Special Cell, they carried back with them the positive
experience and shared it with their friends and neighbours. This resulted in more women
coming to the law and the news of the accessibility of the law being spread by word of
mouth.
The field work in Bombay was a revelation in many ways. The key findings will be
subjected to further analysis in the second half of the next chapter. The first finding in
this survivor model is about the three reasons that rupture the boundary between private
violence and a public recourse to the law. The first amongst this as we have seen in this
chapter is the transgression of the Izzat (honour) boundary. There was a recurrent
mention of ‘Izzat’ and the fact that once this had been destroyed; there was an easier
defiance of social norms as the women now felt that they had little to lose.
The second is the protective instinct of WUR to their children. A major factor that
persuaded women to approach the law was when there were children involved. This
seems to be one of the main rupture points of the defiance of norms.
There are different categories of single-womanhood. Some lived in with partners, some
had entered unwisely into fake marriages, some of them were second and third wives. It
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did not matter. The category ‘single’ was not the main issue. There was another rupture
point when the violence got to an unbearable level. The third reason is a broken threshold
of violence tolerance. Women of different faiths and economic backgrounds approached
the law. There problems differed in terms of the effect of the personal law, for instance,
Reem was tolerant of the other wives whilst Bindiya was not willing to share her man
with any woman.
The next major finding in this model is the reclamation of legal agency by the survivors
and the subsequent carrying over of this agency to other victims who then become
survivors. Women accessed the law in different ways. Some of them came to the police,
others straight to the Cell. Once they had punctured certain social boundaries and
reluctance, they were happy to have publicised their private problems. All of them felt
that they had people interested in their lives and people ready to help. None of the
respondents knew about the DV legislation until they approached the Special Cell. Some
of them did not know about it even afterwards. However this did not prevent their access
to legal aid and support.
The third and final finding is the contribution of the survivors’ experiences to the legal
system. This is explained in terms of the development of an inclusive and comprehensive
definition of domestic violence. The other access point is the use of the survivors’ legal
agency and the reclamations of the rights due to them. The law is thus forced ‘to sit up
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and take notice’ of the WUR as worthy legal subjects. Most of the respondents felt that
the fact that they could choose their path in the law at the Special cell took the pressure of
them to follow complicated and expensive legal procedure. The women defined
‘violence’ as something personal and unique to each of them. They had different
perceptions of what constituted violence. For some, the breach of trust of a partner was
the most violent of harms. Women shared their success stories with neighbours and
relatives and the ability to access the law can spread by word of mouth. They formed
friendships and support systems within the Special Cell and took courage from each
other.
Voice is a struggle to figure out how to present the author’s self while
simultaneously writing the respondents accounts and representing their selves.
Voice has multiple dimensions: First there is the voice of the author. Second there is
the presentation of the voices of one’s respondents within the text. A third
dimension appears when the self is the subject of inquiry. Reflexivity encompasses
voice but voice focuses more upon the process of representation and writing than
upon the processes of problem formation and data gathering. However in the final
product, voice typically is informed by the selection of the empirical problem,
methodology and theoretical tradition (Hertz 1997: xii).
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I have remained true to the narratives as they were shared with me. However, on some
level, our voices have merged to tell a common story.
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CHAPTER SIX
DV in the Light of WUR: Towards a More Feminist DV
Framework
1. Introduction
This chapter builds on the fieldwork findings presented in chapter 4 and 5. The first part
of the chapter focuses on the Victim Model and explores the implications of three key
results. It argues first that the formality of procedure and a strict adherence to the
procedural requirements of the DVA in the Victim Model limits the agency of the victim.
Secondly it explores the relationship with the police, particularly the alienation of the
police from various stages of implementation of the DVA and the subsequent creation of
a civil society safety space. Finally, it considers the relationship between the treatment of
legal agency and the location of the ‘ideal legal female subject’.
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The second part concentrates on the major results of the Survivor Model. This section
argues firstly that factors that puncture the boundaries between keeping violence a secret
and making a public complaint are: the transgression of the Izzat boundary; the fear of
harm to children and the financial need for the welfare of the children; and a severe life
threatening extent of violence. Secondly in the survivor model the reclamation of legal
agency by the survivors has been recorded as an outcome. I will argue that there is an
impact of this agency on others which subsequently transform others from victims to
survivors. The third outcome to be argued is that the survivors’ experiences feed back
into the legal system. This is argued using two access points. The first of these is that the
WUR experiences have contributed towards the development of a comprehensive
definition of domestic violence. The second access point is that the survivors use their
legal agency to reclaim the rights due to them under the law regardless of prejudices and
bias. In this way the law is ‘convinced’ into accepting WUR as worthy legal subjects.
The chapter also identifies some common links and best practices in order to open up the
possibility of further research for an ideal DV law framework which is more feminist,
less biased and agency endowing in nature. Although some of the results are applicable to
all victims and survivors, the chief focus continues to be WUR.
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2. The Victim Model
As we saw in Chapter Four the DV frame work in Delhi is closer to the legal advocacy
approach backed by some feminist inclusive methods. The framework depends on the
DVA to a great extent. One of the primary aims of the drafters is to see a robust
implementation and use of the DVA in cases of domestic violence. The legal subject
within this framework seems to be closer to the classic understanding of the helpless
victim who is in need of the State’s protection. In the following sections we will analyse
the three major findings of the research carried out with regard to the Victim Model. The
first of these is the formality of procedure.
2.1 Formality of Procedure
In Delhi, the participant research with the LCWRI, the police training session and the
different interviews with the stakeholders and authorities established that the
implementation of the DVA within the VAW framework is a priority within the Victim
Model. The DVA is thus extensively supported in its implementation by monitoring and
evaluation conferences, publication of annual reports, training and workshops for
appointed authorities within the DVA and by media awareness. This would mean that the
law has been laid down the victim subject accessing it and there is less scope for
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flexibility of use for WUR especially in terms of defining their experiences of violence
and for victim-empowerment and/ or victim activism.
This is also because, as we saw in Chapters Three and Four, the general outlook of the
legal authorities in the Victim Model towards WUR is that they are victims with limited
power and agency. Even as the authorities in Delhi go a good way towards ensuring that
the DV framework is contained within the rigid structures of the DVA, the victims seem
to be treated as sufferers who are not in the right state of mind to know what is good for
them or what remedy they need because they are caught in a continuum of violence, as is
evident from the police training sessions and from the drafters referring to the main
objective of the DVA as that for providing a ‘violence-free space’ for the victims. The
legal agency appears to be vested in the ‘middle women’ rather than in the victims
themselves. The procedure starts when the woman approaches a Protection Officer, a
service provider or a lawyer. These middle women who are also the designated
authorities in the DVA seem to take on or acquire the legal agency from the victims on
their behalf. It is also important to note at this point that the procedural requirements of
filling out a domestic violence form involve the ticking of boxes against predetermined
definitions of violence. In this sense the definitions of domestic violence have been
already decided and the victims have to adhere to the various descriptions of what the law
deems to have happened to them. Thus WUR have less opportunity to define violence on
their own terms as victims accessing the DVA in the Victim Model. As observed in the
offices of the Protection Officers many of the cases do not make it to the court. Once the
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WUR has given a complaint the power of agency has left their hands. There are several
variables that may or may not ensure justice for the victims. The lack of clerical help in
the offices of the Protection Officer, the unavailability of a computerised data storage
system, the Protection Officer’s discernment about the seriousness and sincerity of the
complaint, and the number of complaints made at any given time are these variables.
Although the DVA aims to give justice in the shortest possible time, delays are inevitable
in some cases due to such vagaries.
2.2 The Police and the Civil Society Safety Space
‘Familial ideology naturalises and universalises the construction of women as
wives and mothers, as economically dependent, as passive, dutiful and self-
sacrificing, across a broad range of personal laws (Kapur & Cossman, 1996: 101)
The legal system gives pre-eminence to the notion of homogeneous family thereby
disregarding the subordinate status of women within the family, and of her experiences of
violence that this entails (Ghosh, 2004). Due to social and cultural perceptions there is a
wide divergence between the legal provision and the perception of those authorities
associated with its implementation (Mitra, 2000:11). The failure of Section 498A of the
Indian Penal Code which recognises physical and mental violence inflicted on a woman
by her husband and in-laws as a cognizable and punishable offence is an example of such
divergence (Chauhan, 1999). It prescribed cruelty is not just confined to causing grave
233
injury, bodily harm, or danger to life, limb, or physical health but also includes mental
health, harassment, and emotional torture through verbal abuse (Ghosh, 1995). This was
achieved after the IPC was amended twice first in 1983 and then in 1986 (Mittal, 2003).
Consequently Section 498A was one of the few legal provisions that have recognised the
fact that the male members of a family can perpetrate violence against women (Newman,
1992; Kriger, 1999). Despite the fact that it brought under the purview of the law what
had been considered to be a private matter, it failed to withstand the test of cultural
perceptions and socially legitimised hierarchies (Jethmalani, 1995). WUR within the
DVA can find parallels in ‘wives’ under Section 498A and the lessons learned under
Section 498A is that legal reform is only effective when accompanied by social and
behavioural changes. In this sense, this is applicable to the DVA and the WUR as its
users.
Unless the cultural and social perceptions about WUR change, the laws in themselves
will not bring justice. WUR in order to negotiate their rights must be aided by legal
agencies that promote and encourage such negotiations. Instead when confronted with the
police, the WUR often find themselves in a hostile environment where their needs are not
treated with the necessary seriousness. Within a legal system where there is an inherent
tolerance of domestic violence and where social and legal mechanisms are in place that
consider the preservation of the family as the top most priority, WUR would find
themselves in an alien social and legal space. As long as there is tolerance of domestic
violence towards women in cultural, legal, and political institutions, laws in themselves
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will not change the situation (Mitra, 2000). Appropriate social and behavioural reform
along with the efficient enforcement of the DV laws can only protect women within the
system (Mitra, 2000). And as the system already supports culturally legitimised social
hierarchies, sometimes the law merely reinforces these hierarchies (Mitra, 2000) .
The police training sessions and the interview with DCP Virk, confirm such dominant
notions of familial ideology and attitudes towards women and suffering. In their
interviews, the Protection Officers, research officers and other stakeholders confirmed the
insensitivity often displayed by the police officers in handling cases of domestic violence.
The police, upon the receipt of complaints from DV victims refuse to register their cases
if they do not feel that the domestic event is not serious enough. In cases that require
investigation the police failed to do so, seriously. This has resulted in the loss of faith of
the victims and of authorities in the protective functions of the police. During the police
training session and afterwards in the interviews, the research officers confirmed the
conscious distancing of the police from various aspects of the DV framework by the
drafters. With the exception of Section 31 of the DVA, the police play little other part in
the procedural aspects of the DVA. However in contradiction, at the time of doing the
research field work it was evident that the police were still the first port of call for victims
of domestic violence in practice. When the victims approach the police station, the police
are required to direct the women to the nearest Protection Officer. The police are also
required to write a Domestic Incidence Report (D.I.R) in the case of a domestic event
occurring. This is mostly for the purposes of maintaining records of cases of violence. It
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is then up to the Protection Officer, the service providers, the medical facilities and the
shelter homes to provide the necessary help to WUR.
Research undertaken in the context of domestic violence in the homes of police officers
has found that because of working conditions that require domination and aggression
police officers tend to have what is called an authoritarian personality (Sgambelluri,
2000). The very nature of both police training and police work promotes aggression,
increasing the risk of excessive use of force on the job and sometimes off the job as well
(D’Angelo, 2000; Neidig et al., 1992; Sgambelluri, 2000). For instance, police officers
are trained for their jobs to dominate physically and psychologically, through posturing
and verbal and physical forms of intimidation (Johnson, Todd, & Subramanian, 2005).
These tactics can be used to gain control in all situations, including those within the
home. Physical and psychological domination is reinforced throughout a police officer’s
career, making it difficult to leave the job at the work place (Johnson et al., 2005;
Sgambelluri, 2000). Recognising that the police are not an ideal access point for victims
of violence to approach the law because of the sensitive nature of the complaints, the
drafters confirmed in the interviews that during the course of the monitoring process they
have worked strategically to marginalise the police from the various stages of DVA
implementation. Specifically in the context of WUR the police would be less of a useful
legal resource even as it is evident from the questions in the police training session and
the interviews of the Protection Officers and the stakeholders that there is a bias among
the police officers against the worthiness of WUR to be legal subjects.
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Thus as argued in Chapter One, despite certain bouts of cooperation and tolerance, the
women’s movement does not have a very sound relationship with the police (Agnihotri,
1995; Basu 2000; Kumar, 2011). More than as a state agency of law and order, women’s
groups have often seen the police as further oppressors of victim as is evident from the
less than perfect record of the treatment received by women in police stations (Kelkar,
1987; Rose, 1992; Kishwar, 1998). Also the emphasis for police, lawyers, and
counsellors whose services are sought for intervention is towards reconciliation and
preservation of the ideal family (Prasad, 1999). Police and lawyers are part of the same
patriarchy that tolerates domestic violence. Unless it is dowry related, these agencies do
not necessarily consider physical, and especially mental abuse crimes (Fernandez, 1997).
Instead such abuse is seen as attempts on the part of the husbands to ‘discipline’ their
wives (Go, Johnson, Bentley et al., 2003). Abuse may also be seen as something that was
caused by drunkenness or induced by stress. Under such circumstances, according to the
police and lawyers, these issues are not serious enough to cause disruption of families,
and certainly not valid grounds for conviction of husbands (Niaz, 2003). It therefore
becomes very frustrating for women to try to win justice from such institutions (Niaz,
2003). Research done on police responses to domestic violence has shown that the
general perception among the police was that these days young women have ‘become too
big for their boots’ the ‘tolerance level among young women had gone down’ and, most
notably, ‘there are no laws to protect men’ (Chikarmane 2000; Ahamed-Gosh, 2004:18).
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Thus, as established by the stakeholders in their interviews and from the secondary
sources, the failure of Section 498A of the IPC to provide adequate redressal to women
resulted in an essential shift in the thinking of the drafters and the other stakeholders
involved with the implementation of the DVA about the need for a civil law of domestic
violence. As repeatedly mentioned in the monitoring and evaluation reports compiled by
the LCWRI, the DVA intends to provide a civil law with criminal overtures that come
into operation when its provisions are breached. A gradual shift was noticed during the
monitoring and evaluation process and during the field work research, in the powers of
the police being transferred to a ‘civil society safety space’. I call it the safety space
because the civil society seems to be taking on a lot of responsibility from the state to
create a legal framework which is more conducive to the safety, comfort and the welfare
of victims of DV. Perhaps in the minds of the drafters, the history of the police atrocities
on women and the insensitivity evidenced in the general attitude of the police whilst
dealing with VAW, have played often and enough for the realisation that another space
has to be freed up for the use by victims of DV. This ‘violence-free’ space could be
envisaged in such a relatively non-threatening framework in which the victim feels more
at ease in making a private complaint public in the absence of police interference and in
the presence of alternate civil officers like Protection Officers and service providers.
Thus the drafters of the DVA realised the virtue in creating a safety space held together
by the civil society in order for women to find the appropriate legal remedy and negotiate
their legal rights within a more victim friendly and women-centric space. This is because
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of the recognition of the dominant social hierarchies set in place by the society and the
family and reinforced by authorities like the police. This safety space is held in place and
protected by the civil society. The constant criticism of the criminal law and the
reluctance of the police in registering complaints within this law can be noted as two of
the reasons for their relative isolation from this safety space.
To further concretise the strength of this space, the authoritative role of the police has
been used in the context of section 31 of the DVA as discussed in Chapter Four. It is at
this point in the DVA that this otherwise civil legislation turns criminal. Upon the breach
of any protection orders by the court the police can step in as a disciplining authority. In
this sense the safety space is further reinforced around the periphery by the threat of the
possibility of criminal sanctions on the abuser. The safety space is thus harmoniously
balancing the requirement of a violence- free zone for women and the necessity of the
possible use of force to distance the abusers from the victims. It appears as though the
police act as a fence of sorts keeping the violence at bay and yet giving all the other
functions to the civil society to provide necessary help and legal aid to women.
2.3 WUR within This Formality
WUR have less of a chance to enjoy familial and neighbourhood support system as is
evidenced from the interviews with the Protection Officers when it is was established that
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WUR usually come unaccompanied to make a complaint. The decision to access the law
in case of DV may be a tough and often lonely one for WUR. The making of private
violence a public complaint appears to be made tougher by the formality of procedure. In
theory the procedure laid down in the DVA entails that once a DIR is filed the proceeding
is initiated. However due to the eagerness of the authorities to make use of the provision
of Protection Officer, the police are directed to send the victim to the nearest Protection
Officer. Once a victim makes a decision and gathers the courage to go to the police
station to make a complaint, she finds herself being shuttled off to a different authority.
As was evident from the interviews with the Protection Officers they are often in offices
that are far away from the police station. A WUR may during this transit from the wrong
authority to right one, abandon the process of accessing the law based on the evidence
supported by the interviews with the Protection Officers. It may also result in more
expenses for travel and sometimes even accommodation for women who come from the
outskirts of Delhi.
Considering the socio-economic relationships of WUR with the other members of the
household, their neighbours, employees and employers, no one who is aware of the abuse
is willing to risk their various relationships and jobs to come to the rescue of the victims.
Due to the fact that the WUR is translocated to another place and family and
neighbourhood that are alien to her she may often lack the support system available to
women in conventional marriages. The translocation may be reasonably presumed to be
hostile when compared to a conventional marriage. A family and neighbourhood that a
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woman is married into may be often more accepting of a legitimate relationship
(Suneetha and Nagraj, 2006). The family members of the partner are also often hostile to
these unconventional relationships and wash their hands of the couple. Most often the
hostility may be directed towards the WUR and not towards their male partners. There is
a tendency to blame the women for such relationships and consequently for the troubles
faced in these relationships. This would explain why married women in most cases
approach the law supported by members of the natal family whereas WUR come
unaccompanied. Once a WUR chooses to go ahead with the unconventional relationship,
in many ways she severs the ties with her natal family and her natal support systems
merely by virtue of her choice.
2.4 WUR and Institutional Challenges
The path of domestic violence victim and her progression from being a victim to
occupying a legal subject position has to be paved by energetic institutional responses.
When she breaks free of her subjection in the private through a negotiation of her rights
in the public she acquires the necessary legal agency to bring a change to her situation
and to the situation of similarly placed victims. (Dave and Solanki, 2001; Devi et al.,
2000; Elizabeth, 1999; Hengsara Hakkina Sangha, 1999; Jaswal, 1999; Mitra, 2000;
Vindhya, 2000). As we saw in Chapter Three for WUR the DVA is the only provision of
law which expressly includes in the definition of relationship includes live-in
relationships and relationships in the nature of marriage. Thus the actual letter of the
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DVA is of significance to WUR and therefore the institutional responses to domestic
violence are even more crucial in deciding the success or the failure of the DVA as
regards to them. Many studies of institutional responses concluded that such responses
failed women (Mitchell, 1983; Dutton, 1992; Shepard, 1999; Coker, 2000). A major
institutional challenge is insistence on corroborative evidence (Suneetha, 2006). Added to
this is the problem of a patriarchal understanding of cruelty and women’s reaction and
tolerance (Dasgupta, 2002). Another hindrance to successful legal access is lengthy and
expensive court and trial procedure (Nigam, 2005). During medical examination and
treatment doctors are often indifferent to women’s suffering and sometimes even aid the
abusers family to conceive important evidence. Another institutional limitation is the
counsellors’ insensitivity to the needs and complaints of the victim. Over the recent years
there has been a movement to encourage the active collaboration between the government
and the civil society in dealing with the problem of domestic violence. Local networks
like friends, families, colleagues at work have also been identified as having the potential
for acting as controlling mechanisms against domestic violence.
2.5 Treatment of Legal Agency and the Worthy Legal Female Subject
Thus we saw that if the process of breaking free from her subjection is helped by
institutional and societal support systems, the access to legal agency of WUR becomes
easier and faster (Mills, 1998; Danis, 2003). In the Victim Model when WUR approach
the institutions the agentive rights of the woman are limited as the institution seeks to
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rewrite the women’s experience with violence in order to fit within the confines of the
domestic incidence form. Often it so happens that the WUR do not have the will or the
resources to follow up on their complaints. The victims have to be perceived by the
institutional authorities as fit agentive subjects of the law. This subjectivity is shaped
through a historic continuity of the liberal idea of the ideal victim subject. When victims
do not act consistently or autonomously, for instance when they change alter or withdraw
the complaint, the perception of unfitness increases. An instance of this was observed in
the Protection Officer P’s office when she showed her annoyance at the inability of the
victim to adhere to the facts of what had happened to her in the narration of the domestic
event.
Thus these subjects of law are often not given the position of an equal citizen making a
complaint. They are instead perceived as people who need to be told what to do and how
to conduct themselves in order to fit the mould of an agentive subject and as would-be
citizens (Suneetha and Nagraj). This is further illustrated by the different institutional
responses in the forms of shelter homes and counselling sessions set in place in Delhi.
They may be required by the law to attend counselling sessions or access a shelter home
or in the absence of the existence of shelter homes, they may be sent to a ‘nearest safe
place’. The agency of this unfit subject is acquired by ‘middle women’ who are deemed
to have the ability to make decisions and act on the behalf of the victim. Even the kind of
violence that the unfit agentive subject faces is redefined by the institutional mechanisms
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set in place. Thus the legal agency is acquired and assumed by the middle women with
the immediate presumption of the victim as an unfit subject.
Another presumption is that of an unworthy legal subject. WUR are sometimes perceived
by institutional authorities not just as unfit but also as unworthy because of the moral
choices they have exercised. The chances of WUR dropping or abandoning complaints
become higher when faced with hostile institutional responses. Although the police have
been slowly isolated from the DV institutional framework they still remain the first port
of call for DV victim. Hence WUR are still met with hostility even after they get over the
initial hesitation to file a complaint. The victim has to attain certain moral credibility in
order for her complaint to be treated as a genuine one. She has to do this within a
stipulated time and it has to fit within the predetermined definition of violence. Several
studies point out that it is not possible for women to fit their lives into such institutional
formats (Nicolaidis, 2002; McPhail, Busch, Kulkarni & Rice, 2007; Kohn, 2010). Studies
have also shown that absenteeism changing of the facts, missing information and medical
reports have been used to discredit the victims of DV (Stephens, 2000; Hartmann, 2003).
Institutions often fail to leave a margin to accommodate the fact that these women also
have to negotiate with their families, friends and even the abuser whilst making the
complaint.
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Thus an important aspect of the interaction of a woman with a legal institution is whether
the institution treats the woman in the subject position of a victim who does not have the
necessary discerning powers or if they are treated as equal citizens. In the Victim Model
the authorities were seeking to rewrite the women’s experiences with violence in order to
fit the mould of a legal institutional language. The evidence of this is from the
requirement of the filling of the domestic violence form in which the violence has been
described for them as observed during the session in the Protection Officers office. In this
sense the victim’s voice is stifled because she is not given enough freedom to express her
experiences of violence without the pre-determined yard sticks of violence. They are
forced to change or alter their complaints in order to meet institutional requirements.
Often follow up meetings and other requisites like counselling, filling in the DIR form,
following up on complaints, the two and fro from the police station to the office of the
Protection Officer put a huge personal and financial burden on the victims and wreak
havoc on their lives and interpersonal relationships. Even with sympathetic Protection
Officers and service providers the victims need to provide their complaints within a
certain time and provide all the necessary facts without ambiguity (Suneetha and Nagaraj,
2010).
The ideal legal subject has to have a certain degree of victimhood before their complaints
are taken seriously. This is evident from interviews with the Protection Officers when
they admitted that the cases that seemed most urgent were based on their idea of how
much suffering the victim was undergoing. There is a dichotomy here between the ideal
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legal subject and the victim subject. The ideal legal subject is the one who has moral
responsibility and is factual and clear about the violence she has been subjected to. The
victim subject however has to show that her suffering is about a pre-determined threshold
before she can evoke the law.
The interview conducted by Deputy Commissioner of Police, Virk, a woman who shows
anger or impatience in a relationship devalues herself from the position of a worthy legal
subject. She does not seem ‘innocent enough’ as she is seen as having provoked the
partner into being violent with her. Any women who reacts in a domestic violence
situation by calling the authorities, complaining to the neighbours or even walking out of
the relationship is acquiring for herself a certain degree of agency. She is initiating the
breaking away from her victimhood and her present subject position. In the case of WUR
this breaking away is often differently located. It has been argued that when women are
trying to be agentive subjects to claim and exercise their rights, they are compared to the
‘historically consolidated notion of the subject’ (Balibar, 1994:11). This subject has
reason, will, moral sense of responsibility and as a result of all these constituent elements,
has the legal subjectivity and their actions are protected by the law. Once they have this
subjection to the law, they get their rights and the agency to demand such rights
(Douzinas, 2000:231-236). What the institutions in the case of WUR are looking for is
such an agency, in a particular way of narrating the domestic event, in the consistency of
their complaint, in their persistence in pursuing the complaint, proof of their victimhood,
the justification of moral choices and the closest adherence possible to the ideal ‘female
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victim’ before they are put on the recourse to justice. When these requisites remain
unfulfilled, the agency is limited and their inadequate legal subjectivities mean that they
do not get justice done to them as full-fledged citizens of the state.
Recently authors have argued that the women’s rights discourse on violence within the
family has entered particular institutional spaces (Koss, 2000; Vargas, 2003). These
spaces can be understood as the sites of political interaction and interactions between
citizen-authorities and would-be citizen. Women seeking justice encounter amongst
others two kinds of power (Dobash & Dobash, 1999). The first of these is the legal
authority which confers upon women rights and which gives solutions that depend on the
woman’s ability to be an ideal legal subject. The second is the governmental power
which addresses these very subjects of welfare offering them realistic and reasonable
solutions. The intent of the new domestic violence law is to institutionalise these two
forms of power in conjunction with the criminal law. It also uses the resources of the civil
society particularly in the form of service providers to enforce the law.
Women approaching the authorities for protection or redressal in the law find that they
have to acquire a balance between appearing like the real victims who need protection
and at the same time showing that they are not wallowing in self-pity (Stubbs, 2002). For
instance a woman who aggressively pursues her case with the help of a lawyer is
perceived as a ‘hard’ survivor. If she were a ‘real’ victim the belief is that she cannot be
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this strong. Research has shown that women who had been beaten by their male partners
but did not fit the symptoms of ‘the battered women’s syndrome’ faced troubled
receiving help from the authorities designated as helpers (Rothenberg, 2003: 783). There
is a social kind of ‘innocent’ and women who got angry at their partners was seen as
causing provocation for the partner for the use of violence against them.
3 Survivor Model
In Mumbai, the Survivor Model the institutional framework is such that the survivors
acquire more legal agency because of the institutional responses. What was seen in the
field was a simultaneous reclamation of legal agency by the survivor and the passing
back of legal agency to the survivor from the institutional support systems. This happens
because the Survivor Model is agency endowing and enabling for the WUR to understand
and decide the remedies available to them and in this process allow the social workers a
certain degree of agency to Act on their behalf. The special cells are places where the
social workers lend a non-judgmental ear to the survivors as was established from the
interviews with the survivors and the social worker. In this space the survivor is given an
extensive understanding of the remedies available to her. She is treated as an equal
citizen who has the discernment to choose the remedy best suited for her and her
situation. During the participant observational research and from the interviews it was
evident that even if she changes her mind about making the complaint or following it up,
her credibility as a legal agentive subject is not at stake. The special cells are based on a
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feminist understanding of providing survivors with the means to find and use their own
voice. Survivors assume fit agentive subject positions when they are confronted with the
law at the special cells. This back and forth of legal agency between the survivor and the
institution is empowering for the survivors and at the same time the activism of these
rights bearing survivors helps improve the framework within this model. Survivors are
able to negotiate their rights as equal citizens of the law. Thus the new subject position
which they acquire is more powerful and less intimidating at the same time. It is more
powerful because the survivors have had the chance to negotiate and make their own
legal choices. It is less intimidating because of the friendly nature of the institution where
they can talk to patient non-judgmental social workers and to other survivors in similar
subject positions. The field work revealed that there are certain break-away points that
rupture the boundary of secrecy when a WUR decides to make a public complaint of a
private violence. The first of these is the transgression of the Izzat boundary.
3.1 Izzat Boundary and its Transgression
Izzat was a resonating theme in the interviews with the WUR. When a WUR breaks away
from the norm of a conventional relationship of marriage she has in societal terms
transgressed the traditional notions of Izzat. By stepping out of the Izzat line she is
walking away from the safety of her natal family and their protection because she has
compromised the familial honour. In this sense her unconventional relationship is already
border-line in the public sphere. When such a woman is subjected to violence by her
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partner she feels she has less to lose in the eyes of the society as she has already
‘sacrificed’ her Izzat as well as the Izzat of her natal family for the sake of this
relationship. WUR transgress the Izzat boundary when they make the sexual choice that
is not approved by their family and social group, thereby asserting their freedom of
choice. Freedom for women spells ‘social disaster’ (Yuwal Davis, 1992: 285). Once a
woman transgresses the Izzat boundary which is also a marked and preserved boundary
between kin groups, she is now ostracised as ‘Besharam’ (Sharma, 1978). WUR have
now abandoned Sharam which is also a metaphor for defining what is public and what is
private. When a woman upsets normal sexual behaviour she endangers these boundaries
and invites public and private censure (Thompson, 1981). By making a choice a sexual
choice, she is also forced to break some social and familial ties. She risks losing the
support of her natal family and the social group as she has chosen to sacrifice their Izzat
for her own ‘selfish’ interest. WUR thus do not have a natal family to go back to in case
her relationship of choice turns sour. In the interviews the WUR expressed the thought
that since they had lost their Izzat for the abusive men, they had nothing more to lose by
approaching the law. In a ‘normal marriage’ women often feel bound to safeguard the
Izzat of her natal family and the family of the husband. Talking about private issues or
troubles in the home and making it public by going to the authorities would bring a great
sense of shame to the family circle. However in the case of WUR and the Izzat boundary
it becomes a ‘double jeopardy’ of sorts as the Izzat has already been lost and now they
have nothing more to lose by approaching the legal authorities or by publicising their
troubled private lives. Thus the WUR who have been historically disadvantaged because
of their transgressive identities and should have therefore received or felt they deserved
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less protection, now find themselves empowered by the sudden absence of the sense of
duty to preserve their izzat. This however happens because they are also supported by the
institutional responses within the Survivor Model of DV framework.
3.2 Fear of harm to children and the need for financial security of children
WUR agency in case of domestic violence survival cannot be limited to the construction
of women as ‘atomistic, mobile individuals’ rather they should be seen as highly
interconnected to others, particularly to children (Mahoney, 1994: 74; Maguigan, 1991;
Coker, 1999; Stubbs, 2002: 44). Several women who seek legal aid to deal with DV are
mothers and often they come to the law when the children are targeted or when they fear
the effects of violence (Harrell Smith, 1996; Davis et.al, 1998; Ptacek, 1999). Abusers
often use children to intimidate their partners or former partners and one of the most
common threats made is to separate the child from the mother (Davis et.al, 1998:33;
Stubbs, 2002:45) as is evident from Sandra’s case. A WUR’s capacity to make a legal
choice is also constrained when children are involved (Lewis et.al, 2000; Stubbs, 2002).
Another point of rupture when the WUR go public with their complaint is when children
are involved in the relationship. As the interviews revealed, most other considerations
take a back seat when children are involved. In this sense WUR act as legal agents for
their children when there is a threat of harm to their children. The safety of children and
the need to isolate and protect them from the abuser becomes a top priority to WUR. The
medical bills and the money for educating the children is a consideration of utmost
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importance to WUR. When children are involved (particularly girl children), the WUR
seem to be ready to take on the agentive rights of their children and approach the law
armed with their fiercely protective maternal instincts.
3.3 Life Threatening Violence
When compared to other women victims of domestic violence, women who seek legal
protection, would have experienced serious levels of violence; be injured; have a partner
who is in trouble with the law or has been violent in other aspects (Coumarelos & Allen,
1998; 1999; Young, Byles & Dobson, 2000; Stubbs, 2002). This is evident from the
interviews with the survivor WUR. Many women maintain silence for a long time till the
violence becomes life threatening. The silence could be a coping mechanism (Stubbs,
2002).
When the violence becomes life threatening the boundary of secrecy is crossed. The
ability to rationalise about the harm in staying with the abuser seems to proportionately
increase with the extent of violence. When there is a threat to the life of the survivor, she
decides to walk out of the relationship and approach the law. The fear of leaving is thus
overcome when the fear of staying exceeds it. The extreme forms of violence include
physical abuse like repeated punching, slapping, kicking and neglect of the health
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problems of the survivor and public humiliation; extreme sexual violence like forcing the
survivor to watch pornographic films and sexual humiliation.
4 Giving Back to the Law: Agentive Subjects and the Language of
Rights
The women define violence and explain in their own terms about what has happened to
them. As established by the interview with Anjaly Dave, these definitions have
contributed during the several years of research on domestic violence by TISS. These
definitions are archived over the years were considered by the drafters of the DVA in
formulating a definition for DV. This is evidence of the victim’s agency feeding back
into the legal system. The experiences of the survivors have in this way influenced the
engineering of the law. What follows is a to and fro agentive relationship between the
survivor and the law.
WUR do not fit the classical model of victim – one who is restrained by societal norms
and controls and need to be freed by the grant of freedom. Neither do they fit the new
model of the empowered women who is supported by society. The WUR are exceptional
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agentive subjects because they challenge their condition of subordination, these
challenging activities are conducted in the previously forbidden public sphere; when
provided with appropriate social, legal and ideological change like in the survivor model,
WUR break free from violent relationships (Hirschmann, 1996). Such a Survivor Model
in which the WUR feature in social networks outside of formal institutions can be
described as moving towards the feminist ideal of a DV survivor framework (Suneetha &
Nagaraj, 2010). In such a framework the subjects of law is a rights bearing agentive
WUR who is working to challenge the violence in her intimate relationship and her rights
are more important than the need of the law to protect against the disintegration of
family.
Thus empowerment legally speaking refers both to WUR’s power to act and the
endowment of such agency by the institutional framework. As a conscious agentive
subject the WUR thus have the capacity and the desire to move on in a single historical
direction- that of increasing self empowernment and decreasing pain (Suneetha &
Nagaraj, 2010). Hence this survivor model of DV framework is both enabling and
empowering.
A liberal notion of WUR agency finds itself on shaky ground in Hirschmann’s
description of a woman in a domestic violence situation (Hirschmann, 1996). According
to Berlin the quintessentially liberal notion of liberty can be understood as negative and
254
positive liberty. Negative liberty is the freedom from state or societal restrictions.
Positive liberty consists of the sum total of enabling conditions that help to pursue one’s
life path. Hirschmann (1996) argues that neither of these models approximates the
experience of women facing violence. Applied to domestic violence, negative liberty
arguments do not mean much. In order to be able to act, instead of freedom from the state
and society, women need more choices, resources, laws and supportive structures from
the state and from society. Similarly, in terms of positive liberty, to realise their life
paths, along with support from society, a woman needs to consciously work against
internalising societal values that prevent her from breaking out of a violent family. In the
case of the Survivor WUR of the Survivor Model in Mumbai, their ability to break free
from the barriers is reinforced by adequate institutional support. She is able to break free
from the internalizing societal familial barriers because in her mind, she has nothing to
lose as she does not have her izzat anymore.
5 Towards a Feminist Model of DV framework: Best Practices
The discourse on domestic violence in India is illuminated by the language of rights and
empowerment in which domestic violence is seen as the condition that needs to be
overcome (Suneetha & Nagaraj, 2010). It imagines the WUR facing violence as
prospective citizen-subjects, who can actualise their right against violence once the law
and institutions are set in order (Suneetha & Nagaraj, 2010). The general understanding is
that the violence can be adequately removed by legal and institutional responses and by
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enabling the agency of the legal subjects. It has been argued that the law is the ultimate
deliverer of justice in cases of domestic violence. The WUR imagined by this discourse is
however a victim of familial obligation and although she is aware of her subjection and
wants to take action she is faced with the barriers of poor public and institutional support
as seen by the language of the Victim Model.
The new institutional spaces available to the survivor WUR of DV are civil society based
and quasi-legal like the special cells for women and children. Since the advent of the
DVA efforts have been made to improve institutional functioning using training and
sensitisation work shops as we saw in the Victim and the Survivor Models. The Mumbai
model provides for an ideal institutional framework as it defies the formal institutional
setting for the treatment of DV cases. As we saw in Chapter Five, it is both enabling of
survivor agency and empowering to WUR. Another institutionally enabled
victim/survivor network which is progressive is seen in both the Models – the victim’s
survivors groups based on friendship, mutual support in the sharing of experiences.
The nature of domestic violence and its prevalence needs to be more fully understood in
relation to the economic cultural and political factors (Gandhi & Shah, 1992; Kumar,
1993; Sunitha & Nagaraj, 2010). Support institutions such as shelter homes and medical
facilities are still vastly lacking. Thus these solutions provided in the Act have to be made
available and widely accessible to all WUR. The private, public and mixed models of
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accessing the DVA must be re-examined bearing in mind that these have little values
until women have economic options outside of their relationships. Familial support must
be encouraged in order to help the victims to access the law. Finally the voices of the
victims and survivors are crucial in enabling a feminist DV framework (Stephen, 2000;
Smith, 2001; Hirschel, 2003; Goodman, 2008).
Survivors of DV are not the only beneficiaries of DV law. Survivor activism helps in the
development of the DV law. The process of development and empowerment is thus
cyclical. The survivors’ voices can help improve the law for other victims and survivors.
The surrogacy of agency by the middle women takes on and fosters what could have been
self-empowering agency for the victims in Delhi. In order for women to take on their
rights as right bearing citizens, institutional support systems must be non-judgmental and
agency endowing. Acquiring too much agency on the behalf of the victims/ survivors
takes from their confidence and their ability to be agents in their own empowerment and
in the empowerment of other women in similar positions.
A survivor who breaks free from or even ruptures the boundary created by the societal
and moral strongholds to approach the law in times of personal experiences of violence is
already exercising agency and making choices for herself and for others who depend on
her. In order for her to make such a difficult decision despite being caught in a trap of
violence, she is a thinking, discerning and brave citizen-subject .Thus in that sense she is
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evoking the law as a rights bearing citizen. An ideal DV framework should foster that
agency and not take from or acquire agency unless and until the survivor herself expects
or asks for the support she needs.
A feminist framework of DV law suits WUR. They are women who have already
transgressed societal norms. They have survived violence or are survivors on the behalf
of other women. A framework that understands them as individuals who have different
needs, women who have had different experiences with violence and heeds their voices is
an ideal one. This feminist framework does not work as a one-sided affair. Survivor
participation and survivor activism helps to build up the framework based on real
survivor voices and actual experiences from the women themselves. Also, the zeal to
implement a new law should not take from the strength and the voices of survivors. The
DVA implemented with more agency for the survivors would benefit the making of an
ideal feminist legal framework.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen the field work findings of the Victim Model and the
Survivor Model in relation to WUR tested and located within the wider discussions in the
research. The major findings relating to the Victim Model have been discussed. These
include a formality of procedure and the limited and surrogated agency of the victim.
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This has consequently resulted in the classic understanding of the victim who is in need
for the state protection against DV. In the Victim Model the police have been alienated in
theory from the DV framework in the process of the movements of the DV law from
criminal to civil. In its place a civil society safety space has sprouted which helps to
protect the victim WUR in a well-rounded manner. Inherent in this Victim Model is the
rudiments of the ideal, legal, female subject who is a would be citizen of the law upon
whom lies the onus of making use of the state and NGO machinery available to her. This
is a more liberal interpretation of victim rights as the individuation of the victim as a legal
subject disregards the economic and social variables.
On the other hand in Mumbai the Survivor Model of DV is based on the notion that the
WUR are full-fledged citizens of the state. They are perceived as worthy legal subjects
and in order to access this perception they break free from societal barricades. The three
different points of rupture were identified as the transgression of the Izzat boundary, fear
of harm to the children and life threatening violence. The Survivor Model also envisions
the reclamation of legal agency by the survivors and the subsequent endowment of such
agency to other survivors. This model as we have seen has fed back into this system and
has successfully aided the development of DV law. The best practices have been
identified in order to work towards an ideal feminist DV framework. The WUR have
come a long way beyond the transgressive identities constructed for them by the law and
the society to a state of being where they are capable of working towards self-
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empowerment and convincing the law of their worthiness as legal subjects and full-
fledged citizens of the state.
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CONCLUSION
1. Introduction
This thesis has identified a category of the users of DV law – Women in Unconventional
Relationships. The original contribution that this thesis makes to the development of
knowledge is that it captures constructions of women’s identities and their legal
subjectivity within the Indian DV law setting, in the light of WUR. In doing this research
investigated two different models of DV framework in Delhi and Mumbai. It tested the
two different human rights approaches to DV law identified by Sally Engle Merry (2003;
2006) in the Indian context. While the Delhi Victim Model is inclined to a legal advocacy
approach with some inclusive feminist processes, the Survivor Model is an alternate DV
framework closer to the feminist social work approach. The thesis builds on Merry’s
analysis of victim subjectivity using the category WUR, thus adding to the development
feminist legal analysis. The contribution of the participant WUR and their strong
articulations of the experiences with domestic violence and the law enriches the existing
scholarship with definitive voices- voices of women who have transgressed societal
norms. It challenges the existing idea within the DV scholarship in India that women who
are socially disadvantaged because of the loss of Izzat will be reluctant to evoke the law.
This research has found that supported by the feminist Survivor Model of DV framework,
WUR will overcome societal barriers and act as right bearing citizens. They feel that
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once they have lost their Izzat with their transgressive identities, they have nothing more
to lose by making their private experiences of violence a public legal complaint.
In the first chapter I argued that the constructions of WUR identities began with the
development of the binary divisions of women as good and bad. These divisions were
selectively adopted from the ancient Hindu texts and politically manipulated to meet the
ends of male superiority and the patriarchal protection of women. The constructions of
WUR continued during the nationalist movement parallel to the mushrooming growth of
the women’s groups. The ghar-bahir argument which was used to answer the women
question further reiterated the historical constructions of WUR identities. The chapter
also explored the awkward relationship between the police and the women’s movement,
and the historical reasons for the civil society activism in the framing of DV law.
In the second chapter I argued that studying the WUR and a legal subjectivity and agency
in their legal encounters can attain a deconstruction of the liberal legal subject and the
exploration of their multi-layered subjectivities. I have located WUR within the VAW
and post-colonial feminist discourses by a substantive analysis of the existing
scholarships on the subject of WUR within VAW. Developing the themes from Chapter
One, Chapter Two has traced the transgression and positioning of WUR in the private-
public dichotomy and the result of the transgression resulting in a public identity. Chapter
Two also identified the research methodology best suited for this thesis. The mixed
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methods triangulated findings of this thesis. The heart of the thesis is the incorporation of
women’s experiences with violence and law in the survivor’s own voices as a part of the
feminist methodology. The contribution to knowledge is also from their powerful voices
towards the development of a feminist, women centric DV framework.
In Chapter Three I located the constructions of WUR within the DV law prior to the
advent of the DVA, within the DVA and the subsequent case law. I argued that the
marginal position of the WUR within the DV frame work is linked to the ways in which
the judiciary interprets the provisions and constructs WUR identities within the case law.
We explored the implications of the encounter of the transgressive WUR identities with a
legal system which seems to support very different values. I argued that the tensions in
the constructions of WUR identities by the higher courts is due to the general recognition
by the law of the ideal legal DV subject as the constructed vulnerable married women.
In Chapter Four working as a participant observer with the LCWRI I investigated the
Victim Model illuminated by the WUR and argued that this model of DV framework is
less agency endowing for the victims. From the data collected the major findings were
the connection between formality of procedure and the treatment of legal agency, the
alienation of the police from the various stages of the implementation of the DVA and the
creation of the civil society safety space and the connection between the constructions of
WUR and the ideal legal female subject.
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In Chapter Five an alternative legal framework in the form of the Survivor Model in
Mumbai was analysed in the light of WUR. The survivor’s narratives revealed the extent
of legal agency in this model. The major findings were the reasons for the rupture of the
boundary between private violence and public recourse to law. This rupture was
attributed to the transgression of the Izzat (honour) boundary, the protective attitude of
WUR towards their children and a broken threshold of violence tolerance. The second
finding was the claiming of legal agency by the WUR and the passing over of such
agency to other survivors. The third major finding that we saw in Chapter Five was the
contribution made by the survivors to the development of the DV law.
In Chapter Six I analysed the limitations of the victim model as regards WUR and located
my findings within the wider discussions in my analytical framework. I argued that the
Survivor vulnerable in the DV framework because of loss of Izzat and /or their civil
death. However contradictorily the research in Mumbai revealed that with the aid of the
woman-friendly strategy of the Survivor Model they exercised more agency because they
have ‘nothing to lose’.
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2. The Evolving DV Law
The DVA as a civil law dealing with domestic violence is still evolving
(Bhandyopadadhyay, 2008; Uma, 2010; Gosh, 2011). The transition from criminal to
civil is not without hiccups (Lodhia, 2009; Rajesh, 2010). Even as the civil law is being
used by survivors, the course of justice is being directed towards civil law for victims.
Section 498A and 304B and the provisions for breach of trust continue to be availed of
(Rayaprol, 2010). As envisaged by the drafters the DVA acts as a satellite legislation that
does not take away or take the place of any other law (Jaising, 2006; Basu, 2008). The
main remedy availed of under the DVA is maintenance (LC, 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010).
The DVA has its critics especially on the side of implementation with authors arguing
that the NGO have not fully embraced the function of being service providers (Choudhry,
2007; Rajesh, 2010; Suneetha, 2010). Apart from in Delhi, the appointment of protection
officers has been criticised for its vagaries (Uma, 2010; Ghosh, 2011). However in spite
of these short comings the DVA continues to be of great aid to victims and survivors of
DV (Dube, 2010; Ghosh, 2011).
WUR have used the DVA as was imagined by the drafters when they crafted the
definitions of domestic violence victim and domestic relationship. For the WUR, the
DVA is more inclusive of them even as the definition of wife is being made more
inclusive for the purposes of section 498A and maintenance (Rajesh, 2010; Sen; 2010;
265
Uma, 2010). The courts have tried to broaden the scope of these terms in order to avoid
the mischief of men flouting responsibility by using the excuse of an invalid marriage
under the law as discussed in chapter three. The different ways in which the DVA has
been availed of by the victims and the survivors in the different parts of the country
continue to vary (Jaising, 2007; Suneetha, 2010). The monitoring and evaluation reports
and conferences continue to identify best practices and minimise harmful and ineffective
ones. An example of this is the opening of special cell in the states of Haryana and
Punjab after its success story in Maharashtra (Anand, 2009).
3. WUR as Agentive Legal Subjects
As seen in chapters 4, 5 and 6 the WUR as a category is not homogenous. There are
different kinds of unconventional relationships that include women who have been
cheated into false marriages and women who decided to live with persons of their own
choices. Two different frameworks within which WUR encounter the DV law have been
explained in the victim model and the survivor model. As seen in chapter four the victim
model is relatively more formal and rigid framework of accessing the law. The unequal
power relationships between the victims and the authorities are more pronounced. Once
the victim steps out to the public the formal law is set in motion by the filing of the DIR.
The victims have the access to this law in the public where the parameters have already
been drawn out for them. The agency of the victims is limited and the middle women act
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as surrogate agents for them to access the law. This surrogacy entails a limited subject
position for the victims as women who have less discernment and a weakened ability to
think for themselves and to understand what is good for them. This weakened subject
position presupposes a weak helpless abused woman who lacks the powers of reason and
the ability to discern (Moore, 1994; Das, 1999). Thus their legal agency is fostered by the
middle women upon whom now lies the responsibility of accessing the law on the
behalves of the victims. The formality of procedure also means that the definitions of the
victim’s experiences with violence have been predetermined for them. The victims have
to ‘stick to their stories’ and show consistency in stating the facts about what happened to
them (Durfee, 2009; Fernandez, 2010). The parameters of domestic violence have been
predetermined for them. It is to the discretion of the middle women to decide which cases
make it to the courts. Whilst some officers use the measure of urgency based on the
extent of violence and the state of the victim, some others are served on a ‘first come first
served’ basis. The victim has to appear more victimised and yet has to be consistent
enough with the facts in order to acquire the right subject position (Randall, 2004). The
judgment of the worthiness of this subject position is left to be determined by the middle
women.
In the survivor model WUR are, simply stated, survivors. When they approach the
Special Cells they acquire legal agency on their behalves and on the behalves of other
women and their female children. The special cells act as a safety space which is violence
free, agency endowing and enabling in nature for the survivors to decide on which path
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they would like to take for recourse to justice. The questions here are ‘what do you
want?’ and ‘how would you want to do it?’ instead of the mere statement ‘this is how you
should do it’. This endowment of agency is a powerful empowering factor for the
survivors to realise their rights and as importantly to have the realisation of the sense of
entitlement to such rights (Stubbs, 2002). The definitions of violence vary with the
realisation that experiences of violence differ from woman to woman and as citizens they
are entitled to define violence as they see and experience it. The fact they carry forward
such agency is evident from the interviews when the women were talking about
educating their girl children in order to avoid what has happened to the survivors to
repeat in the case of their children. A chain of agency continues as the availability of the
recourse to justice through the special cells is made known to other women who are
colleagues, neighbours, and friends and in some cases even strangers to the survivors.
Thus legal agency is acquired, transformed and the chain of the agency is set in motion.
Subject position is more favourable to the subjects of the law.
An important feature of the survivor model is the enabling of survivors to define violence
instead of having to adhere to pre-prepared versions of the descriptions of sexual,
emotional, mental and physical violence. Such contributions by the survivors have fed
back into the system. However inclusive a domestic incident questionnaire may appear,
the right to describe and complain about what violence has happened to them is
diminished to the extent of the formalism demanded by the victim model.
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WUR are not merely in unconventional relationships but they are also unconventionally
asserting their rights to access the law in the survivor model. The keen sense of the
entitlement to rights as female citizens has been enabled by the framework represented by
the survivor model. Such a framework supports the feminist ethos of women’s
empowerment (Mohanty, 1991; Kabeer, 1999). The treatment as equal citizens and
subjects of the law benefits greatly to build the survivor’s confidence in themselves and
in the legal system.
4. The Judicial Constructions of WUR
Whilst some of the judgments are progressive and empowering for women’s rights,
many other decisions fall short of the requirements of DV law that are meant to protect
women in distress. Notions of the ideal female legal subject and the ideal Indian wife as
aspects of the various constructions of Indian womanhood in its ideal forms have often
crept into their decisions. Often in the weighing of the scales between preserving the
sanctity of family life and its unquestionable male autonomy in the private on one side,
and the rights of the victims/survivors of DV, the balance tilts heavily towards the
preservation of the family. These notions of the pure and impure and the increased value
and rights of a wife as opposed to the ‘mistress’ have been constructed and maintained in
the social, political and legal dominant discourses throughout the nationalist movement
and even into post colonial India (Sangri, 1990; Dasgupta, 1995). The national identity is
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often linked to the pure nurturing Indian womanhood ideal (Roy, 1941; Thomas, 1989;
Mankekar, 1999). Even after the victims/survivors have managed to access the system for
legal redressal, these ideals of womanhood guide some judges and justice is thus
miscarried. Gender sensitisation programmes for the judges have been conducted in order
to improve the judicial outlook against gender bias (Stewart, 2001). Even as the laws to
protect against domestic violence have improved and have tried to be rights endowing in
nature, if its implementation is marred by unfair judicial decisions, the entire framework
will lack legitimacy.
5. Best Practices
The best aspect of the victim model is the monitoring and evaluation programme set in
motion by the LCWRI (Uma, 2010; Ghosh, 2011). This is an important way of nurturing
a young law and also in maintaining a tight rein on inefficient or prejudicial practices. At
the same time it helps in identifying best practices on a state to state basis. This has meant
that the law is dynamic and fresh with the yearly review of the legislation. The DVA has
many special features that makes it a good and efficient law (Bandhopadhyay, 2008, Sen,
2010, Ghosh, 2011). One of these is the constant check that the drafters keep upon the
framework in the victim model. In the course of time the adolescence of the DVA may
give way to a more mature and dependable legislation. In the meantime the strict
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adherence to formality of procedure has its advantages and disadvantages as seen in
chapter six.
Contrasting this with the survivor model the latter looks more favourable to the survivor.
Perhaps the hidden quality of this framework is the possibility of survivor empowerment
(Sokoloff, 2005). The framework is more conducive to the sense of worth of the citizen
in the legal subject position. It appears in comparison, more survivor-centred the entry
options available to the survivors in the form of special cells prepares the survivors for
the possible legal battle or even if the survivors decide not to proceed legally, they are
still provided with a space to think, discuss, understand and decide. Such a feminist
framework ensures the survivor-centeredness of the implementation of the DV law
(Margulies, 1995).
Further research into survivor contribution to the building of the law would be useful to
understand the extent of empowerment possible within this framework. Research also in
the context of the limited agency and the surrogacy of agency by the middle women in
the victim model can aid in understanding why the drafters adhere to this model. Whilst
both the models have their advantages and disadvantages, the WUR fare better in the
survivor model. The WUR comfortably take on the legal agency and acquire a subject
position in the law which may not be ideal but is of equal relevance in the law. Thus even
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when they are faced with barriers of the constructions of the ideal, they make the best of
the ‘real’ subject position.
The women’s movement and the civil society continue in shaping the course of VAW
and specifically DV. With the advent of the DVA the focus has shifted slightly from
dowry related issues to domestic violence (Vyas, 2006). The civil society continues to
implement and monitor the law specifically with regard to the civil society safety space.
Although service providers and medical facilities have not yet been completely
designated the civil society functions almost in a parallel state of being protecting victims
and nurturing survivors. This role played by the civil society has improved the
implementation of the DVA.
Even as the DVA gains momentum as a civil law dealing with DV, other provisions of
the criminal procedure code and the Indian penal code dealing with DV continue to be
used. The DVA thus functions as a sounding board from where the victims/survivors can
decide on what remedies to pursue. The DVA fits in within the transitional phase from
the criminal law to the civil law (Jaising, 2007; Basu, 2008; Kadam, 2011). The
advantage of having a civil law protecting against domestic violence is that it would be
easier for women to make a civil complaint as opposed to a criminal one as it would be
less stigmatic in society In the case of WUR the DVA continues to be the only piece of
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legislation that expressly includes them in the definitions of domestic violence and
domestic relationship (Sen, 2010; Uma, 2010).
6. Conclusion
The survivor model as previously discussed is powerfully enabling of legal agency for
the survivors. This is in contrast to the surrogacy of agency in the victim model. The
friendly feminist environment helps the survivors in different ways that include
confidence building and sharing of their experiences with violence. This is less
intimidating than the formality of a protection officer’s office and the formal procedure
associated with the filing of DIR in the victim model. An ideal legal framework for DV
would include these best practices along with a system for monitoring and evaluation
(Jaising, 2006; Basu, 2008). The framework would not give importance to the marital
relationship between the victim/survivor and the abuser. A feminist framework would
concentrate on the welfare of the women as opposed to protecting the family and
expecting women to compromise on their welfare (Lewis, Dobash & Dobash, 2001).
Such a framework would also provide a constant support to the survivor and follow up on
the well-being. Within this system the WUR would not be expected to adhere to the
notion of an ideal legal subject. The WUR of Bombay succeeded in overcoming the
expectation of the ideal legal subject. The subject position has been shifted in their
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favour. By their strengths and definitions of violence and their determination to access
justice and what is rightfully theirs, they have stretched the notions of the ideal subject to
include them. The WUR have come a long way in history. From being the impure woman
who was an outcaste in the legal, political and the nationalist discourses, the WUR have
acquired for themselves the right to be perceived as agentive legal subjects. Different
DV models are differently enabling for WUR. As survivors they become agents in their
own empowerment and for the sake of other similarly placed women. To this extent, the
DVA has been progressive for being morally silent on the definition of who can access
the remedies (Mahajan, 2011). The safety space and the violence free zone envisaged by
the drafters have coincided in the case of the survivor model.
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Appendix B
Section 1 (Chapter 1) PRELIMINARY
THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT,
2005NO. 43 OF 2005[13th September, 2005.]
An Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the
Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and for
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.BE it enacted by Parliament in the Fifty-
sixth Year of the Republic of India as follows:-
1. Short title, extent and commencement.-(1) This Act may be called the Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.(3) It shall
come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, appoint.
2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) "aggrieved person" means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship
with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic
violence by the respondent;
(b) "child" means any person below the age of eighteen years and includes any adopted,
step or foster child;
(c) "compensation order" means an order granted in terms of section 22;
(d) "custody order" means an order granted in terms of section 21;
(e) "domestic incident report" means a report made in the prescribed form on receipt
of a complaint of domestic violence from an aggrieved person;
(f) "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at
any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by
consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or
are family members living together as a joint family;
(g) "domestic violence" has the same meaning as assigned to it in section 3;
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(h) "dowry" shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961);
(i) "Magistrate" means the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, or as the case may be, the
Metropolitan Magistrate, exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) in the area where the aggrieved person resides temporarily
or otherwise or the respondent resides or the domestic violence is alleged to have taken
place;
(j) "medical facility" means such facility as may be notified by the State
Government to be a medical facility for the purposes of this Act;
(k) "monetary relief" means the compensation which the Magistrate may order the
respondent to pay to the aggrieved person, at any stage during the hearing of an
application seeking any relief under this Act, to meet the expenses incurred and the
losses suffered by the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence;
l) "notification" means a notification published in the Official Gazette and the
expression "notified" shall be construed accordingly;(m) "prescribed" means prescribed
by rules made under this Act;
(n) "Protection Officer" means an officer appointed by the State Government under
sub-section (1) of section 8;
(o) "protection order" means an order made in terms of section 18;
(p) "residence order" means an order granted in terms of sub-section (1) of section 19;
(q) "respondent" means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic
relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has
sought any relief under this Act:Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a
relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of
the husband or the male partner;
(r) "service provider" means an entity registered under sub-section (1) of section 10;
(s) "shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage
has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes
such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the
respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved
person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and
includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a
member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title
or interest in the shared household;
(t) "shelter home" means any shelter home as may be notified by the State Government
to be a shelter home for the purposes of this Act.
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3. Definition of domestic violence.-
For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the
respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it -
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether
mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing
physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or
(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce
her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or
other property or valuable security; or
(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any
conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or(d) otherwise injures or causes harm,
whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.
Explanation I.-For the purposes of this section,-
(i) "physical abuse" means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause
bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development
of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force;
(ii) "sexual abuse" includes any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses,
humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of woman;
(iii) "verbal and emotional abuse" includes-
(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule specially
with regard to not having a child or a male child; and
(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved person is
interested.
(iv) "economic abuse" includes-
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved
person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or
otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited
to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property,
jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared
household and maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable,
valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved
person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may
be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other
property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and
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(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the
aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship
including access to the shared household.
Explanation
II.-For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct
of the respondent constitutes "domestic violence" under this section, the overall facts
and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration.
4. Information to Protection Officer and exclusion of liability of informant.-
(1) Any person who has reason to believe that an act of domestic violence has been, or is
being, or is likely to be committed, may give information about it to the concerned Protection
Officer.
(2) No liability, civil or criminal, shall be incurred by any person for giving in good
faith of information for the purpose of sub-section (1).
5. Duties of police officers, service providers and Magistrate.-A police officer, Protection
Officer, service provider or Magistrate who has received a complaint of domestic violence or
is otherwise present at the place of an incident of domestic violence or when the incident of
domestic violence is reported to him, shall inform the aggrieved person-(a) of her right to
make an application for obtaining a relief by way of a protection order, an order for monetary
relief, a custody order, a residence order, a compensation order or more than one such order
under this Act;(b) of the availability of services of service providers;(c) of the availability of
services of the Protection Officers;(d) of her right to free legal services under the Legal
Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987);(e) of her right to file a complaint under section
498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), wherever relevant: Provided that nothing in this
Act shall be construed in any manner as to relieve a police officer from his duty to proceed in
accordance with law upon receipt of information as to the commission of a cognizable
offence.
6. Duties of shelter homes.-If an aggrieved person or on her behalf a Protection Officer or a
service provider requests the person in charge of a shelter home to provide shelter to her,
such person in charge of the shelter home shall provide shelter to the aggrieved person in the
shelter home.
7. Duties of medical facilities.-If an aggrieved person or, on her behalf a Protection Officer
or a service provider requests the person in charge of a medical facility to provide any
medical aid to her, such person in charge of the medical facility shall provide medical aid to
the aggrieved person in the medical facility.
8. Appointment of Protection Officers.-
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(1) The State Government shall, by notification, appoint such number of Protection Officers in
each district as it may consider necessary and shall also notify the area or areas within which a
Protection Officer shall exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred on him by or
under this Act.
(2) The Protection Officers shall as far as possible be women and shall possess such
qualifications and experience as may be prescribed.
(3) The terms and conditions of service of the Protection Officer and the other officers
subordinate to him shall be such as may be prescribed.
9. Duties and functions of
Protection Officers.- (1) It shall be
the duty of the Protection Officer-
(a) to assist the Magistrate in the discharge of his functions under this Act;
(b) to make a domestic incident report to the Magistrate, in such form and in such manner as
may be prescribed, upon receipt of a complaint of domestic violence and forward copies
thereof to the police officer in charge of the police station within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction domestic violence is alleged to have been committed and to the service providers
in that area;
(c) to make an application in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed to the
Magistrate, if the aggrieved person so desires, claiming relief for issuance of a protection
order;
(d) to ensure that the aggrieved person is provided legal aid under the Legal Services
Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987) and make available free of cost the prescribed form in
which a complaint is to be made;
(e) to maintain a list of all service providers providing legal aid or counselling, shelter
homes and medical facilities in a local area within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate;
(f) to make available a safe shelter home, if the aggrieved person so requires and forward a
copy of his report of having lodged the aggrieved person in a shelter home to the police
station and the Magistrate having jurisdiction in the area where the shelter home is
situated;
(g) to get the aggrieved person medically examined, if she has sustained bodily injuries and
forward a copy of the medical report to the police station and the Magistrate having
jurisdiction in the area where the domestic violence is alleged to have been taken place;
(h) to ensure that the order for monetary relief under section 20 is complied with and
executed, in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974);(i) to perform such other duties as may be prescribed.
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2) The Protection Officer shall be under the control and supervision of the Magistrate,
and shall perform the duties imposed on him by the Magistrate and the Government by,
or under, this Act..
10. Service providers.-
(1) Subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, any voluntary association registered
under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860) or a company registered under the
Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or any other law for the time being in force with the
objective of protecting the rights and interests of women by any lawful means including
providing of legal aid, medical, financial or other assistance shall register itself with the State
Government as a service provider for the purposes of this Act.
(2) A service provider registered under sub-section (1) shall have the power to
(a) record the domestic incident report in the prescribed form if the aggrieved person so
desires and forward a copy thereof to the Magistrate and the Protection Officer having
jurisdiction in the area where the domestic violence took place;
(b) get the aggrieved person medically examined and forward a copy of the medical report to
the Protection Officer and the police station within the local limits of which the domestic
violence took place;
(c) ensure that the aggrieved person is provided shelter in a shelter home, if she so requires
and forward a report of the lodging of the aggrieved person in the shelter home to the
police station within the local limits of which the domestic violence took place.
(3) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any service provider or any
member of the service provider who is, or who is deemed to be, acting or purporting to act
under this Act, for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in the exercise
of powers or discharge of functions under this Act towards the prevention of the commission
of domestic violence.
11. Duties of Government.-The Central Government and every State Government, shall
take all measures to ensure that-
(a) the provisions of this Act are given wide publicity through public media including the
television, radio and the print media at regular intervals;
(b) the Central Government and State Government officers including the police officers
and the members of the judicial services are given periodic sensitization and awareness
training on the issues addressed by this Act;
(c) effective co-ordination between the services provided by concerned Ministries and
Departments dealing with law, home affairs including law and order, health and human
resources to address issues of domestic violence is established and periodical review of
the same is conducted;
(d) protocols for the various Ministries concerned with the delivery of services to
women under this Act including the courts are prepared and put in place.
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12. Application to Magistrate.-
(1) An aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the
aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more
reliefs under this Act:
Provided that before passing any order on such application, the Magistrate shall take into
consideration any domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or
the service provider.
(2) he relief sought for under sub-section (1) may include a relief for issuance of an order
for payment of compensation or damages without prejudice to the right of such person to
institute a suit for compensation or damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic
violence committed by the respondent:Provided that where a decree for any amount as
compensation or damages has been passed by any court in favour of the aggrieved person,
the amount, if any, paid or payable in pursuance of the order made by the Magistrate under
this Act shall be set off against the amount payable under such decree and the decree shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any
other law for the time being in force, be executable for the balance amount, if any, left after
such set off.
(3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and contain such
particulars as may be prescribed or as nearly as possible thereto.
(4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which shall not ordinarily be
beyond three days from the date of receipt of the application by the court.
(5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub-
section (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing.
13. Service of notice.-
(1) A notice of the date of hearing fixed under section 12 shall be given by the Magistrate to
the Protection Officer, who shall get it served by such means as may be prescribed on the
respondent, and on any other person, as directed by the Magistrate within a maximum period
of two days or such further reasonable time as may be allowed by the Magistrate from the
date of its receipt.
(2) A declaration of service of notice made by the Protection Officer in such form as may
be prescribed shall be the proof that such notice was served upon the respondent and on any
other person as directed by the Magistrate unless the contrary is proved.
14. Counselling.-
(1) The Magistrate may, at any stage of the proceedings under this Act, direct the respondent
or the aggrieved person, either singly or jointly, to undergo counselling with any member of a
service provider who possess such qualifications and experience in counselling as may be
prescribed.(2) Where the Magistrate has issued any direction under sub-section (1), he shall
fix the next date of hearing of the case within a period not exceeding two months.
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15. Assistance of welfare expert.-In any proceeding under this Act, the Magistrate may
secure the services of such person, preferably a woman, whether related to the aggrieved
person or not, including a person engaged in promoting family welfare as he thinks fit,
for the purpose of assisting him in discharging his functions.
16. Proceedings to be held in camera.-If the Magistrate considers that the circumstances
of the case so warrant, and if either party to the proceedings so desires, he may conduct
the proceedings under this Act in camera.
17. Right to reside in a shared household.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force,
every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared
household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same.
(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or
any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by
law.
18. Protection orders.-The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved person and the
respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that
domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order in
favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from-
(a) committing any act of domestic violence;
(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic violence;
(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or, if the person
aggrieved is a child, its school or any other place frequented by the aggrieved person;
(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with the aggrieved person,
including personal, oral or written or electronic or telephonic contact;
(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or held or enjoyed
by both the parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by the
respondent, including her stridhan or any other property held either jointly by the parties or
separately by them without the leave of the Magistrate;
(f) causing violence to the dependants, other relatives or any person who give the
aggrieved person assistance from domestic violence;
(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection order.
19. Residence orders.-
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(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the
Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a
residence order -
(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the
possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the
respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household;
(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household;
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the
shared household in which the aggrieved person resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off the shared household or
encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except
with the leave of the Magistrate; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the
aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the
circumstances so require: Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any
person who is a woman.
(2) The Magistrate may impose any additional conditions or pass any other direction
which he may deem reasonably necessary to protect or to provide for the safety of the
aggrieved person or any child of such aggrieved person.
(3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to execute a bond, with or
without sureties, for preventing the commission of domestic violence.
(4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be an order under Chapter
VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and shall be dealt with
accordingly.
(5) While passing an order under sub-section (1), sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), the
court may also pass an order directing the officer in charge of the nearest police station to
give protection to the aggrieved person or to assist her or the person making an
application on her behalf in the implementation of the order.
(6) While making an order under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may impose on the
respondent obligations relating to the discharge of rent and other payments, having
regard to the financial needs and resources of the parties.
(7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in-charge of the police station in whose
jurisdiction the Magistrate has been approached to assist in the implementation of the
protection order.(8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to return to the possession
of the aggrieved person her stridhan or any other property or valuable security to which
she is entitled to.
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20. Monetary reliefs.-
(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the
Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses
incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved
person as a result of the domestic violence and such relief may include, but not limited
to,-
(a) the loss of earnings;
(b) the medical expenses;
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of any property from
the control of the aggrieved person; and
(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an
order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force.
(2) The monetary relief granted under this section shall be adequate, fair and
reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is
accustomed.
(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an appropriate lump sum payment or
monthly payments of maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the case may
require.(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for monetary relief made under sub-
section (1) to the parties to the application and to the in charge of the police station within the
local limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent resides.
(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted to the aggrieved person
within the period specified in the order under sub-section (1).
(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make payment in terms of the order
under subsection (1), the Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the respondent, to
directly pay to the aggrieved person or to deposit with the court a portion of the wages or
salaries or debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which amount may be
adjusted towards the monetary relief payable by the respondent.
21. Custody orders.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being
in force, the Magistrate may, at any stage of hearing of the application for protection order or for
any other relief under this Act grant temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved
person or the person making an application on her behalf and specify, if necessary, the
arrangements for visit of such child or children by the respondent: Provided that if the Magistrate
is of the opinion that any visit of the respondent may be harmful to the interests of the child or
children, the Magistrate shall refuse to allow such visit.
22. Compensation orders.-In addition to other reliefs as may be granted under this Act, the
Magistrate may on an application being made by the aggrieved person, pass an order directing
the respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and
emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by that respondent.
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23. Power to grant interim and ex parte orders.-
(1) In any proceeding before him under this Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim
order as he deems just and proper.
(2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the
respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a
likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex
parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved
person under section 18, section 19, section 20, section 21 or, as the case may be, section 22
against the respondent.
24. Court to give copies of order free of cost.
The Magistrate shall, in all cases where he has passed any order under this Act, order that a
copy of such order, shall be given free of cost, to the parties to the application, the police officer
in-charge of the police station in the jurisdiction of which the Magistrate has been approached,
and any service provider located within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court and if any
service provider has registered a domestic incident report, to that service provider.
25. Duration and alteration of orders.-
(1) A protection order made under section 18 shall be in force till the aggrieved
person applies for discharge.
(2) If the Magistrate, on receipt of an application from the aggrieved person or the
respondent, is satisfied that there is a change in the circumstances requiring alteration,
modification or revocation of any order made under this Act, he may, for reasons to be
recorded in writing pass such order, as he may deem appropriate.
26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.-
(1) Any relief available under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal
proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved
person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the
commencement of this Act.
(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with
any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a
civil or criminal court.
(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other
than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of
such relief.
27. Jurisdiction.-(1) The court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the
Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which-
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is
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employed; or
(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(c) the cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent court to grant a protection
order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act.
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable throughout India.
28. Procedure.-(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all proceedings under sections 12,
18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under section 31 shall be governed by the provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall
prevent the court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application under
section 12 or under sub-section (2) of section 23.
29. Appeal.-There shall lie an appeal to the Court of Session within thirty days from the
date on which the order made by the Magistrate is served on the aggrieved person or the
respondent, as the case may be, whichever is later.
30. Protection Officers and members of service providers to be public servants.-The
Protection Officers and members of service providers, while acting or purporting to act in
pursuance of any of the provisions of this Act or any rules or orders made thereunder shall
be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860).
31. Penalty for breach of protection order by respondent.-
(1) A breach of protection order, or of an interim protection order, by the respondent shall
be an offence under this Act and shall be punishable with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to
twenty thousand rupees, or with both.
(2) The offence under sub-section (1) shall as far as practicable be tried by the Magistrate
who had passed the order, the breach of which has been alleged to have been caused by the
accused.(3) While framing charges under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may also frame
charges under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other provision of
that Code or the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), as the case may be, if the facts
disclose the commission of an offence under those provisions.
32. Cognizance and proof.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974), the offence under sub-section (1) of section 31 shall be cognizable and non-
bailable.
(2) Upon the sole testimony of the aggrieved person, the court may conclude that an
offence under subsection (1) of section 31 has been committed by the accused.
33. Penalty for not discharging duty by Protection Officer.-If any Protection Officer
fails or refuses to discharge his duties as directed by the Magistrate in the protection
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order without any sufficient cause, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to
twenty thousand rupees, or with both.
34. Cognizance of offence committed by Protection Officer.-No prosecution or other
legal proceeding shall lie against the Protection Officer unless a complaint is filed with
the previous sanction of the State Government or an officer authorised by it in this behalf.
35. Protection of action taken in good faith.-No suit, prosecution or other legal
proceeding shall lie against the Protection Officer for any damage caused or likely to be
caused by anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act or
any rule or order made thereunder..
36. Act not in derogation of any other law.-The provisions of this Act shall be in
addition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law, for the time being in
force.
37. Power of Central Government to make rules.-
(1) The Central Government may, by notification, make rules for carrying out the provisions
of this Act.
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such
rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:-
(a) the qualifications and experience which a Protection Officer shall possess under sub-
section (2) of section 8;
(b) the terms and conditions of service of the Protection Officers and the other officers
subordinate to him, under sub-section (3) of section 8;
(c) the form and manner in which a domestic incident report may be made under clause
(b) of sub-section (1) of section 9;
(d) the form and the manner in which an application for protection order may be made to
the Magistrate under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 9;
(e) the form in which a complaint is to be filed under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section
9;
(f) the other duties to be performed by the Protection Officer under clause (i) of sub-
section (1) of section 9;
(g) the rules regulating registration of service providers under sub-section (1) of section 10;
(h) the form in which an application under sub-section (1) of section 12 seeking reliefs under
this Act may be made and the particulars which such application shall contain under sub-
section (3) of that section;
(i) the means of serving notices under sub-section (1) of section 13;
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(j) the form of declaration of service of notice to be made by the Protection Officer under
sub-section (2) of section 13;
(k) the qualifications and experience in counseling which a member of the service
provider shall possess under sub-section (1) of section 14;
(l) the form in which an affidavit may be filed by the aggrieved person under sub-section (2)
of section 23;
(m) any other matter which has to be, or may be, prescribed.
(3) Every rule made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before
each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be
comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the
session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses
agree in making any modification in the rule or both Houses agree that the rule should not be
made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the
case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice
to the validity of anything previously done under that rule.
